Canonizado vs. Aguirre

Acceptance of a second public office during the pendency of a case challenging one's removal does not constitute abandonment of the first office where the removal was involuntary and caused by an unconstitutional provision of law; consequently, appointments made pursuant to an unconstitutional statute are legal nullities that cannot confer any rights, and the illegally removed officers are entitled to reinstatement with backwages.

Petitioners were serving as Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) under Republic Act No. 6975 when Republic Act No. 8551 (the New Police Law) took effect on March 6, 1998. Section 8 of RA 8551 deemed the terms of all current commissioners expired, effectively removing petitioners from office without due process. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of this provision before the Supreme Court, seeking reinstatement and backwages.

• Petitioners Alexis C. Canonizado, Edgar Dula Torres, and Rogelio A. Pureza were Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) serving under Republic Act No. 6975.
• Republic Act No. 8551 took effect on March 6, 1998; Section 8 thereof provided that the terms of current commissioners were deemed expired, constituting a bar to their reappointment.
• Petitioners were removed from their offices pursuant to Section 8 of RA 8551.
• On April 15, 1998, petitioners instituted the present action assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 8 of RA 8551.
• During the pendency of the case, on June 30, 1998, then President Estrada appointed Canonizado as Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
• Canonizado took his oath of office on July 2, 1998, and again on July 7, 1998, but never received the salary pertaining to the Inspector General position.
• On the same date as Canonizado's appointment (June 30, 1998), Leo S. Magahum and Cleofe M. Factoran were appointed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners by President Estrada to complete the four regular members of the Commission.
• Respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong was originally appointed under RA 6975, removed therefrom, and subsequently re-appointed for a two-year term on March 11, 1998 pursuant to Section 8 of RA 8551.
• On January 25, 2000, the Court declared Section 8 unconstitutional and ordered petitioners' reinstatement with backwages, prompting respondents to file the instant Motion for Reconsideration.

• Canonizado did not abandon his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM, as evidenced by his initiation and tenacious pursuance of the present case.
• He should not be faulted for seeking gainful employment during the pendency of the case to support himself and his family.
• Canonizado never received the salary for the Inspector General position, indicating he did not truly occupy it in substance.
• Canonizado was compelled to leave his post as Commissioner by an unconstitutional provision, not voluntarily; therefore, he harbored no willful desire to abandon his duties.
• The incompatibility of offices rule does not apply because Canonizado never discharged the functions of both offices simultaneously, having been forced out of the NAPOLCOM first.
• The general prayer for "such other reliefs just and equitable" cannot be interpreted as an alternative prayer for payment of salaries in lieu of reinstatement, distinguishing this case from Mayor v. Macaraig.
• Respondents are estopped from raising new issues in their motion for reconsideration that were not raised in their comment to the petition.

• Canonizado abandoned his claim for reinstatement by accepting and qualifying for the position of Inspector General of the IAS-PNP, which is incompatible with the position of NAPOLCOM Commissioner.
• The appointment and oath-taking of Canonizado are official acts of the Executive Department of which the Court must take mandatory judicial notice under Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
• The positions are incompatible because RA 8551 prohibits IAS personnel from sitting in committees deliberating on PNP appointments, while the NAPOLCOM exercises control and supervision over the PNP.
• Execution of the decision is problematic because there are currently four incumbent commissioners (Cairme, Adiong, Magahum, and Factoran) but only three petitioners plus Adiong claiming reinstatement, creating uncertainty as to who should be replaced.
• Magahum and Factoran should have been impleaded as respondents in a quasi-quo warranto proceeding to give them opportunity to defend their positions.
• The Court should apply the ruling in Mayor v. Macaraig and order the payment of salaries and benefits for the unexpired terms instead of reinstatement to avoid displacing incumbent commissioners who have not been shown to be unfit.
• Re-appointment of petitioners under RA 6975 violates Section 16 thereof, which prohibits reappointment of commissioners.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether incumbent commissioners Magahum and Factoran should have been impleaded as respondents in this proceeding to satisfy due process.
  • Whether respondents are estopped from raising arguments regarding the validity of appointments under RA 6975 and the necessity of impleading Magahum and Factoran, which were not raised in their comment to the petition.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether Canonizado's acceptance of the position of Inspector General constitutes abandonment of his NAPOLCOM Commissionership.
  • Whether the doctrine of incompatibility of offices applies to Canonizado's situation.
  • Whether respondent Adiong is entitled to reinstatement under his original appointment under RA 6975.
  • Whether the ruling in Mayor v. Macaraig (ordering payment of back salaries in lieu of reinstatement) should be applied to this case.
  • Whether re-appointment of petitioners under RA 6975 violates Section 16 thereof prohibiting reappointment.

