Dunlao vs. Court of Appeals
This case involves a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the conviction of petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that fencing is a malum prohibitum where intent to gain need not be proved, and that mere possession of stolen goods gives rise to a prima facie presumption of fencing under Section 5 of PD 1612, which the petitioner failed to rebut with sufficient and convincing evidence.
Primary Holding
In prosecutions for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612), intent to gain need not be proved as the crime is malum prohibitum; mere possession of stolen goods constitutes prima facie evidence of fencing, and the accused bears the burden of overcoming this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence.
Background
Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. was a licensed scrap iron dealer operating "Dunlao Enterprise" in Davao City. He was accused of purchasing and receiving stolen farrowing crates and GI pipes from Lourdes Farms, Inc., valued at P20,000.00, knowing them to be stolen. The items were discovered in his business premises by police operatives and employees of Lourdes Farms after the latter received information regarding the location of the stolen goods.
History
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An Information was filed on January 19, 1987 in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 9 (Criminal Case No. 14655) charging petitioner with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612.
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Petitioner was arraigned on March 13, 1987, where he pleaded NOT GUILTY, and trial subsequently ensued.
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On May 30, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to imprisonment of six years, eight months and one day as minimum to seven years and four months as maximum of prision mayor.
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Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which promulgated its decision on May 10, 1993 affirming the judgment of conviction.
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Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Facts
- Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. was a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City operating under the business name "Dunlao Enterprise."
- On October 25, 1986, at about 2:30 p.m., Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito Catog, employees of Lourdes Farms, Inc., together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas, went to petitioner's premises to verify information that stolen farrowing crates and G.I. pipes from Lourdes Farms were located there.
- Upon arrival, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the compound, with assorted lengths of G.I. pipes found inside a cabinet in the shop and another pile outside the shop but within the compound.
- After being informed by police that the pipes belonged to Lourdes Farms and had been stolen, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the items, which were then taken to the police station in a dump truck.
- Petitioner testified that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the G.I. pipes in front of his establishment in the afternoon, that he refused to buy them, and that the person requested to leave them temporarily, promising to return but never did.
- Petitioner claimed that around 5:30 to 6:00 p.m., as they were about to close, he had the pipes brought inside his compound for safekeeping.
- The stolen articles were found displayed on petitioner's shelves inside his compound, with some items already cut into short pieces and distributed in cabinets inside the building.
- Prosecution witness Carlito Catog, a purchaser for Lourdes Farms, testified that the recovered materials were worth P59,000.00 based on fabrication costs, while the Information alleged the value at P20,000.00.
- Petitioner claimed the pipes were worth only P200.00.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- The prosecution failed to prove that petitioner purchased the G.I. pipes and that he knew they were stolen items, which are essential elements of the crime charged.
- Petitioner acted in good faith and without criminal intent as he was merely a temporary custodian of the items, which were brought by well-dressed men in a jeep who failed to return.
- The items were placed in open public view inside his business establishment, indicating no intent to conceal.
- The value of the stolen items was only P200.00, not P20,000.00 as alleged in the Information.
Issues
- Procedural:
- N/A
- Substantive Issues:
- Whether the prosecution failed to prove the elements of fencing, specifically the purchase of stolen items and knowledge of their stolen nature.
- Whether the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612 was sufficiently rebutted by petitioner.
- Whether intent to gain is an element that must be proved in violations of the Anti-Fencing Law.
- Whether the trial court correctly determined the value of the stolen property.
Ruling
- Procedural:
- N/A
- Substantive:
- Intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by special laws such as the Anti-Fencing Law, as fencing is a malum prohibitum where the only inquiry is whether the law was violated, not the intent of the offender.
- Mere possession of stolen goods gives rise to a presumption of fencing under Section 5 of PD 1612, and the law does not require proof of purchase.
- Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of fencing by sufficient and convincing evidence; his testimony that he was merely keeping the items for strangers was incredible and contradicted by the fact that he displayed the items on shelves and failed to ascertain the identity of the depositors.
- The value of P20,000.00 as alleged in the Information is realistic and supported by the evidence, compared to petitioner's incredible claim of P200.00 given that the items filled almost a truckload.
Doctrines
- Mala in se vs. Mala prohibita — Distinguishes between acts wrong in themselves (mala in se) where intent governs, and acts wrong merely because prohibited by law (mala prohibita) where the only inquiry is whether the law was violated and intent is immaterial.
- Presumption of Fencing — Under Section 5 of PD 1612, mere possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery constitutes prima facie evidence of fencing, which the accused must overcome by sufficient and convincing evidence.
- Intent to Gain in Special Laws — In crimes punished by special statutes like the Anti-Fencing Law, intent to gain (animus furandi) need not be proved as it is the act alone, irrespective of motives, that constitutes the offense.
Key Excerpts
- "The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?"
- "When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial."
- "Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing."
- "x x x the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1612 x x x must be upheld in the light of petitioner's shallow demurrer premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence."
Precedents Cited
- Lim v. Court of Appeals (222 SCRA 286) — Controlling precedent establishing that intent to gain need not be proved in violations of the Anti-Fencing Law as it is a malum prohibitum crime, and affirming the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of PD 1612.
- Soriano v. People (88 Phil. 368) — Cited for the principle that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person.
- People v. Sia Teb Ban (54 Phil. 52) — Cited for the rule that the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act.
- U.S. v. Go Chico (14 Phil. 128) — Cited for the doctrine that dolo is not required in crimes punished by special statutes.
- U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng (30 Phil. 577) — Cited for the principle that in mala prohibita crimes, the act alone, irrespective of the motives, constitutes the offense.
Provisions
- Presidential Decree No. 1612, Section 2(a) — Defines fencing as the act of any person who, with intent to gain, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of articles known or should be known to have been derived from robbery or theft.
- Presidential Decree No. 1612, Section 5 — Establishes that mere possession of stolen goods is prima facie evidence of fencing.
- Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence — Provides that unlawful intent may be inferred from the commission of an unlawful act.