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Title	IDs & Reference #s	Background	Primary Holding	Subject Matter
Pante vs. People (18th January 2021)	AK603265 969 SCRA 243 , 894 Phil. 54 , G.R. No. 218969	Dawson Word lost a bundle of money (US dollars and Philippine pesos). A minor, one of Pante's co-accused, found the money and shared it with Pante and another minor. Pante, the only adult, took a significant portion of the money and used it for personal expenses. He only returned a portion after police intervention.	A person who receives lost property from the original finder and subsequently misappropriates it, knowing it is not rightfully theirs, is considered a "finder in law" and can be held liable for theft under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the Revised Penal Code for failing to return the property to the owner or authorities.	Property and Land Law
PLDT vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation (9th October 2019)	AK339916 922 SCRA 518 , 864 Phil. 899 , G.R. No. 214546	Citi Appliance, owner of a land in Cebu City, discovered underground telephone lines, cables, and manholes installed by PLDT while excavating for a parking lot for its planned commercial building. These installations were preventing Citi Appliance from fully utilizing its property. Citi Appliance sought to have PLDT remove these installations or pay for parking exemption fees, leading to a forcible entry case when PLDT refused.	The Petition for Review is granted; the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution are set aside; the action for forcible entry is deemed to have prescribed, and the Municipal Trial Court in Cities had no jurisdiction over the case.	Property and Land Law
Leviste Management System, Inc. vs. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc (4th April 2018)	AK149294 829 Phil. 176 , 860 SCRA 355 , G.R. No. 199353	Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. owns and operates a condominium building. Leviste Management System, Inc. (LEMANS) owned Concession 3, a unit within the building. LEMANS sought to build Concession 4 on the roof deck above Concession 3. Legaspi Towers objected, arguing the construction was illegal as it violated the Master Deed and Condominium Act and was built without proper approvals. LEMANS claimed ownership of the airspace and good faith in the construction, seeking application of Article 448 of the Civil Code.	Article 448 of the Civil Code regarding builders in good faith is not applicable in condominium settings governed by the Condominium Act, Master Deed, and By-Laws. Condominium corporations, acting through their Board of Directors, have the right to abate constructions violating the Master Deed and By-Laws, and unit owners cannot unilaterally expand their units onto common areas.	Property and Land Law
Heirs of Jose Mariano and Helen S. Mariano vs. City of Naga (12th March 2018)	AK791996 931 Phil. 369 , 858 SCRA 179 , G.R. No. 197743	In 1954, City Heights Subdivision offered to donate 5 hectares of land to the City of Naga for the City Hall, conditional on the subdivision being awarded the construction contract. The Municipal Board accepted the donation, and the City took possession and built the City Hall and other government offices. However, the construction contract was awarded to a different contractor. The landowners and their heirs later demanded the return of the property, arguing the condition for donation was not met, and the donation was not properly executed.	The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision and reinstated the Regional Trial Court's decision, as modified. It ordered the City of Naga to vacate the subject property, peacefully surrender possession to the petitioners, pay a monthly rental of PHP 2,500,000 (later modified to PHP 75,000 for attorney's fees), and recognized that the donation was void and the petitioners had a better right to possession based on their Torrens title.	Property and Land Law
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan vs. Garcia, Jr. (5th October 2016)	AK518566 804 SCRA 629 , 796 Phil. 414 , G.R. No. 174964	The Province of Bataan owned land occupied by the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades (MLLSAT) and Bataan Community Colleges (BCC). Republic Act No. 8562 converted MLLSAT into Bataan Polytechnic State College (BPSC) and integrated BCC into it, declaring the lands occupied by these schools as property of BPSC and mandating the transfer of titles. The Province of Bataan refused to transfer the titles, claiming the lands were patrimonial property and mortgaged.	The Supreme Court held that the subject parcels of land are considered communal property of the State, held in trust by the Province of Bataan, and therefore are subject to the absolute control and disposition of the National Government through Congress. A writ of mandamus compelling the transfer of land titles to BPSC was correctly issued.	Property and Land Law
