Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)

The jurisprudential doctrine of condonation is abandoned for being inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution's principles that public office is a public trust and that public officials are accountable to the people at all times; however, this abandonment is to be applied prospectively. Furthermore, Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared partially unconstitutional for encroaching upon the Supreme Court's rule-making power and for improperly restricting the judicial review of the Ombudsman's acts.

The case arose from an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman into alleged anomalous activities related to the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. A complaint was filed against then-Mayor Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., and other city officials for Plunder and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The alleged irregularities spanned Binay, Jr.'s first term (2010-2013) and continued into his second term (2013-2016), leading the Ombudsman to initiate administrative and criminal proceedings against him.

• On July 22, 2014, a complaint was filed before the Ombudsman against Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., then-Mayor of Makati City, and other city officials concerning alleged irregularities in the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
• The Ombudsman's investigation covered alleged anomalous activities in Phases III, IV, and V of the project, which occurred during Binay, Jr.'s first term (2010-2013) and second term (2013-2016).
• On March 10, 2015, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. for six months without pay, finding strong evidence of his guilt for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and concluding his stay in office could prejudice the investigation.
• Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that his re-election in 2013 effectively condoned any administrative liability from his prior term, rendering the administrative cases moot.
• On March 16, 2015, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the suspension, citing the condonation doctrine as established in previous Supreme Court cases.
• Despite the TRO, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the suspension, leading Binay, Jr. to file a petition for contempt in the CA against the Ombudsman and DILG officials.
• On April 6, 2015, the CA issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI), again relying on the condonation doctrine to establish Binay, Jr.'s ostensible right to remain in office.

• The Ombudsman argued that the CA lacked jurisdiction to issue any injunctive writ to delay an investigation conducted by her office, pursuant to the prohibition in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act).
• The Ombudsman contended that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings, which are criminal in nature and could result in her effective removal from office.
• The Ombudsman asserted that the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense that should be raised and proven during the administrative proceedings before her office, and it is not a proper basis for a court to enjoin a preventive suspension order.
• The Ombudsman urged the Supreme Court to abandon the condonation doctrine, arguing it has no constitutional or statutory basis, undermines the principle of public accountability, and was based on a misinterpretation of American jurisprudence.

• Binay, Jr. argued that the CA has the constitutional judicial power to review acts of any government instrumentality, including the Ombudsman, for grave abuse of discretion.
• He claimed the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion by issuing the preventive suspension order without considering the well-established condonation doctrine, which extinguished his administrative liability for acts committed during his previous term.
• He asserted that his re-election in 2013 gave him a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, which was violated by the suspension order.
• Regarding the contempt charge, Binay, Jr. submitted that while the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, an action for contempt imposes penalties of fine or imprisonment and does not necessarily result in removal from office, thus the CA has the inherent power to punish for contempt.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a petition for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order (preventive suspension) of the Ombudsman.
  • Whether the CA has the authority to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, in light of Section 14 of R.A. 6770.
  • Whether the CA's directive for the Ombudsman, an impeachable officer, to comment on a petition for contempt is improper and illegal.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the jurisprudential condonation doctrine is bereft of legal basis and should be abandoned.
  • Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the injunctive writs against the preventive suspension order based on the condonation doctrine.

• Procedural:
  • The Court ruled that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning the orders of the Ombudsman. The second paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, which limited remedies against the Ombudsman's decisions to a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, was declared unconstitutional for improperly expanding the Court's appellate jurisdiction without its consent, consistent with the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto.
  • The Court held that the CA has the authority to issue injunctive writs. The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, which prohibits courts (except the Supreme Court) from issuing injunctions to delay the Ombudsman's investigations, was declared unconstitutional for violating the principle of separation of powers by encroaching on the Supreme Court's exclusive constitutional power to promulgate rules of procedure. However, the Court declared this statutory prohibition merely "ineffective" until the Court itself adopts such a rule.
  • The Court found the Ombudsman's challenge to the contempt proceedings to be premature. The CA had only directed her to file a comment and had not yet given due course to the contempt petition. The Ombudsman could properly raise her objections, including her status as an impeachable officer, in her comment before the CA.
• Substantive:
  • The Court abandoned the condonation doctrine. After a thorough historical and legal analysis, it found that the doctrine has no legal basis in the 1987 Constitution or any existing statute. It runs contrary to the constitutional principles that public office is a public trust and that public officials must be accountable at all times. The doctrine was found to be an obsolete jurisprudential creation based on a misreading of American case law that is incompatible with the current legal framework on public accountability.
  • The Court ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. At the time the injunctive writs were issued, the condonation doctrine was an established and binding jurisprudence. The CA was merely adhering to settled precedents, which at that time constituted "good law." The abandonment of the doctrine was made prospective in its application and therefore did not retroactively invalidate the CA's actions.

