A public employee reinstated pursuant to an executive clemency grounded on the employee's innocence is entitled to full back wages from the date of illegal dismissal to the date of reinstatement, as the clemency obliterates the adverse effects of the administrative decision and nullifies the dismissal.

Petitioner Vicente Garcia was a Supervising Lineman summarily dismissed from the Bureau of Telecommunications on April 1, 1975, for alleged dishonesty related to the loss of telegraph poles. A criminal case for qualified theft based on the same facts was filed against him. He was acquitted in the criminal case, with the trial court noting his innocence and commending his dedication. Despite the acquittal, his request for reinstatement was initially denied, leading him to seek executive clemency, which was eventually granted.

• Petitioner Vicente Garcia, a Supervising Lineman in Lucena City, was summarily dismissed on April 1, 1975, by the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications for dishonesty concerning lost telegraph poles.
• He did not appeal the administrative decision.
• A criminal case for qualified theft based on the same facts resulted in his acquittal on January 23, 1980, with the trial court finding him innocent and commending his actions in trying to protect government property.
• His request for reinstatement post-acquittal was denied, prompting him to seek executive clemency.
• On August 26, 1981, executive clemency was granted by the President, based on his innocence as found by the trial court and favorable recommendations from the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.
• Garcia was recalled to service on March 12, 1984.
• His claim for back salaries from April 1, 1975, to March 12, 1984, was denied by the Commission on Audit (COA) on July 23, 1985, on the grounds that the executive clemency was silent on back wages and he had not rendered service during that period.

• Petitioner argued that he is entitled to the payment of back wages after being reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
• Petitioner contended that the award of back wages is implicit in the grant of executive clemency, the ultimate objective of which is to accord full justice to him, especially since the clemency was based on his innocence.

• The COA argued that petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case did not necessarily free him from administrative liability.
• The COA contended that petitioner's unexplained failure to appeal the administrative decision was tantamount to a waiver of his right to back wages.
• The COA asserted that the executive clemency was granted for reinstatement only, as it was silent on the matter of back wages.
• The COA claimed that back wages are allowed only if the respondent is exonerated from the administrative charge or if the suspension/dismissal is declared illegal or unjustified by the court.
• The COA invoked the "no service, no pay" rule, stating that petitioner did not render any service during the period before his reinstatement.

• Whether the petitioner is entitled to the payment of back wages for the period from his dismissal to his reinstatement, following the grant of executive clemency based on his innocence.

• Yes, the petitioner is entitled to full back wages from April 1, 1975 (date of dismissal) to March 12, 1984 (date of reinstatement).
• The Court reasoned that the executive clemency granted to the petitioner was based on his innocence, as established by the trial court's acquittal which found he did not commit the offense.
• Such a pardon, grounded on innocence, completely obliterates the adverse effects of the administrative decision, exculpating the petitioner from the administrative charge and rendering his reinstatement automatic.
• The clemency effectively nullified the dismissal, making it unjust from the start, thus entitling the petitioner to reparation for the injury suffered, including back wages.
• The President's exercise of executive clemency, in this case, also involved the power of control over the executive department, setting aside the administrative decision of a subordinate office.
• The Court distinguished this case from those where pardon does not automatically entitle to back wages, emphasizing that here, innocence was the basis, not mere forgiveness of guilt.
• The Court found it fair and just to award full back wages without deduction or qualification, deviating from the general five-year limit due to the specific circumstances demonstrating the petitioner's innocence and the injustice of his dismissal.

• Executive Clemency (Pardon based on innocence) — The power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons. In this case, the executive clemency granted to petitioner was found to be based on his innocence of the charges for which he was administratively dismissed. The Court held that a pardon based on innocence affirms this innocence, relieves the party from all punitive consequences, and restores their clean name and character. It effectively obliterated the administrative decision and rendered the dismissal null and void, thereby entitling petitioner to automatic reinstatement and back wages.
• Presidential Power of Control — The power of the President as chief executive to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. The Court stated that in pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised this power of control, setting aside the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, thus nullifying the dismissal and relieving petitioner from administrative liability.
• Right to Back Wages for Unjust Dismissal — The principle that individuals illegally dismissed or acquitted of charges leading to their dismissal are entitled to back wages as a form of relief and reparation. The Court applied this by reasoning that since the executive clemency based on innocence nullified the petitioner's dismissal, making it unjust, he was entitled to back wages for the period he was out of service.
• Effect of Pardon on Civil Rights and Reinstatement — While a pardon generally frees an individual from penalties and restores civil rights, it does not automatically result in reinstatement or entitlement to back wages unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence. In this case, because the pardon was explicitly based on innocence, it led to automatic reinstatement and the right to back wages.

• "When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt."
• "The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service."
• "Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service."
• "Verily, law, equity and justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal."

• Monsanto v. Factoran — Cited to establish the general rule on the effects of a pardon: it forgives guilt but does not erase the fact of commission of the crime, and unless expressly grounded on innocence, it does not bring back lost reputation or automatically entitle to reinstatement and back wages. This case was distinguished because Garcia's pardon was based on innocence.
• Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture & Sports — Referenced to support the principle that automatic reinstatement following exoneration (in Sabello's case, acquittal that cleared him of charges) entitles the employee to back wages.
• Mondano v. Silvosa — Cited for the definition of the President's power of control over executive departments, which was exercised in setting aside the administrative dismissal.
• Ginzon v. Municipality of Murcia; Gementiza v. Court of Appeals; Balquidra v. CFI; Cristobal v. Melchor — Cited as examples of established jurisprudence fixing recovery of back wages to five years for illegally dismissed government employees. The Court deviated from this five-year rule in Garcia's case due to the specific circumstances of innocence.

• Art. XII-(D), Sec. 2, par. 2, of the 1973 Constitution (now Art. IX-[A], Sec. 7, of the 1987 Constitution) — Referenced by the Deputy Executive Secretary as the basis for the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review COA decisions on certiorari.
• Art. VII, Sec. 19, 1987 Constitution (similar provision in earlier Constitutions) — Implicitly referred to as the source of the President's power to grant executive clemency.
• Section 43 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) — Mentioned as the provision under which the Civil Service Commission was asked for comment regarding the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.