• Procedural:
  • The petition is not a quo warranto proceeding but one primarily seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality; therefore, Magahum and Factoran need not be impleaded as respondents. Their appointments are nullities arising from an unconstitutional provision, and they could have intervened if they wished to defend their positions.
  • Respondents are estopped from raising the issue regarding Section 16 of RA 6975 and the necessity of impleading Magahum and Factoran, as these arguments were belatedly raised only in the motion for reconsideration and not in the original comment.
• Substantive:
  • Abandonment: Canonizado did not abandon his office. Abandonment requires voluntary relinquishment with intent to terminate possession, accompanied by an overt act. Canonizado was compelled to leave by an unconstitutional provision, not voluntarily. Acceptance of another position during the pendency of a case challenging involuntary removal does not constitute abandonment, particularly where necessary to earn a living and continue public service.
  • Incompatibility: The rule that acceptance of an incompatible office ipso facto vacates the first does not apply because Canonizado never held both offices simultaneously; he was forced out of the NAPOLCOM by the unconstitutional Section 8 before accepting the Inspector General position.
  • Adiong's Reinstatement: Adiong is entitled to reinstatement under his original RA 6975 appointment. His appointment under RA 8551 is null and void because it was made pursuant to an unconstitutional provision. An unconstitutional act confers no rights and affords no protection.
  • Mayor v. Macaraig: The ruling is inapplicable because petitioners herein specifically prayed for reinstatement and did not make an alternative prayer for payment of salaries in lieu of reinstatement. The general prayer for other reliefs cannot be interpreted as inconsistent with the specific prayer for reinstatement.
  • Section 16 of RA 6975: The Court did not pass upon this issue as it was not raised in the comment and the validity of appointments under RA 6975 was never the issue in the case.

• Abandonment of Public Office — Defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof; requires both an intention to abandon and an overt act by which the intention is carried into effect; non-performance of duties due to involuntary removal by an unconstitutional statute does not constitute abandonment.
• Incompatibility of Offices — The rule that "he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office" applies only when the offices are held simultaneously; incompatibility arises from the nature and relations of the two positions creating contrariety and antagonism in duties, not merely from physical impossibility of performance.
• Nullity of Acts Under Unconstitutional Law — An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection; appointments made pursuant to an unconstitutional provision are null and void ab initio, and there can be no valid appointment to a non-vacant position.
• Security of Tenure — Constitutional guarantee protecting public officers from removal except for cause and after due process; removal by operation of an unconstitutional statute violates this right and entitles the officer to reinstatement.

• "Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof."
• "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection."
• "There can be no valid appointment to a non-vacant position."
• "He who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding."
• "A contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his right to live, which contemplates not only a right to earn a living, as held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and productive life."

• Tan v. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 17 (1960) — Cited as controlling precedent holding that acceptance of a second position during the pendency of an appeal does not constitute abandonment where the officer was deprived of his office and salary through no fault of his own.
• Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228 (1961) — Cited for the same principle as Tan; acceptance of temporary employment during the pendency of an appeal challenging removal does not constitute abandonment where the officer has a "right to live."
• Mayor v. Macaraig, 194 SCRA 672 (1991) — Distinguished; applied only where petitioners prayed for alternative relief of payment of salaries in lieu of reinstatement, which was absent here.
• Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 276 (1998) — Cited for the definition of abandonment and non-user.
• Fernandez v. Cuerva, 21 SCRA 1095 (1967) — Cited for the principle that unconstitutional acts confer no rights.
• Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240 (1992) — Cited for the rule that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position does not become vacant.

• Section 8, Republic Act No. 8551 — The provision declared unconstitutional for violating the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; it deemed the terms of current NAPOLCOM Commissioners expired upon the law's effectivity.
• Section 4, Republic Act No. 8551 — Cited regarding the composition of NAPOLCOM and the appointment of new commissioners to replace those removed.
• Section 45, Republic Act No. 8551 — Cited to demonstrate the incompatibility between the NAPOLCOM and IAS positions (prohibiting IAS personnel from sitting in committees deliberating on PNP appointments).
• Section 5, Republic Act No. 8551 — Cited regarding NAPOLCOM's power of control and supervision over the PNP.
• Section 16, Republic Act No. 6975 — Cited by respondents regarding the prohibition on reappointment of commissioners; the Court declined to rule on this.
• Rule 129, Section 1, Rules of Court — Cited by respondents regarding mandatory judicial notice of official acts of the Executive Department.