• Condonation Doctrine — A jurisprudential rule stating that a public official's re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him for it. In this case, the Court traced the doctrine's origins to the 1959 case of Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, re-examined its legal underpinnings, found it to be without basis under the 1987 Constitution, and prospectively abandoned it.
• Separation of Powers — The constitutional principle that divides governmental authority into three distinct branches—legislative, executive, and judicial—each with its own powers and responsibilities, preventing encroachment by one branch upon another. The Court applied this doctrine to declare the first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 unconstitutional, as Congress (legislative) infringed upon the Supreme Court's (judicial) exclusive power over rules of procedure by prohibiting courts from issuing injunctive writs.
• Judicial Power — The authority vested in courts to settle justiciable controversies and to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Court held that the power to issue provisional and ancillary writs, such as injunctions, is inherent in judicial power and is necessary for a court to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect and prevent its judgment from being mooted.
• Stare Decisis — The legal principle of determining points in litigation according to precedent. The Court applied this principle to hold that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the injunctions based on the then-existing condonation doctrine. The Court also emphasized that stare decisis is not an inflexible rule and can be overturned when there are powerful countervailing considerations, as was the case for abandoning the condonation doctrine.
• Prospective Application of Rulings — The principle that a new judicial rule or the overturning of a previous doctrine applies only to future cases and does not affect rights that have vested or actions taken in reliance on the old rule. The Court explicitly stated that its abandonment of the condonation doctrine is prospective in effect, so it did not apply to Binay, Jr.'s case but will apply to all misconduct committed after the finality of this decision.

• "To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term."

• Fabian v. Desierto — Cited as the controlling precedent for declaring the second paragraph of Section 14, R.A. 6770 unconstitutional, as it improperly increased the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its consent by mandating a direct appeal from the Ombudsman to the SC.
• Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija — Identified as the 1959 case that first established the condonation doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence. The Supreme Court extensively analyzed and ultimately overturned the reasoning in Pascual.
• Aguinaldo v. Santos — Referenced as a key post-1987 case that applied the condonation doctrine, which the CA relied upon in its ruling. The doctrine established in this case was expressly abandoned.
• Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA — Identified as the specific precedent the CA followed when it issued the TRO, which led the Supreme Court to conclude that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
• Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. — Cited to justify the Court's decision to rule on the condonation doctrine despite the case's potential mootness, by invoking the exceptions to the moot and academic principle, particularly when paramount public interest is involved and controlling principles need to be formulated.

• 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 1 — (Public Office is a Public Trust) This provision was the central constitutional basis for abandoning the condonation doctrine, as the doctrine was found to be fundamentally incompatible with the principle of continuous public accountability.
• 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5(5) — (Supreme Court's Rule-Making Power) This was the basis for declaring the first paragraph of Section 14, R.A. 6770 unconstitutional, as the statutory prohibition on injunctions was an encroachment by Congress on the Court's exclusive power over pleading, practice, and procedure.
• Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), Section 14 — (Restrictions) The Court declared the first paragraph (prohibiting injunctions by lower courts) unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers and the second paragraph (limiting judicial review) unconstitutional for expanding the SC's appellate jurisdiction.
• Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code), Section 60 — (Grounds for Disciplinary Action) This section was cited to demonstrate that there are statutory grounds for disciplining local officials and that re-election is not provided as a means of extinguishing administrative liability.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 9(1) — (CA Jurisdiction) This provision was cited as the statutory source of the CA's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, which was the proper legal basis for its authority to hear Binay, Jr.'s petition.

• Justice Lucas P. Bersamin — In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Bersamin concurred with the majority's declaration that Section 14 of R.A. 6770 is unconstitutional. However, he dissented from the majority's decision to re-examine and abandon the condonation doctrine, arguing that the issue was not justiciable in this case. He contended that the propriety of the CA's injunction should have been resolved based on the rules for preventive suspension, not by overturning a long-standing doctrine. He viewed the abandonment of the doctrine as an unwarranted indulgence in conjecture and an anticipation of future controversies that was not ripe for adjudication.