Dadulo vs. Court of Appeals

An appeal from a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases does not automatically stay the execution of the penalty; under the amended Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules, decisions are immediately executory even pending appeal. Furthermore, factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.

The case arose from an administrative complaint involving an incident on September 22, 2002, where petitioner, a Barangay Security Development Officer (BSDO) or barangay official, allegedly ordered the seizure of construction materials from the residence of Gloria Patangui in Quezon City and their transfer to the barangay outpost without proper authority or justification.

• On September 22, 2002, construction materials were taken from the house of respondent Gloria Patangui and brought to the barangay outpost upon orders of petitioner.
• Respondent Gloria Patangui testified that she was informed by a Barangay Security Development Officer (BSDO) that petitioner ordered the seizure of the materials.
• Jessica Patangui, respondent's 9-year-old daughter, testified that she witnessed two men enter their premises and take the construction materials while a woman supervised the activity; she later identified these men as petitioner's co-accused.
• Efren Pagabao, one of the BSDOs charged with petitioner, admitted that they went to respondent's residence upon petitioner's orders to verify whether respondent had a barangay permit for the house construction they were undertaking.
• Petitioner denied the charges and alleged that respondent was a "professional squatter," but failed to specifically deny the acts imputed against her or explain why the construction materials were later found at the barangay outpost.

• The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding her guilty was not supported by substantial evidence.
• The immediate implementation of the suspension order was premature because her appeal should have the effect of staying execution, citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals and Laxina v. Court of Appeals regarding Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989).

• The factual findings of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, including the affidavits and testimonies of Gloria Patangui, Jessica Patangui, and the admission of Efren Pagabao.
• The immediate implementation of the suspension was proper because Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 and Administrative Order No. 14-A (implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 1 s. 2006), which now explicitly provides that "an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory."
• Rule 43, Section 12 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal shall not stay the judgment unless the Court of Appeals directs otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the immediate implementation of the suspension order pending appeal to the Court of Appeals was premature and violated the petitioner's rights.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service was supported by substantial evidence.

• Procedural:
  • The implementation was not premature. The Court held that under the amended Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 and No. 14-A), an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. The amendment applies retroactively to pending cases as procedural laws do not vest rights. Additionally, Rule 43, Section 12 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that an appeal shall not stay the judgment unless the Court of Appeals directs otherwise. The petitioner is considered under preventive suspension during the appeal and entitled to back pay and emoluments if she wins.
• Substantive:
  • The finding of guilt was supported by substantial evidence. The Court affirmed the rule that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. The testimonies of Gloria Patangui, Jessica Patangui, and the admission of Efren Pagabao established petitioner's liability, while petitioner's mere general denials and failure to specifically refute the allegations or explain the presence of the materials at the outpost were insufficient to overcome the evidence.

• Substantial Evidence — Defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion; applied to uphold the Ombudsman's factual findings based on witness testimonies and admissions, and to establish that such findings are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.
• Retroactivity of Procedural Laws — Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent, as no vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws.
• No Vested Right in Public Office — Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or an absolute right to hold office; hence, immediate execution of suspension does not violate vested rights.
• Immediate Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decisions — As amended by Administrative Order No. 17 and No. 14-A, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman now explicitly provide that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, the respondent is deemed under preventive suspension pending appeal, and the Ombudsman shall ensure strict enforcement of its decisions.

• "Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive."
• "Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent."
• "There is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office."
• "An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory." (referring to the amended Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules)

• Lapid v. Court of Appeals — Distinguished; the ruling that an appeal stays execution was based on the old rule when Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules was silent on execution pending appeal.
• Laxina v. Court of Appeals — Distinguished; decided under the previous rule where immediate execution was not expressly provided for in the Ombudsman Rules.
• In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH — Applied for the doctrine that procedural laws are retroactive and that there is no vested right in public office.
• Buencamino v. Court of Appeals — Followed; upheld the resolution denying preliminary injunction against immediate implementation of suspension orders under the amended Ombudsman rules.

• Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Cited by petitioner regarding the effectivity and finality of Ombudsman decisions; the Court noted this provision was later amended by the Ombudsman's own rules.
• Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 and Administrative Order No. 14-A, implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 1 s. 2006) — Provides that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, that decisions in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course, and that refusal to comply is a ground for disciplinary action.
• Rule 43, Section 12 of the Rules of Court — States that the appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.