Declarador vs. Gubaton

A child in conflict with the law convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence under Article 192 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC; the disqualification is determined by the imposable penalty for the crime charged as provided by law, not the actual penalty imposed by the court after trial.

• Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985, and was a student at Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz.
• At around 9:45 a.m. on July 25, 2002, Bansales stabbed his teacher, Yvonne Declarador, to death inside a classroom.
• The victim sustained 15 stab wounds on different parts of the body as indicated in the Post-Mortem Certificate prepared by Rural Health Physician Pilar Posadas.
• On October 10, 2002, an Information was filed charging Bansales with murder, alleging the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength.
• The crime was committed while the accused was 17 years of age.
• The RTC found Bansales guilty of murder and sentenced him to an indeterminate imprisonment of twelve years and one day to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, but suspended the sentence pursuant to P.D. 603 and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth.
• The accused was to turn 18 years old on June 3, 2003, prompting the RTC to set a preliminary conference.
• Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) took effect on May 20, 2006, while the case was pending before the Supreme Court.

• Rennie Declarador claimed that under Article 192 of P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
• Citing People v. Ondo, petitioner argued that since Bansales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.
• Petitioner maintained that he has sufficient personality to file the petition despite the offense being a public crime.

• Frank Bansales argued that the petitioner has no standing to file the petition because the offense charged is a public crime brought in the name of the People of the Philippines, and only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition assailing the order of the RTC.
• Bansales contended that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center, hence the court did not abuse its discretion.
• The OSG, in its comment, posited that respondent's sentence cannot be suspended since he was charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, insisting that entitlement to suspended sentence depends on the imposable penalty for the crime charged as provided by law, not the sentence actually imposed.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether petitioner has standing to file the petition for certiorari.
  • Whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the petition directly with the Supreme Court.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.

• Procedural:
  • The Court ruled that the petitioner, being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, has sufficient personality to file the special civil action for certiorari, consistent with the liberal construction of the Rules of Court to promote their object.
  • While the general rule requires a petition for certiorari assailing an RTC order to be filed in the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a petition directly filed before it when there are special and important reasons therefor, such as the nature and importance of the issues raised involving a juvenile and the application of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations.
• Substantive:
  • The Court held that under Article 192 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, a youthful offender convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.
  • The term "punishable" refers to the possible or imposable penalty specified by law, not the actual penalty imposed by the court after trial. The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor.
  • Since murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, Bansales is disqualified from having his sentence suspended despite being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense.
  • Republic Act No. 9344, which took effect during the pendency of the case, merely amended Article 192 to allow suspension of sentence even if the juvenile is already 18 years old at the time of pronouncement of guilt, but maintained the other disqualifications regarding the nature of the offense.
  • The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in suspending the sentence of Bansales.

• Liberal Construction of Rules — The Rules of Court should be liberally construed to promote their object, allowing the surviving spouse of a murder victim to file a petition for certiorari assailing the suspension of the accused's sentence.
• Hierarchy of Courts — A petition for certiorari assailing an order of the RTC should generally be filed in the Court of Appeals; however, the Supreme Court may take cognizance of petitions directly filed before it when there are special and important reasons clearly set out, such as the nature and importance of the issues involving juvenile justice.
• Definition of "Punishable" — The term "punishable" means "deserving of, or liable for, punishment" and refers to the possible or imposable penalty specified by law, not the actual penalty imposed by the court after trial.
• Statutes in Pari Materia — Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read and construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy; thus, P.D. No. 603, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, and R.A. No. 9344 should be harmonized to maintain the disqualification from suspended sentence for capital offenses.

• "The word 'punishable' does not mean 'must be punished,' but 'liable to be punished' as specified."
• "Thus, the term refers to the possible, not to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed."
• "The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile."

• People v. Ondo, G.R. No. 101361, November 8, 1993 — Cited by petitioner as precedent establishing that a juvenile charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.
• Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998) — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it when there are special and important reasons therefor, considering the nature and importance of the issues raised and in the interest of speedy justice.
• Paredes v. Gopengco, 140 Phil. 81 (1969) — Cited for the rule that the surviving spouse of the deceased has sufficient personality to file a special civil action for certiorari as the offended party.
• U.S. v. Villalon, 37 Phil. 322 (1917) — Cited for the definition of "punishable" as "deserving of, or liable for, punishment."
• People v. Hughes, 32 N.E. 1105 (1893) — Cited for the principle that it is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile from suspended sentence.
• Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004 — Cited for the doctrine that statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy.

• Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) — Provides for the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offenders, including the disqualification for those convicted of offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
• Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) — Reproduces the disqualification from Article 192 of P.D. No. 603 regarding automatic suspension of sentence for juveniles convicted of offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
• Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines the crime of murder and imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
• Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) — Amends Article 192 of P.D. No. 603 to allow suspension of sentence even if the juvenile is already 18 years old at the time of pronouncement of guilt, but maintains the disqualifications for capital offenses.
• Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a petition for certiorari assailing an order of the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.