Buac vs. COMELEC

The COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results and to order the revision and recount of ballots cast therein, pursuant to its constitutional power under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscites, which encompasses all necessary and incidental powers to give effect to such mandate.

In April 1998, a plebiscite was conducted in Taguig to ratify Republic Act No. 8487 (the Taguig Cityhood Law), proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a highly urbanized city. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers suspended the canvass of sixty-four election returns and proclaimed that the "NO" votes prevailed, rejecting the cityhood proposal. The COMELEC en banc ordered the Board to reconvene and complete the canvass, after which the Board again proclaimed the negative votes as winners. Petitioners, proponents of the cityhood measure, filed a petition to annul the results before the COMELEC, alleging fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of votes.

• On April 25, 1998, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of Republic Act No. 8487, proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a highly urbanized city.
• The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers suspended the canvass of sixty-four (64) election returns and proclaimed that the "NO" votes won, rejecting the conversion.
• The COMELEC en banc ordered the Board to reconvene and complete the canvass of the remaining returns.
• Upon completion, the Board issued an Order proclaiming that the negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite.
• Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista filed a petition to annul the results of the plebiscite with the COMELEC, alleging fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of votes and the preparation of returns, and praying for revision and recount of ballots.
• The case was docketed as an election protest (EPC No. 98-102) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.
• Private respondent Alan Peter S. Cayetano intervened and filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest and that jurisdiction lies with the Regional Trial Court.
• On October 3, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order giving due course to the petition, treating it as akin to an election protest, and directed the revision committees to revise and recount the plebiscite ballots.
• On October 19, 2001, Cayetano filed an unverified Motion for Reconsideration, admitting in the motion that he received a copy of the October 3, 2001 Resolution on October 9, 2001.
• On November 29, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division granted the Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition, ruling that it has no jurisdiction over controversies involving the conduct of a plebiscite and the annulment of its results as such involves quasi-judicial powers not contemplated under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
• On October 28, 2002, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the dismissal, holding that its power to enforce and administer laws relative to plebiscites under Section 2(1), Article IX-C is purely administrative and not quasi-judicial, and that jurisdiction over the petition lies with the RTC under Section 19(6) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
• During the pendency of the Taguig case, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over a similar petition involving the Malolos cityhood plebiscite, resolved it, and declared Malolos a city.

• Jurisdiction to decide plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally vested with the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants it the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscites.
• The power to enforce laws relative to plebiscites necessarily includes the incidental power to ascertain the true results through revision and recount of ballots, and to remove this power would render the constitutional mandate nugatory.
• The impugned COMELEC Resolution is discriminatory because during the pendency of the Taguig case, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over a similar case concerning the Malolos cityhood plebiscite, resolved it, and declared Malolos a city, demonstrating inconsistent application of jurisdictional rules.

• There is no such action as a "plebiscite protest" under the Constitution, the laws, or the COMELEC rules, which only provide for election protests involving the election of persons to public office.
• The quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(2), Article IX-C extends only to contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective officials, which does not include controversies over plebiscite results.
• Even if the petition is treated as akin to an election protest, the RTC has original jurisdiction over election protests involving municipal officials, with the COMELEC having only appellate jurisdiction over such cases.
• Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 vests the RTC with jurisdiction over cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and since the COMELEC has no quasi-judicial jurisdiction over plebiscites, the RTC has jurisdiction.
• A plebiscite involves the expression of public will on a public issue, not the vindication of private rights, and thus does not fall under the traditional concept of judicial power; however, if judicial power is invoked, the RTC is the proper forum.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Motion for Reconsideration filed by private respondent Cayetano was filed within the reglementary period of five days under Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to annul the results of a plebiscite based on allegations of fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of ballots.
  • Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over such petitions under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

• Procedural: The Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires that a motion for reconsideration be filed within five (5) days from receipt of the resolution. Cayetano admitted receiving the October 3, 2001 Resolution on October 9, 2001, but filed his motion only on October 19, 2001 (ten days later). Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion.
• Substantive: The COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results. The power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscites under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution is not merely administrative but includes the necessary and incidental power to ascertain the true results of the plebiscite, including the authority to order revision and recount of ballots. A plebiscite involves the determination of the sovereign will of the electorate, not the adjudication of conflicting private rights, and thus does not fall under the traditional judicial power of regular courts under Article VIII, Section 1. Furthermore, granting RTC jurisdiction would result in "jumbled justice," as multiple RTCs from different judicial regions could exercise jurisdiction over national plebiscites. The COMELEC's quasi-judicial power under Section 2(2) is limited to contests involving elective officials, but this does not preclude the COMELEC from exercising administrative jurisdiction over plebiscite controversies under Section 2(1).

