Borlongan vs. Peña

In criminal prosecutions, the posting of bail does not constitute a waiver of the right to question the validity of an arrest warrant; judges are constitutionally mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause by examining the records and affidavits and cannot merely rely on the prosecutor's bare certification; and a complaint-affidavit based on hearsay and lacking personal knowledge of the affiant is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause or the issuance of warrants of arrest.

The case arose from a civil dispute between respondent Atty. Magdaleno Peña and Urban Bank (represented by petitioners as officers and directors) regarding agent's compensation for securing a property in Pasay City. When petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss in the civil case attaching documents allegedly showing Peña was appointed by Isabela Sugar Company (ISCI) rather than Urban Bank, Peña retaliated by filing a criminal complaint alleging the documents were falsified, leading to the issuance of warrants of arrest and the subsequent legal challenge.

• Respondent Atty. Magdaleno Peña instituted Civil Case No. 754 against Urban Bank and petitioners (Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, Arturo Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Eric Lee, and Ben Lim, Jr.) before the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bago City, for recovery of agent's compensation, damages, and attorney's fees.
• Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing they never appointed Peña as agent, attaching four documents: (1) a Letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar Company (ISCI); (2) an unsigned Letter dated December 7, 1994 from Marilyn G. Ong; (3) a Letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and (4) a Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.
• Peña filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor alleging the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures and were neither stockholders nor officers of ISCI.
• The City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated September 24, 1998, finding probable cause for four counts of Introducing Falsified Documents under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the RPC against all petitioners.
• Informations were filed with the MTCC (Criminal Case Nos. 6683-6686), and Judge Primitivo Blanca issued warrants of arrest for all petitioners, including Ben Lim, Jr.
• On October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation, claiming denial of due process, lack of probable cause, and that Ben Lim, Jr. was not a director of Urban Bank.
• The MTCC denied the motion on November 13, 1998, ruling that preliminary investigation was not available for cases within the jurisdiction of first-level courts, that the warrants were validly issued, and that posting bail constituted a waiver of the right to assail the warrants.
• Petitioners posted bail on the same day they filed the Omnibus Motion, with their bail bonds expressly stipulating that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest.
• At the arraignment, petitioners refused to enter a plea, and the court entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for them.

• They were denied due process because they were not afforded the right to submit counter-affidavits and no preliminary investigation was conducted as required by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• The judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments without requiring counter-affidavits, violating the Rules of Court.
• There was no probable cause to support the Informations, as the allegations in the complaint-affidavit did not establish that a crime was committed.
• Ben Lim, Jr. is not a director of Urban Bank and was improperly included in the criminal charges, as paragraph 9 of the complaint-affidavit (the accusatory portion) omitted him.
• The civil case involves a prejudicial question that should suspend the criminal proceedings.
• Posting bail does not waive their right to assail the validity of the warrants of arrest under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, especially since they filed their motion on the same day, their bail bonds contained express stipulations reserving such right, and they refused to enter a plea during arraignment.

• The issues raised became moot and academic when petitioners posted bail and were arraigned.
• Posting bail and participating in arraignment constitutes waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of the warrant of arrest under the old rule.

• Procedural Issues:
  1. Whether petitioners waived their right to question the validity of their arrest by posting bail and being arraigned.
  2. Whether the MTCC gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and recall of warrants.
  3. Whether the judge personally determined the existence of probable cause before issuing the warrants of arrest.
• Substantive Issues:
  1. Whether there was probable cause to support the filing of the Informations and the issuance of warrants of arrest for the crime of introducing falsified documents.
  2. Whether the criminal cases should be dismissed for lack of probable cause.

