Primary Holding
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 of Quezon City is unconstitutional and void as it constitutes an invalid exercise of police power amounting to confiscation of property without due process or just compensation, rather than a valid regulation.
Background
Quezon City enacted an ordinance regulating private cemeteries, including a provision (Section 9) requiring a 6% set-aside for pauper burials. This provision was not initially enforced, but seven years later, the City Council resolved to enforce it, directing the City Engineer to stop land transactions in cemeteries not complying with the 6% requirement. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc., a cemetery operator, challenged the ordinance in court.
History
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Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 enacted by Quezon City Council.
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Seven years after enactment, Quezon City Council passed a resolution to enforce Section 9.
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Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction at the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002).
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Court of First Instance declared Section 9 of the ordinance null and void.
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City Government and City Council of Quezon City filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
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City Government and City Council filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-34915).
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Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Facts
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1.
Quezon City Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, Section 9 mandates private memorial park cemeteries to set aside at least 6% of their area for the charity burial of deceased paupers who were Quezon City residents for at least 5 years prior to death.
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2.
This designated area should be developed and open for operation within six months of application approval.
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3.
For several years, this ordinance was not enforced.
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4.
Quezon City Council passed a resolution to enforce Section 9.
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5.
Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. about the enforcement.
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6.
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. argued the ordinance was unconstitutional and filed a case against it.
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7.
The lower court found Section 9 to be an invalid exercise of police power.
Arguments of the Petitioners
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1.
The taking of respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power.
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2.
The land is taken for public use as a burial ground for paupers.
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3.
Quezon City Council is authorized by its charter and local police power to enact ordinances necessary for public health, safety, morals, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and property protection.
Arguments of the Respondents
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1.
The ordinance constitutes confiscation of property as it permanently restricts the use of the property, depriving the owner of all beneficial use.
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2.
The general welfare clause does not justify taking property outright; it pertains to regulating liberty and property use, not outright confiscation.
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3.
Police power, when depriving property, is usually for destruction (like nuisance abatement) to promote general welfare, not for taking for public use.
Issues
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1.
Is Section 9 of the Quezon City Ordinance a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling
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1.
No. Section 9 is not a valid exercise of police power.
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2.
The ordinance constitutes a taking or confiscation of property, not mere regulation.
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3.
It compels private cemeteries to provide free burial grounds, shifting the city's responsibility to private entities without compensation.
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4.
It is not a reasonable regulation related to public health, morals, safety, or general welfare.
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5.
The ordinance exceeds the power to regulate and enters the realm of prohibition and confiscation, which is not authorized under the police power granted to Quezon City as defined in its charter.
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6.
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate.
Doctrines
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1.
Police Power: The inherent power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. The court ruled the ordinance exceeded police power as it was confiscatory, not regulatory.
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2.
Eminent Domain: The power of the state to take private property for public use with just compensation. The court implied the ordinance resembled eminent domain but lacked just compensation, making it invalid.
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3.
Due Process of Law: The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. The court found the ordinance violated due process by taking property without just compensation.
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4.
General Welfare Clause: Provisions in municipal charters granting cities police power for the welfare of their inhabitants. The court found this clause insufficient to justify the confiscatory nature of the ordinance.
Key Excerpts
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1.
"The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate."
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2.
"The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery..."
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3.
"It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation."
Precedents Cited
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1.
People vs. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33: Cited to support the principle that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit.
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2.
Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954: Also cited to support the principle that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit.
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3.
Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250: Cited regarding the presumption of validity of ordinances enacted under police power, but ultimately distinguished from the present case.
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4.
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849: Cited regarding the presumption of validity of ordinances and the burden of proof on those challenging them, but ultimately distinguished from the present case.
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5.
U.S. v. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil. 102: Cited regarding judicial restraint in striking down legislative action under police power, but ultimately distinguished from the present case.
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6.
Eboña v. Daet, [1950] 85 Phil. 369: Cited for affirming the presumption of validity of municipal ordinances, but ultimately distinguished from the present case.
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7.
Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660: Cited to illustrate the broad and extensive nature of police power.
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8.
Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957: Cited to highlight the extensive scope of police power and its relationship with the due process clause.
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9.
U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 Phil. 104: Cited to emphasize that police power embraces the entire system of public regulation.
Statutory and Constitutional Provisions
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1.
Article III, Section 1, subparagraph 1, Constitution: (Bill of Rights) - Due process clause, stating no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
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2.
Republic Act No. 537 (Charter of Quezon City), Section 12, Sub-sections 'C', 't', and '00': Defined the powers of Quezon City Council, including police power, power to regulate businesses, power to prohibit burials in city centers, and the general police power clause.
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3.
Republic Act No. 537, Section 13: Established penalties for violating city ordinances.
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4.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code), Section 177 (q): Outlined the powers of sangguniang panlungsod regarding burial of the dead.