• Traditional Concept of Judicial Power — Defined as the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, involving the settlement of conflicting private rights. The Court held that plebiscite controversies do not involve private rights but the sovereign will of the electorate, and thus do not fall under traditional judicial power cognizable by regular courts.
• Administrative vs. Quasi-Judicial Powers of COMELEC — The COMELEC exercises administrative powers under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C (enforce and administer election laws) and quasi-judicial powers under Section 2(2) (election contests involving elective officials). The Court held that jurisdiction over plebiscite results derives from the administrative power under Section 2(1), which includes incidental quasi-judicial functions necessary to enforce the law, rather than the specific quasi-judicial power under Section 2(2).
• Necessary and Incidental Powers — The grant of a principal power includes the grant of all necessary and incidental powers to make it effective. The power to enforce laws relative to plebiscites includes the power to ascertain true results through revision and recount, to cancel proclamations, and to supervise board of canvassers proceedings.
• Jumbled Justice — The doctrine that granting regular courts jurisdiction over national plebiscite results would create an unmanageable situation where multiple RTCs from different judicial regions could exercise jurisdiction, undermining the orderly administration of justice.

• "The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power. It does not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement."
• "To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain the true results of the plebiscite through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally mandated power to 'enforce' laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite."
• "To grant the RTC jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results can lead to jumbled justice."
• "This is the first time that the COMELEC's jurisdiction over a petition to annul the results of a plebiscite has been assailed and surprisingly, this is the first time that the COMELEC has yielded its historic jurisdiction."

• Salva v. Macalintal — Distinguished; held to involve the validity of COMELEC rules and regulations (administrative), not the results of a plebiscite, and thus did not support the thesis that questions on plebiscite validity fall within the general jurisdiction of regular trial courts.
• Baytan v. COMELEC — Cited for the classification of COMELEC's constitutionally vested powers into administrative (Section 2(1)) and quasi-judicial (Section 2(2)), and for the rule that the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers only in election contests involving elective officials.
• Maruhom v. COMELEC — Cited for the principle that the constitutional grant of powers to COMELEC is intended to give it all necessary and incidental powers to achieve free, orderly, honest, and credible elections.
• Nolasco v. COMELEC — Cited for the holding that the COMELEC's power to enforce and administer election laws includes the power to cancel proclamations.
• Garces v. Court of Appeals — Cited in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio for the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC, and for the holding that the "case or matter" referred to in Article IX-A, Section 7 must be within the COMELEC's jurisdiction.
• Lopez v. Roxas — Cited in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio Morales for the principle that judicial power is vested in the judicial branch except only so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency.

• 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1 — Defines judicial power as including the duty to settle actual controversies involving legally demandable rights; cited to distinguish plebiscite controversies from traditional judicial power.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 2(1) — Grants COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscites; basis for the majority holding that COMELEC has jurisdiction over plebiscite results.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) — Grants COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications of elective regional, provincial, and city officials; cited by respondents and dissenters as limiting COMELEC's quasi-judicial jurisdiction, but distinguished by majority as inapplicable to plebiscite controversies.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), Section 19 — Grants RTC jurisdiction over civil cases and cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; held by majority as inapplicable because plebiscite controversies are not civil actions involving private rights.
• Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), Sections 251 and 252 — Cited in the dissent regarding RTC jurisdiction over election protests involving municipal and barangay officials.
• COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 19, Section 2 — Prescribes the 5-day period for filing motions for reconsideration; basis for the procedural ruling that the motion was filed out of time.

• Justice Antonio T. Carpio — Argued that the COMELEC's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is expressly limited by Section 2(2), Article IX-C to election contests involving elective officials, which does not include plebiscites. Contended that the power to enforce and administer plebiscite laws under Section 2(1) is purely administrative and does not include quasi-judicial power to revise ballots. Held that RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) and (6) of BP 129 because the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any quasi-judicial body.
• Justice Conchita Carpio Morales — Joined by Justice Callejo, Sr. Argued that petitioners invoke administrative power but seek quasi-judicial function (revision/recount for fraud). Contended that determination of fraud/irregularities is a justiciable controversy requiring judicial or quasi-judicial power, which the Constitution does not grant to COMELEC for plebiscites. Held that since neither Constitution nor law confers this quasi-judicial power on COMELEC, jurisdiction remains with the judicial branch (RTC).