• Procedural: The Supreme Court held that the issues were not mooted by the posting of bail and arraignment. Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) modified the old rule that posting bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The new rule is curative and retroactive in application. Posting bail was a matter of imperative necessity to avert incarceration and did not constitute waiver, especially since petitioners filed their Omnibus Motion on the same day they posted bail, their bail bonds expressly stipulated that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest, and they refused to enter a plea during arraignment. The Court found that the judge failed to personally determine probable cause as required by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 9(b) of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The judge blindly followed the prosecutor's certification without examining the records, affidavits, and supporting documents. The careless inclusion of Ben Lim, Jr. in the warrant despite not being named in the accusatory portion of the complaint-affidavit demonstrated a clear abdication of judicial function and a violation of the constitutional mandate.
• Substantive: The Court found no probable cause to support the criminal charges. The complaint-affidavit was based on hearsay, not personal knowledge. Atty. Peña merely asserted that the documents were falsified and that the signatories were dummies, without alleging that he was present during the execution of the documents or that he was familiar with the signatures to conclude they were forged. The averments were sweeping assertions insufficient to warrant the filing of a complaint or the issuance of warrants. The prosecutor failed to carefully scrutinize the complaint, and the judge failed to require searching questions and answers. The Court ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.

• Posting Bail as Waiver of Right to Assail Arrest — The rule that posting bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Waiver requires clear and convincing proof of actual intention to relinquish the right; mere posting of bail to avoid incarceration is not waiver, particularly when accompanied by an immediate challenge to the arrest and a refusal to enter a plea.
• Personal Determination of Probable Cause — Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. This does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and witnesses, but the judge must go beyond the prosecutor's bare certification and personally evaluate the report, affidavits, and supporting documents. The judge has exclusive and personal responsibility to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause and cannot follow blindly the prosecutor's certification.
• Hearsay in Complaint-Affidavits — Affidavits must be based on personal knowledge to guard against hearsay. A complaint-affidavit containing mere assertions without factual basis or personal knowledge of the affiant is insufficient to establish probable cause or justify the issuance of warrants of arrest.
• Exceptions to the Rule Against Enjoining Criminal Prosecution — Courts may enjoin criminal prosecutions when necessary to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights, when there is a prejudicial question, when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority, when the prosecution is under an invalid law, when double jeopardy is apparent, when the court has no jurisdiction, when it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution, when charges are manifestly false and motivated by vengeance, or when there is clearly no prima facie case.

• "The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure."
• "There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge."
• "What he is never allowed to do is to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision."
• "Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification... he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it."
• "It behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty."
• "The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial."

• Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez — Cited for the proposition that Section 26, Rule 114 is a new rule intended to modify previous rulings that application for bail constitutes waiver of right to assail warrant; the rule is curative and retroactive in application.
• People v. Red — Cited as the original ruling that posting bail to avoid incarceration does not imply waiver of rights, which Section 26, Rule 114 reverted to.
• Soliven v. Makasiar — Cited for the interpretation that "personal determination" of probable cause by the judge does not mean personal examination of complainant and witnesses, but exclusive personal responsibility to satisfy himself of probable cause by evaluating supporting documents.
• Brocka v. Enrile — Cited for the enumeration of exceptions to the rule that criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined.
• Baltazar v. People — Cited for the duty of the judge to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause to insulate the falsely charged from the tribulations of trial.
• Jimenez v. Jimenez — Cited for the principle that it is imperative upon the fiscal or judge to relieve the accused from trial when evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case.
• Sales v. Sandiganbayan — Cited for the duty of prosecutors to carefully weigh evidence before filing informations.

• Article 172 (Use of Falsified Documents) and Article 171 (Falsification) of the Revised Penal Code — Define the crime charged against petitioners under the second paragraph of Article 172.
• Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that posting bail does not bar the accused from questioning the validity of his arrest or the existence of probable cause.
• Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution — Mandates that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses.
• Section 9(a) and (b), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs the procedure for cases not falling under RTC jurisdiction or covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, requiring the judge to personally examine the complainant and witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing a warrant.
• Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence — Provides the hearsay rule requiring personal knowledge for affidavits and testimony.