Primary Holding
A local government cannot initiate expropriation proceedings without a valid ordinance authorizing it; a resolution is insufficient under Section 19 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code).
Background
The City of Mandaluyong sought to expropriate Alberto Suguitan’s property for expanding the Mandaluyong Medical Center using a 1994 resolution. Suguitan challenged this, arguing it violated procedural requirements under the Local Government Code.
History
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1994: Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 396 authorizing expropriation.
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1995: Expropriation complaint filed (RTC Pasig, SCA No. 875); Suguitan’s motion to dismiss denied.
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1995: Writ of possession granted after Mandaluyong deposited 15% of the property’s value.
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1998: RTC issued an Order of Condemnation.
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2000: Supreme Court reversed the RTC’s decision.
Facts
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1.
The City of Mandaluyong used Resolution No. 396 (1994) to authorize expropriation of Suguitan’s property under TCT No. 56264.
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2.
The city failed to negotiate a sale with Suguitan before filing the expropriation case.
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3.
The RTC allowed immediate possession upon deposit of 15% of the property’s value.
Arguments of the Petitioners
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1.
Expropriation required an ordinance, not a resolution, under Section 19 of RA 7160.
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2.
No public necessity justified the taking.
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3.
The city lacked a budget to pay just compensation.
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4.
Alleged ulterior motive: Mayor Benjamin Abalos sought the property for personal use.
Arguments of the Respondents
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1.
Expropriation required an ordinance, not a resolution, under Section 19 of RA 7160.
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2.
No public necessity justified the taking.
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3.
The city lacked a budget to pay just compensation.
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4.
Alleged ulterior motive: Mayor Benjamin Abalos sought the property for personal use.
Issues
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1.
Does Section 19 of RA 7160 require an ordinance (not a resolution) to authorize eminent domain?
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2.
Was the expropriation validly initiated via a resolution?
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3.
Was there a genuine public necessity for the taking?
Ruling
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1.
The Supreme Court reversed the RTC’s decision.
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2.
Eminent domain by LGUs requires an ordinance under RA 7160. Resolutions lack permanence and generality.
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3.
The IRR’s provision allowing resolutions conflicts with the law and is invalid.
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4.
Mandaluyong may re-initiate expropriation with a proper ordinance.
Doctrines
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1.
Strict Construction of Eminent Domain: Powers must be narrowly interpreted to protect property rights.
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2.
Legislative Nature of Eminent Domain: While delegated to LGUs, compliance with statutory requirements (e.g., ordinances) is mandatory.
Key Excerpts
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1.
“The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercises of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny.”
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2.
“[An] ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body.”
Precedents Cited
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1.
“The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercises of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny.”
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2.
“[An] ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body.”
Statutory and Constitutional Provisions
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1.
1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 9: Private property shall not be taken without just compensation.
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2.
RA 7160 (Local Government Code), Sec. 19: Requires LGUs to enact an ordinance to exercise eminent domain.
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3.
Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Governs expropriation proceedings.