Arizala vs. Court of Appeals

The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal; consequently, where a statute criminalizing supervisors' membership in rank-and-file unions is effectively repealed and replaced by laws allowing such membership, accused supervisors must be acquitted of pending criminal charges under the repealed statute.

Under the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), government-owned or controlled corporations were subject to collective bargaining obligations similar to private employers, but supervisors were prohibited from joining labor organizations composed of rank-and-file employees, with criminal penalties imposed for violations. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a government-owned corporation performing proprietary functions, had a collective bargaining agreement with the GSIS Employees Association containing a "maintenance-of-membership" clause obligating members to maintain union membership for the duration of the agreement.

• The petitioners were supervisory employees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Central Visayas Regional Office: Pablo Arizala was Chief of the Accounting Division; Sergio Maribao was Chief of the Billing Section; Leonardo Joven was Assistant Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief); and Felino Bulandus was Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance Division (and Acting Division Chief).
• The GSIS had executed a collective bargaining agreement with the GSIS Employees Association, the labor organization representing the majority of its employees, which contained a "maintenance-of-membership" clause requiring all employees who were members at the time of execution or who became members thereafter to maintain their union membership in good standing for the duration of the agreement as a condition for continued employment.
• Under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), individuals employed as supervisors were prohibited from being eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their supervision, though they could form separate organizations of their own.
• Demands were made on all four petitioners to resign from the GSIS Employees Association in view of their supervisory positions, but they refused to do so.
• Two criminal cases were filed against them in the City Court of Cebu for violation of the Industrial Peace Act.
• Both cases resulted in convictions, with each petitioner sentenced to pay a fine of P500.00 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
• At the time of the 1973 Constitution's effectivity on January 17, 1973, the case of Arizala and Maribao was pending in the Court of Appeals, while that of Joven and Bulandus was pending decision in the City Court of Cebu.
• The Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) took effect on November 1, 1974, repealing provisions of the Industrial Peace Act not adopted as part of the Code and providing that terms and conditions of employment of government employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, would be governed by the Civil Service Law rather than collective bargaining.
• Subsequent legislation including Executive Order No. 111 (1986), Executive Order No. 180 (1987), and Republic Act No. 6715 (1989) modified the rights of government employees regarding self-organization, with RA 6715 explicitly allowing supervisors who were already members of rank-and-file bargaining units to remain therein.

• The petitioners argued that when the 1973 Constitution took effect, their cases were still pending, and subsequent legislation effectively repealed the Industrial Peace Act provisions under which they were charged.
• They contended that the Labor Code (PD 442) repealed those parts of the Industrial Peace Act not adopted as part of the Code, and specifically did not adopt the provision conferring on government-owned or controlled corporation employees the right of self-organization and collective bargaining, instead placing such employees under the Civil Service Law.
• They asserted that the specific criminal penalty for violation of the prohibition on supervisors being members of labor organizations of employees under their supervision had disappeared from the law.
• They maintained that the Labor Code modified the concept of unfair labor practice, making it merely an administrative offense rather than a criminal offense.
• They argued that since the terms and conditions of government employment were fixed by law and no longer subject to collective bargaining, the rationale for prohibiting supervisors from joining rank-and-file unions (preventing employer control of the union) no longer existed.

• The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the Labor Code provided that all actions or claims accruing prior to its effectivity shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual.
• They contended that the legislature cannot generally intervene and vacate the judgment of the courts, either directly or indirectly, by the repeal of the statute under which said judgment has been rendered.
• They maintained that the petitioners' criminal liability survived the repeal of the penal statute.

