Calalang vs. Medina

A claim for damages that is merely incidental to a petition for mandamus cannot survive the dismissal of the principal action when the latter has become moot due to the respondent's performance of the duty sought to be compelled; moreover, damages arising from delays in administrative franchise proceedings are legally impossible to ascertain prior to a final judgment establishing the specific conditions and capacity of the franchise.

This case arose from competing applications involving ice plant franchises in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Republic Act No. 2290 granted petitioner Consuelo Calalang a franchise to operate an ice plant, while a competing operator sought to increase the capacity of an existing facility. The Public Service Commission's handling of these applications—particularly its initial refusal to conduct a joint hearing and its subsequent delay in resolving motions for reconsideration—led to multiple judicial interventions, including a prior certiorari proceeding and the present mandamus action accompanied by a substantial claim for damages for alleged losses due to administrative delay.

• On June 19, 1959, Republic Act No. 2290 was approved, granting petitioner Consuelo S. Calalang a franchise to construct, operate, and maintain an ice plant and cold storage in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
• On August 17, 1959, Calalang filed PSC Case No. 126911 with the Public Service Commission for the corresponding certificate of public convenience.
• Prior thereto, on July 27, 1959, Aurora Tanjangco, as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, filed PSC Case No. 126537 seeking to increase the capacity of an existing ice plant from ten (10) to forty (40) tons daily.
• Calalang objected to Tanjangco's petition and moved for a joint hearing of both cases.
• On September 10, 1959, PSC Associate Commissioner Aspillera overruled Calalang's opposition and denied the motion for joint hearing.
• Calalang filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied, prompting her to file certiorari (Case L-16068) in the Supreme Court.
• While L-16068 was pending, Commissioner Aspillera rendered a decision on September 28, 1959, authorizing Tanjangco to increase capacity to thirty (30) tons daily.
• The Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on December 3, 1959, restraining execution of Aspillera's decision.
• On September 26, 1960, the PSC denied Calalang's application in Case No. 126911.
• On November 29, 1960, the Supreme Court decided L-16068, reversing the PSC orders, setting aside the hearing and judgment in Case No. 126537, and ordering the PSC to jointly try both cases.
• Relying on this decision, Calalang filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration in Case No. 126911, which was submitted for resolution on August 15, 1963.
• Despite Calalang's petitions dated December 7, 1963, and April 7, 1964, the PSC failed to act on the motion for reconsideration.
• On May 24, 1965, Calalang commenced the present action for mandamus to compel the PSC commissioners to act on her motions, and to recover P100,000.00 in damages for alleged losses from 1962 to the present.
• On June 14, 1965, twenty days after the filing of the mandamus petition, the PSC issued an order setting aside its decision in Case No. 126911 and setting both cases for joint trial.

• The PSC commissioners unlawfully neglected their ministerial duty by failing to resolve her motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration in PSC Case No. 126911 for an unreasonable period of time (from August 15, 1963 to May 24, 1965).
• The undue delay in the resolution of her pending motions caused her to suffer damages amounting to P100,000.00 from 1962 to the filing of the petition.
• The claim for damages should be entertained independently despite the mootness of the mandamus action because the damages were a direct result of the respondents' failure to perform their duty.

• The petition for mandamus had become moot and academic because the PSC had already issued the order compelling the joint trial and setting aside the decision in Case No. 126911, thereby performing the specific act sought to be compelled.
• The Supreme Court lacks original jurisdiction to entertain the claim for damages independently once the principal action for mandamus is dismissed for being moot.
• The amount of damages cannot be ascertained as there is no final judgment fixing the conditions under which Calalang may operate the ice plant, particularly its capacity, making the claim premature and speculative.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court can entertain a claim for damages that is merely incidental to a petition for mandamus after the principal action has become moot due to the performance of the act sought to be compelled.
  • Whether the Court retains original jurisdiction over an incidental claim for damages once the principal action for mandamus is dismissed.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the petitioner is entitled to recover damages for the alleged undue delay in the resolution of her motions before the Public Service Commission.

• Procedural:
  • The Court dismissed the petition. It held that the petition for mandamus had become moot because the PSC, on June 14, 1965, issued the order directing the joint trial of the cases and setting aside the decision in Case No. 126911, thereby complying with the command sought in the petition.
  • The Court ruled that the claim for damages, being merely incidental to the petition for mandamus and not an independent cause of action, could not be entertained once the principal action was dismissed. The Court noted that without the mandamus action, it would have no original jurisdiction over the claim for damages.
• Substantive:
  • The Court declined to rule on the entitlement to damages. It reasoned that there was no means by which to ascertain the amount of damages allegedly sustained, assuming respondents could be held liable.
  • Until a final judgment rendered in the underlying PSC cases fixed the conditions under which Calalang might operate the ice plant and cold storage, particularly the capacity thereof, it was legally impossible to determine the extent of her damages.

• Mootness in Mandamus — A petition for mandamus becomes moot and academic when the public official or body against whom it is directed performs the act sought to be compelled during the pendency of the proceedings. Once the relief prayed for has been granted or accomplished, there is no longer any justiciable controversy to resolve.
• Incidental Damages in Special Civil Actions — A claim for damages that is merely incidental to the principal action (such as mandamus) cannot survive independently when the main action is dismissed. The jurisdiction of the court over the incidental claim derives from its jurisdiction over the principal action.
• Prematurity of Damages Claims — Damages cannot be legally determined when the underlying right or the extent thereof (such as the conditions and capacity of a franchise) has not yet been finally adjudicated. The computation of damages requires a fixed basis or standard, which is absent until final judgment on the substantive right.

• "It should be noted, however, that her claim for damages is incidental to the petition for mandamus, without which we would have no original jurisdiction to entertain said claim."
• "Indeed, unless and until a final judgment has been rendered fixing the conditions under which Mrs. Calalang may operate the ice plant and cold storage covered by her franchise, and, particularly, the capacity thereof, it is legally impossible to determine the amount of said damages."

• Calalang v. Aspillera (Case L-16068) — Cited as the prior decision reversing the PSC's orders and mandating the joint trial of the competing ice plant applications, which formed the basis for the petitioner's subsequent motions and the present mandamus action.

• Republic Act No. 2290 — The statute granting the petitioner a franchise to construct, operate, and maintain an ice plant and cold storage in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which was the subject of the administrative proceedings before the PSC.
• N/A — No constitutional provisions (including Article II) were cited or discussed in the decision.