Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court acknowledges this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former address is ineffectual; however, proof of ineffectual service at the former address is not necessarily proof of the affirmative allegation of when service was made at the updated address. The burden of proving the specific date of service at the new address to establish timeliness of appeal rests on the party making the allegation.

The Dolor Spouses purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land from Manuel Cammayo in 1984, paying the full consideration of P30,000.00. In 1989, they authorized the Manzanilla family to occupy the lot and construct a house. In October 1999, petitioner Gatmaytan, claiming to be the registered owner of the lot, filed an ejectment suit against the Manzanilla family. In response, the Dolor Spouses filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Property and Damages against Gatmaytan and Cammayo before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, alleging that Gatmaytan had the larger parcel titled in her name but refused to deliver the segregated portion to them.

• On February 17, 1984, the Dolor Spouses executed a Deed of Sale with Manuel Cammayo for a 300 square meter parcel of land in Novaliches, Quezon City, for P30,000.00, with P15,000.00 paid upon execution and the balance upon delivery of the registrable deed and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
• Per a "Kasunduan" and receipt dated May 18, 1984, the Dolor Spouses paid the entire consideration even before the TCT was delivered.
• On May 16, 1986, a second Deed of Sale was executed by Cammayo in favor of Francisco Dolor, stating the full consideration of P30,000.00 without conditions.
• On March 27, 1989, the Dolor Spouses authorized Cecilio T. Manzanilla and his family to occupy the lot and construct a house.
• In October 1999, Gatmaytan filed an ejectment suit against Encarnacion Vda. De Manzanilla and her family, claiming to be the registered owner.
• The Dolor Spouses then filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Property and Damages against Gatmaytan and Cammayo.
• Gatmaytan claimed the Deed of Sale was never registered and that the lot was part of a larger parcel conveyed earlier to her by Cammayo; she also raised prescription as a defense.
• Cammayo acknowledged the sale to the Dolor Spouses but claimed he had an agreement with Gatmaytan for her to defray expenses for taxes and segregation of title, with the condition that she would deliver the segregated portion to the Dolor Spouses.
• On March 27, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering Gatmaytan to convey the lot to the Dolor Spouses.
• On June 8, 2004, Gatmaytan's counsel, Atty. Raymond Palad, filed a Notice of Change of Address with the RTC, changing the address from No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City to Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City.
• On the same date, the RTC issued an Order noting the change and directing that service of papers, processes, and pleadings be made at the updated address.
• The copy of the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision attached to the petition shows typewritten text indicating furnishing a copy to Atty. Palad at No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City, and handwritten text stating "Mailed also to Atty. Raymond Palad at: Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Ave., Quezon City."
• A registry return receipt attached to the back portion of the last page of the RTC Decision indicated that a copy was received by Maricel Luis, for and on behalf of Atty. Palad, on April 14, 2006.
• Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration on June 16, 2006.
• The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling that the Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the 15-day period from April 14, 2006.

• Gatmaytan insists that the RTC Decision has not attained finality because the April 14, 2006 service was made to her counsel's former address at No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City, despite a Notice of Change of Address filed on June 8, 2004 and acknowledged by the RTC in an Order of the same date directing service to the new address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City.
• She contends that service upon the former address was ineffectual, and that service upon the updated address was made only on June 1, 2006, making the June 16, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration timely filed within the 15-day period.
• She claims that the RTC realized its error regarding the date of service and resolved her Motion for Reconsideration on the merits, giving due course to her Notice of Appeal.

• The respondents (implied through the Court of Appeals' ruling) argued that the Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time, having been filed on June 16, 2006, more than 15 days after April 14, 2006, when counsel's authorized representative received a copy of the decision at the former address.
• They emphasized that previous orders of the RTC were likewise received by Maricel Luis, and that her authority to receive for Atty. Palad had never been questioned.
• They maintained that the RTC Decision had already become final and executory, precluding the filing of an appeal.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal on the ground that the RTC Decision had already attained finality due to the late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration.
• Substantive Issues: Whether service of the RTC Decision at counsel's former address was ineffectual due to the prior notice of change of address, and whether the petitioner proved the date when service was made at the updated address to establish the timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration.

• Procedural: The Supreme Court held that while service at the former address was indeed ineffectual because the RTC had acknowledged the change of address in its June 8, 2004 Order and bound itself to serve papers at the updated address, the petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proving the specific date when service was made at the updated address. The Court found that the petitioner merely alleged that service was made on June 1, 2006, but failed to present acceptable proof such as certifications from the Post Office record book, the actual page of the postal delivery book, registry receipt, or return card as required in Cortes v. Valdellon. The Court noted that the petitioner even failed to attach a copy of the receipt she alluded to, or the RTC Resolution supposedly resolving her Motion on the merits. Having failed to prove the reckoning point for the 15-day period, the Court could not conclude that the Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed.
• Substantive: The Court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal. It ruled that proof of ineffectual service at a counsel's former address is not necessarily proof of when service was made at the updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when service was made is distinct from the burden of proving where service was made. A party who fails to discharge this burden is not entitled to the relief prayed for. Consequently, the RTC Decision dated March 27, 2006 attained finality, and its findings and ruling must stand.

• Finality of Judgments — Once a judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, and the court loses jurisdiction over the case. This is based on public policy that there must be an end to litigation.
• Service upon Counsel — Service upon the parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties themselves. When a party has appeared by counsel, service shall be made upon the counsel unless service upon the party is ordered by the court.
• Effect of Notice of Change of Address — When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court acknowledges this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former address is ineffectual. Service is deemed completed only when made at the updated address.
• Burden of Proof — A party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. A mere allegation is not evidence. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when service was made is distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where service was or was not made.
• Proof of Service by Registered Mail — Acceptable proofs of mailing and service include: (1) certifications from the official Post Office record book and/or delivery book; (2) the actual page of the postal delivery book showing the acknowledgment of receipt; (3) registry receipt; and (4) return card.

• "When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court acknowledges this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former address is ineffectual."
• "Proof, however, of ineffectual service at a counsel's former address is not necessarily proof of a party's claim of when service was made at the updated address."
• "The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when service was made is distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where service was or was not made."
• "A party who fails to discharge his or her burden of proof is not entitled to the relief prayed for."
• "A mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence."

• Delos Santos v. Elizalde — Cited for the principle that service upon the parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers.
• Cortes v. Valdellon — Cited for the enumeration of acceptable proofs of mailing and service by registered mail: certifications from the official Post Office record book, the actual page of the postal delivery book, registry receipt, and return card.
• BPI Family Savings Bank v. Pryce Gases — Cited for the principle that appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and one who wishes to file an appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules.
• Filipro, Inc. v. Permanent Savings & Loan Bank — Cited for the principle of finality of judgments and the policy that there must be an end to litigation.
• Industrial Timber Corp. v. Ababon — Cited for the principle that nothing is more settled in law than that a judgment can no longer be disturbed once it becomes final and executory.

• Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines filing and service, and provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.
• Rule 13, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail, and when a party summoned by publication has failed to appear, judgments against him shall be served by publication.
• Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines when personal service and service by registered mail are deemed completed.
• Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk.
• Rule 37, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides the grounds for and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration (within the period for taking an appeal).
• Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides the period for ordinary appeal (15 days from notice of judgment) and states that the period shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
• Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court — States the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.