Bagatsing vs. Commission on Elections

Disqualification cases filed after the election but before proclamation of the winning candidate must be dismissed as disqualification cases under COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, but referred to the COMELEC Law Department for preliminary investigation; suspension of proclamation is only warranted if the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information is filed with the appropriate trial court.

Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda, and Jaime Lopez, together with private respondent Jose L. Atienza, were rival candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. Seven days after the elections, the petitioners filed a disqualification complaint against Atienza with the COMELEC, alleging that he caused the disbursement of public funds amounting to P3,375,000.00 within the prohibited forty-five-day period before the elections, intended as financial assistance for public school teachers who served as poll watchers, in violation of Article 22, Section 261(g)(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).

• Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda, and Jaime Lopez, together with private respondent Jose L. Atienza, were candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections.
• On May 18, 1998, seven days after the elections, petitioners filed a complaint for disqualification (SPA No. 98-319) against private respondent with the COMELEC.
• The complaint alleged that private respondent caused the disbursement of P3,375,000.00 in public funds within the prohibited forty-five-day period before the elections, violating Article 22, Section 261(g)(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).
• The alleged disbursement was intended as financial assistance for public school teachers who manned the precinct polls in Manila during the elections.
• On May 20, 1998, the COMELEC First Division issued an order finding probable cause and strong evidence of election offenses, directing the City Board of Canvassers of Manila to suspend the proclamation of private respondent should he obtain the winning number of votes.
• On May 21, 1998, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
• On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC First Division issued a resolution granting the Motion for Reconsideration, setting aside the order of suspension, and directing the City Board of Canvassers to complete the canvass and proclaim the winning candidate.
• The COMELEC dismissed the disqualification case but referred the charges to the Law Department for preliminary investigation, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
• On the same day (June 4, 1998), petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation, and later in the afternoon, a Motion for Reconsideration and a Second Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation.
• At around 3:00 p.m. on June 4, 1998, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila reconvened and proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected Mayor.
• On June 25, 1998, without waiting for the resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration pending before the COMELEC en banc, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
• On July 2, 1998, the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration because petitioners had already filed the petition before the Supreme Court.

• The COMELEC acted whimsically, capriciously, and arbitrarily when it dismissed the disqualification complaint based on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, which had already been modified by the Supreme Court in Sunga v. COMELEC.
• The dismissal by the COMELEC was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• The COMELEC erred in not ordering the suspension of private respondent's proclamation despite their timely-filed motions to suspend the immediate intended proclamation.

• COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is applicable and mandates the dismissal of disqualification cases filed after the election but before proclamation, with referral to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.
• The Supreme Court in Lozano v. COMELEC upheld Resolution No. 2050 as a specific rule prevailing over general COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether petitioners properly availed of the remedy of certiorari before the Supreme Court while their Motion for Reconsideration was still pending before the COMELEC en banc.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Resolution dated June 4, 1998 dismissing the disqualification case against private respondent and referring the same to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.
  • Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the suspension of private respondent's proclamation.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court will not countenance the practice of taking shortcuts of established rules of procedure pertaining to the hierarchy of courts and remedies of last resort.
  • When petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari, they knew that their motion for reconsideration was still pending with the COMELEC en banc, yet they went directly to the Supreme Court.
  • This practice falls short of forum-shopping in the technical sense and will not be allowed.
• Substantive:
  • The Court did not nullify in toto COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 in Sunga v. COMELEC; it only found objectionable the second paragraph of paragraph 1 of said Resolution as it infringes on Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
  • The Sunga case cannot apply to the instant case because here, the disqualification case was filed on May 18, 1998, seven days after the May 11, 1998 elections.
  • Therefore, paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 applies: the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.
  • The COMELEC did not err in not ordering the suspension of private respondent's proclamation because there was no prima facie finding of guilt by the Law Department, and no corresponding information had been filed with the appropriate trial court as required by paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050.
  • The mere pendency of a disqualification case against a winning candidate does not justify the suspension of his proclamation after winning in the election.

• Hierarchy of Courts and Remedies — Litigants must observe the proper hierarchy of courts and exhaust available remedies before resorting to extraordinary writs; filing a petition before the Supreme Court while a motion for reconsideration is pending before a lower tribunal constitutes a prohibited shortcut.
• Specific vs. General Rule — As between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail; COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, being specific to disqualification cases, prevails over the general COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Effects of Disqualification Cases Filed After Election — Under Resolution No. 2050, disqualification cases filed after the election but before proclamation must be dismissed as disqualification cases but referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation; suspension of proclamation requires a prima facie finding of guilt and the filing of information with the trial court.

• "The Court will not countenance the practice of taking any shortcuts of the established rules of procedure pertaining to the hierarchy of courts and remedies of last resort."
• "To hold otherwise would unduly encourage the filing of baseless and malicious petitions for disqualification if only to effect the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, not only to his damage and prejudice but also to the defeat of the sovereign will of the electorate, and for the undue benefit of underserving third parties."
• "The word 'shall' signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced."

• Sunga v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 76 (1998) — Controlling precedent interpreting COMELEC Resolution No. 2050; held that only the second paragraph of paragraph 1 (regarding pre-election filed cases unresolved after election) was invalid for infringing Section 6 of RA 6646, but did not nullify the Resolution in toto.
• Lozano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94628, October 28, 1991 — Cited to uphold the applicability of Resolution No. 2050 as a specific rule prevailing over general COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Silvestre v. Duavit — Cited in Sunga regarding the interpretation of Resolution No. 2050 and its relation to Section 6 of RA 6646.
• Singco v. COMELEC, 101 SCRA 420 (1980) — Cited for the principle that the mere pendency of a disqualification case against a candidate does not justify the suspension of his proclamation after winning in the election.

• Article 22, Section 261(g)(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Prohibits the giving of salary increases or remuneration to government employees within forty-five days before a regular election; cited as the provision allegedly violated by private respondent.
• Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Enumerates grounds for disqualification of candidates, including violation of Section 261 provisions.
• Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — Mandates that if a disqualification case is not resolved before an election, the COMELEC shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action; cited to invalidate the second paragraph of paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 2050 in Sunga.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 (November 3, 1988) — Formulates rules governing the disposition of disqualification cases filed under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of RA 6646; paragraph 2 governs cases filed after election but before proclamation.