• Procedural:
  • Whether the repeal of the penal provision prohibiting supervisors from joining rank-and-file unions, while the criminal cases were pending on appeal, deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish the accused.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the petitioners' criminal liability for violation of the Industrial Peace Act was obliterated by subsequent legislation (the 1973 Constitution, Labor Code, Executive Order No. 111, Executive Order No. 180, and Republic Act No. 6715) which removed the prohibition on supervisors maintaining membership in rank-and-file labor organizations.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court held that the repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. Citing People v. Tamayo and People v. Almuete, the Court ruled that where the offense ceases to be criminal by subsequent legislation while the case is pending on appeal, the proceedings must be dismissed because it would be illogical to sentence the accused for an offense that no longer exists.
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that the prohibition on supervisors joining rank-and-file unions was effectively removed by subsequent legislation. The Labor Code allowed supervisors (if not managerial) to join rank-and-file unions. More decisively, Republic Act No. 6715 explicitly authorized supervisors who were already members of existing rank-and-file bargaining units at the time of its effectivity to "remain therein." Therefore, the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor organization, which was once a crime under the Industrial Peace Act, is not only no longer a crime but is explicitly allowed under present law, warranting acquittal.

• Repeal of Penal Statutes — The doctrine holds that the repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal, particularly when the repeal is absolute and not a reenactment, and where the legislative intent shows that the conduct formerly denounced is no longer deemed criminal. The Court applied this to dismiss the charges against the petitioners since the act was decriminalized while on appeal.
• Right to Self-Organization of Government Employees — The doctrine traces the evolution of the right to self-organization for government employees from the Industrial Peace Act (which allowed collective bargaining for proprietary functions but prohibited strikes for governmental functions), through the Labor Code (which initially exempted government employees from collective bargaining), to the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws (which granted the right to self-organization but limited collective bargaining to matters not fixed by law). The Court used this historical analysis to demonstrate that the prohibition on supervisory membership had been effectively abrogated.
• Supervisory Employees' Union Membership — The doctrine distinguishes between managerial and supervisory employees, holding that while managerial employees are ineligible to join any labor organization, supervisory employees may join, assist, or form separate labor organizations of their own, and under current law (RA 6715), may remain in existing rank-and-file units if they were members at the time of the law's effectivity.

• "The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal."
• "The decisive consideration is that at present, supervisors who were already members of a rank-and-file labor organization at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, are authorized to 'remain therein.' It seems plain, in other words, that the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on such membership, is not only not a crime, but is explicitly allowed, under present law."
• "It would be illogical for this court to attempt to sentence appellant for the offense that no longer exists."

• People v. Tamayo (61 Phil. 225) — Controlling precedent establishing that where a criminal statute is repealed while the appeal is pending such that the act ceases to be criminal, the criminal proceedings must be dismissed.
• People v. Almuete (69 SCRA 410) — Controlling precedent reaffirming that the repeal of a penal law deprives courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged under the old law, applied to uphold dismissal of charges when the offense ceased to exist under subsequent legislation.
• United States v. Cuna (12 Phil. 241) — Cited for the distinction between repeal by reenactment (which does not destroy criminal liability) and absolute repeal (which does).
• Wing v. United States (218 U.S. 272) — Cited to show the American common law approach to repealed statutes, contrasted with the Philippine rule.
• Manila Cordage Co. v. CIR (78 SCRA 408) — Cited regarding maintenance-of-membership clauses in collective bargaining agreements.
• GSIS v. Castillo (98 Phil. 876) — Cited to establish that the GSIS performs proprietary functions and is engaged in insurance, which is not inherently a governmental function.
• Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1) — Cited regarding the status of government employees under labor law.

• Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), Section 3 — Provided the prohibition on supervisors being eligible for membership in labor organizations of employees under their supervision, and the right of employees to self-organization.
• Republic Act No. 875, Section 25 — Prescribed criminal sanctions for violations of Section 3.
• Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), Article 250 — Modified the concept of unfair labor practice to be merely an administrative offense rather than a criminal offense (later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 70).
• Presidential Decree No. 442, Article 314 — Provided that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by Civil Service Law.
• Republic Act No. 6715 (1989) — Amended the Labor Code to explicitly allow supervisors who were members of existing rank-and-file bargaining units to remain therein, and defined supervisory and managerial employees.
• Executive Order No. 180 (1987), Section 3 — Declared that high level employees whose functions are policy-making or managerial, or whose duties are highly confidential, shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and-file government employees.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-B, Section 2(5) — Provided that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
• 1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3 — Guaranteed the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities including the right to strike.