Domino vs. Commission on Elections

For purposes of constitutional qualifications for elective office, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," requiring not merely physical presence but a bona fide intention to abandon one's former domicile and establish a new permanent residence (animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi), and a decision in voter exclusion proceedings does not acquire the nature of res judicata so as to preclude the COMELEC from independently determining a candidate's compliance with residency requirements.

The case involves the interpretation of the one-year residence requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It addresses the interplay between voter exclusion proceedings and candidate disqualification cases, the distinction between the COMELEC's jurisdiction and that of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and the proper disposition when a disqualified candidate wins the election but has not been proclaimed.

• On March 25, 1998, petitioner Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Sarangani for the May 11, 1998 elections, declaring a residence of one year and two months in the constituency.
• On March 30, 1998, private respondents filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, alleging Domino was not a resident of Sarangani but remained a registered voter of Quezon City.
• Private respondents presented evidence showing Domino was registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City as of June 22, 1997, and had run for Congress in Quezon City's 3rd District in 1995.
• Domino claimed he established residence in Alabel, Sarangani in January 1997, presenting a lease contract dated January 15, 1997, and subsequently purchased property there on November 4, 1997.
• On January 19, 1998, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Quezon City, in exclusion proceedings initiated by Domino himself, excluded him from the Quezon City voters list, declared him a resident of Sarangani since December 1996, and ordered the transfer of his registration to Alabel.
• On May 6, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division disqualified Domino, computing his residency period from June 22, 1997 (his Quezon City registration) to May 11, 1998, finding it fell short of the constitutional requirement.
• On election day, May 11, 1998, COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 ordering that votes for Domino be counted but suspending proclamation if he won, due to the non-finality of the disqualification resolution.
• Domino won the election with the highest number of votes but was not proclaimed as winner.
• Lucille Chiongbian-Solon, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, intervened seeking to be proclaimed as the duly elected representative.

• The MTC decision declaring him a resident of Sarangani is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC under the principle of res judicata, precluding any contrary finding on his residency status.
• He had resided in Sarangani since January 1997, satisfying the one-year requirement by the May 11, 1998 elections through his lease contract, property acquisition, and actual physical presence.
• The COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the petition as the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has exclusive jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress.

• The MTC decision in exclusion proceedings does not constitute res judicata and is not binding on the COMELEC in disqualification proceedings because there is no identity of parties or causes of action.
• Domino failed to meet the one-year residence requirement as his domicile remained in Quezon City until at least June 22, 1997, evidenced by his voter registration and previous candidacy in that district.
• The COMELEC has jurisdiction over the disqualification petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and such jurisdiction continues even after the election if the candidate has not been proclaimed or taken oath.
• Lucille Chiongbian-Solon argued that she should be proclaimed as the candidate with the second highest number of votes, or alternatively, that Domino's votes should be considered stray votes due to his disqualification.

• Procedural:
  • Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court decision in voter exclusion proceedings constitutes res judicata and is binding upon the COMELEC in disqualification proceedings.
  • Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the disqualification petition, or whether jurisdiction lies with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether petitioner Juan Domino satisfied the one-year residence requirement for congressional candidates under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
  • Whether the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed winner when the winning candidate is disqualified.

• Procedural:
  • The MTC decision does not constitute res judicata because there is no identity of parties, subject matter, or cause of action between the exclusion proceeding (filed by Domino himself) and the disqualification proceeding (filed by private respondents). Furthermore, the MTC exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Domino a resident of Sarangani and ordering the transfer of his registration, as exclusion proceedings are limited to determining the right to remain in the voters list, not declaring residence in another municipality.
  • The COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. This jurisdiction continues even after the election if no final judgment of disqualification was rendered before the election, provided the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken oath. Since Domino was not proclaimed, the HRET's jurisdiction under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution has not yet attached.
• Substantive:
  • Domino failed to satisfy the one-year residence requirement. "Residence" for electoral purposes means "domicile," which requires not only physical presence but also a bona fide intention to abandon the former domicile and establish a new permanent residence (animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi). Domino's registration as a voter in Quezon City on June 22, 1997 created a strong presumption that his domicile remained there. Counting from June 22, 1997 to May 11, 1998 yields less than one year of residence in Sarangani. The lease contract and property acquisition in Sarangani, while indicative of intent, were insufficient to prove abandonment of his Quezon City domicile within the required timeframe.
  • The candidate receiving the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner when the winning candidate is disqualified. The people's choice expressed through the ballot is paramount, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred to the repudiated loser. The votes cast for Domino were not stray votes because the disqualification was not yet final on election day, and the voters cast their ballots in the sincere belief he was qualified.

