Drilon vs. Court of Appeals

A complaint for malicious prosecution must allege ultimate facts showing that the criminal prosecution was instituted without probable cause and with malice, not merely conclusions of law; furthermore, such a complaint must be filed only after the termination of the criminal case in the accused's favor, and the filing of a legally defective information by public prosecutors based on a doubtful question of law does not constitute malicious prosecution where there is probable cause and good faith.

Following the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d'etat, the Department of Justice, then headed by petitioner Franklin Drilon, referred a letter-complaint to a Special Composite Team of Prosecutors to investigate private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged participation in the rebellion. The case arose from the prosecutors' decision to file an information charging Enrile with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder, despite existing jurisprudence under People v. Hernandez prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with common crimes committed in furtherance thereof.

• After the December 1989 coup d'etat, the Department of Justice referred a letter-complaint from the National Bureau of Investigation to a Special Composite Team of Prosecutors (composed of petitioners Trampe, Abesamis, and Mananquil) to investigate Juan Ponce Enrile for alleged participation in the coup.
• The Team of Prosecutors issued a subpoena to Enrile and ordered him to submit his counter-affidavit. Instead, Enrile filed a Petition for Summary Dismissal and an urgent motion praying for at least five days' notice before the filing of any information against him.
• Enrile sent "cautionary letters" to judges in Quezon City, Manila, Makati, and Pasay, requesting notice of any information filed, and published notices in newspapers of general circulation.
• On February 27, 1990, the Team of Prosecutors filed before the RTC of Quezon City an Information charging Enrile with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. They also filed before the RTC of Makati an Information charging him with obstruction of justice under Presidential Decree No. 1829.
• Enrile was arrested and detained overnight at the NBI headquarters, then transferred to Camp Karingal. He discovered that the information was first filed on February 21, 1990, but was subsequently withdrawn for re-filing on February 27, 1990, without his knowledge.
• In Enrile v. Salazar, the Supreme Court granted Enrile provisional liberty and later ordered the modification of the Information to simple rebellion only, in consonance with the Hernandez doctrine.
• In Enrile v. Amin, the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a separate information for obstruction of justice violated the Hernandez doctrine and ordered the quashal of said information.
• On August 20, 1990, while the rebellion case was still pending, Enrile filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging bad faith in filing the information for rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder, and claiming violations of his constitutional rights to due process and bail.
• On February 12, 1993, or almost three years after the filing of the civil complaint, the RTC dismissed with finality the rebellion charges against Enrile.

• The complaint fails to state a cause of action because there is no allegation of any actionable wrong constituting a violation of any legal right of the private respondent.
• The filing of the information for rebellion with murder and frustrated murder was initiated in the honest belief that it could be sustained under the first part of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and petitioners acted in good faith, without malice, and within the scope of their authority.
• Public officials cannot be held personally liable by way of damages for any alleged injury suffered by the plaintiff when acting in good faith and within the scope of their official duties.
• The denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, making certiorari the proper remedy.

• A cause of action has been sufficiently pleaded, and the defenses of good faith and performance of official duties are best disposed of in a judicial hearing.
• The defense of good faith is irrelevant because the suit is brought under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, where the defense of good faith is allegedly immaterial.
• The preliminary investigation was railroaded, and petitioners ignored or summarily denied plaintiff's pleas for strict compliance with procedural rules.
• Petitioners knowingly and maliciously filed a legally non-existent offense (rebellion complexed with murder) despite being fully aware of the Hernandez doctrine, constituting "legal experimentation."
• Petitioners deliberately misled plaintiff and his lawyers by inducing them to believe the charge would be filed in Makati, while surreptitiously filing it in Quezon City, thereby preventing plaintiff from posting bail and witnessing the raffle.
• The complaint was not premature because the dismissal of the obstruction of justice case (under PD 1829) constituted a termination of prosecution in plaintiff's favor.