• Residence as Domicile — For purposes of constitutional qualifications for suffrage and elective office, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends to return whenever absent.
• Animus Manendi and Animus Non Revertendi — To effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual removal or change of domicile; (2) bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence (animus non revertendi); and (3) definite acts corresponding with the purpose of establishing a new permanent residence (animus manendi). The purpose to remain must be for an indefinite period, and the residence must be actual.
• Res Judicata in Voter Exclusion Proceedings — A decision in voter exclusion or inclusion proceedings, even if final, does not constitute res judicata on matters other than the right to vote in the specific precinct, and does not preclude subsequent proceedings on the voter's political status or right to be registered in other elections. Such proceedings are summary in character and their factual findings are not conclusive upon the COMELEC in disqualification cases.
• Second Placer Rule — When the winning candidate is disqualified, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner. The electorate's choice is paramount, and the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who obtained a plurality of votes. The wreath of victory cannot be transferred to the repudiated loser.

• "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
• "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
• To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
• While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
• It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
• In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect.
• To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice.

• Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar — Cited for the principle that a decision in voter inclusion/exclusion proceedings does not constitute res judicata as to matters of citizenship or residence for purposes other than the right to vote in the specific precinct.
• Nuval v. Guray — Cited for the requisites of res judicata (identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action) and applied to show that exclusion proceedings and quo warranto proceedings have different parties, subject matters, and causes of action.
• Romualdez v. RTC — Cited for the definition of residence as domicile and the requirements for changing domicile.
• Aquino v. COMELEC — Cited for the requirements for changing domicile and the principle that HRET jurisdiction begins only after a candidate becomes a member of Congress.
• Labo v. COMELEC — Cited for the doctrine that the second placer cannot be proclaimed winner when the winning candidate is disqualified.
• Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC — Cited for the principle that both intent and actual presence must satisfy the length of time prescribed by law for residency requirements.
• Lazatin v. COMELEC and Ututalum v. COMELEC — Cited for the principle that COMELEC jurisdiction over disqualification cases continues even after election if the candidate has not been proclaimed.
• Fernandez v. COMELEC — Cited for the distinction between COMELEC and HRET jurisdiction regarding disqualification of congressional candidates.

• Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution — Sets the qualifications for Members of the House of Representatives, including the requirement of being a resident of the district for at least one year immediately preceding the election.
• Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution — Grants the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of Congress.
• Section 78, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Grants the COMELEC jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy based on false representations.
• Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voter's Registration Act of 1996) — Governs the procedure for change of residence and transfer of registration records to another city or municipality.
• Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that if a candidate is not declared disqualified before the election and receives the winning number of votes, the COMELEC shall continue with the trial and may order suspension of proclamation.
• Section 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that the procedure for disqualification cases applies to petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy.

• Justice Panganiban — Concurred in the result (dismissal of the petition) but disagreed with the majority's equating of "residence" with "domicile." He argued that for constitutional qualifications, "residence" should be understood in its ordinary dictionary meaning as actual, physical, and personal presence in the district, rather than the technical legal concept of domicile which allows maintenance of residence without physical presence through animus revertendi. He maintained that applying the domicile concept would defeat the purpose of the residency requirement, which is to ensure familiarity between representatives and their constituents. Nevertheless, he found that Domino failed to prove actual physical presence in Sarangani for one year.