• Procedural:
  • Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
  • Whether the denial of a motion to dismiss is subject to review by certiorari.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the complaint for damages states a cause of action to hold petitioners liable for malicious prosecution.

• Procedural:
  • While the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss is not subject to review by certiorari because it is an interlocutory order, the rule admits of an exception where the denial is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
  • The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to dismiss the case, notwithstanding the obvious insufficiency of the complaint against petitioners, which would unjustly compel them to needlessly go through a protracted trial.
• Substantive:
  • The complaint fails to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
  • First, the complaint was filed long before Enrile's acquittal in the rebellion charge, rendering the action premature. A suit for malicious prosecution must be filed only after the termination of the criminal case in favor of the accused.
  • Second, there are no factual allegations in the complaint that can support a finding of malice and bad faith. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and related words without ultimate facts to support them are mere conclusions of law that are not deemed admitted in a motion to dismiss.
  • The decision to file the information, while legally defective under the Hernandez doctrine, was based on an honest conviction that the Hernandez case could be differentiated and that the first part of Article 48 of the RPC applied. A doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith.
  • Public officials enjoy the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties, which the plaintiff failed to overcome.
  • The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. Since petitioners had probable cause to believe that Enrile could be held for trial, they cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution.
  • There is no statutory right of a prospective accused to be notified beforehand of the filing of an information against him; thus, the allegations regarding lack of notice do not constitute an actionable wrong.

• Malicious Prosecution — Defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution in favor of the defendant. The elements are: (1) the defendant was the prosecutor or instigated the prosecution; (2) the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff's acquittal; (3) lack of probable cause; and (4) the prosecutor was actuated by malice or improper motives.
• Hypothetical Admission Rule — In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the motion hypothetically admits the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded in the complaint, but does not extend to conclusions of law, inferences, interpretations of law, or allegations subject to judicial notice.
• Presumption of Good Faith for Public Officials — Public officials are presumed to act in good faith and with regularity in the performance of official duties; a doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith, and any person who seeks to establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive.
• Probable Cause vs. Malice — The presence of probable cause in filing a criminal information signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice; a suit for malicious prosecution will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause.

• "A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another."
• "The admission does not extend to conclusion or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice."
• "The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury."
• "A doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law always accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties."
• "The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice."

• People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) — Established the doctrine that common crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion are absorbed by the crime of rebellion and cannot be complexed with it; cited as the controlling precedent that the petitioners were allegedly aware of but sought to differentiate.
• Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 218 (1990) — Granted provisional liberty to Enrile and ordered the modification of the information from complex crime to simple rebellion; cited for the ruling that the information, despite its defect, remained valid as it charged an offense defined by the RPC.
• Enrile v. Amin, 189 SCRA 573 (1990) — Ordered the quashal of the information for obstruction of justice as it violated the Hernandez doctrine; cited as the basis for the dismissal of the separate charge.
• Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 211 (1997) — Case with basically the same facts involving the same petitioners and Homobono Adaza; cited as controlling precedent for the definition of malicious prosecution and the requirement that it must be filed after acquittal.
• De Dios v. Bristol Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., 55 SCRA 349 (1974) — Explained that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits only material and relevant facts well pleaded, not conclusions of law or inferences.
• Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995) — Cited for the principle that public officials enjoy the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties.
• Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16 (1993) — Cited for the principle that the presence of probable cause signifies the absence of malice.
• Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 459 (1999) — Cited for enumerating the elements of malicious prosecution.

• Article 32 of the New Civil Code — Cited by respondent as the basis for the action where good faith is allegedly irrelevant; the Court analyzed the complaint as one for malicious prosecution under general human relations provisions.
• Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8) of the New Civil Code — Identified by the Court as the statutory bases for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution.
• Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code — Cited regarding the complexing of crimes; the petitioners claimed they filed the information under the first part of this article (complex crime proper) rather than the second part (necessary means).
• Presidential Decree No. 1829 — The obstruction of justice law under which a separate information was filed against Enrile.
• Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.