Mercader, Jr. vs. Bardilas (27th June 2016)	AK382375 788 Phil. 136 , 794 SCRA 387 , G.R. No. 163157	The dispute arose between owners of subdivided lots originally part of a larger property. Spouses Mercader and Spouses Bardilas owned adjacent lots, with Spouses Bardilas' lot being burdened by a right of way for the benefit of Spouses Mercader's lot and others to access Clarita Village. A fence erected by the Clarita Village Association restricted the original exit of the right of way, leading to conflicts about encroachment and the extent of rights over the easement.	The owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion of land burdened by a road right of way easement and may use it, provided such use does not hinder the easement's purpose. The phrase "with existing Right of Way" in a title doesn't automatically grant the dominant estate ownership of the easement area.	Property and Land Law
Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas (30th May 2016)	AK786051 791 SCRA 272 , 785 Phil. 712 , G.R. No. 180110	Capwire, a telecommunications company, claimed co-ownership of the "Wet Segment" of submarine cable systems laid internationally and reported "Indefeasible Rights in Cable Systems" as property. For loan restructuring, Capwire assessed the value of its right and submitted a sworn statement for real properties. The Provincial Assessor of Batangas then issued real property tax assessments on these cable systems. Capwire contested the assessments, arguing the cables were in international waters and not taxable in the Philippines.	The Supreme Court denied Capwire's petition, affirming the dismissal of its appeal. The Court held that Capwire should have exhausted administrative remedies before resorting to court action because factual issues were involved, and that submarine communication cables are considered taxable real property.	Property and Land Law
Alolino vs. Flores (4th April 2016)	AK909292 788 SCRA 92 , 783 Phil. 605 , G.R. No. 198774	Petitioner Alolino owned property with a two-story house. Respondents Flores spouses built a house/sari-sari store on an adjacent municipal/barrio road without a building permit. This structure blocked Alolino's light and ventilation and access to the municipal road from his rear door, prompting him to seek its removal.	The respondents' house/sari-sari store, illegally constructed on a barrio road (public property), is deemed a public and private nuisance per se and must be demolished. The reclassification of the barrio road to residential by the Sanggunian resolution was ineffective because it was not done through a valid ordinance approved by two-thirds of the Sanggunian members.	Property and Land Law
Republic vs. Tan (10th February 2016)	AK918613 783 SCRA 643 , 780 Phil. 764 , G.R. No. 199537	Andrea Tan applied for original land registration based on acquisitive prescription, claiming continuous possession of a parcel of land declared alienable and disposable in 1965. The Municipal Trial Court granted her application, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Republic appealed, arguing that mere declaration of alienability is insufficient for prescription against the State.	A declaration that government-owned land is alienable and disposable does not, by itself, convert it into patrimonial property of the State; an express declaration that the land is no longer intended for public use or public service is required for acquisitive prescription to apply against the State.	Property and Land Law
Manila Electric Company vs. The City Assessor (5th August 2015)	AK880939 765 Phil. 605 , G.R. No. 166102	MERALCO had been operating in Lucena City since 1922 under various franchises, some of which provided tax exemptions on certain electric facilities. Lucena City began assessing real property tax on MERALCO's electric facilities starting 1985. MERALCO contested these assessments, arguing that its facilities were exempt under its franchise and were personal property, not real property.	The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, declaring that MERALCO's electric facilities are subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code. However, it nullified the 1997 appraisal and assessment by the City Assessor of Lucena due to violation of MERALCO's right to due process and ordered a new assessment to be conducted in accordance with the Local Government Code.	Property and Land Law
Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. (NOVAI) vs. Republic (3rd August 2015)	AK461713 765 Phil. 429 , 764 SCRA 524 , G.R. No. 177168	The land in question was originally part of Fort William McKinley, later Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). Presidential Proclamation No. 423 reserved a large area for military purposes. Proclamation No. 461 excluded a portion as AFP Officers’ Village, intended for disposal under specific laws. Subsequently, Proclamation No. 478 reserved a smaller portion, including the property in dispute, for veterans rehabilitation. NOVAI claimed to have purchased the land from the Republic based on a Deed of Sale referring to a fictitious Proclamation No. 2487.	Land reserved for public or quasi-public purposes remains inalienable public domain unless explicitly withdrawn from such reservation by law or presidential proclamation and positively declared alienable and disposable. A sale of inalienable public land is void ab initio, and the title issued based on such sale is also void.	Property and Land Law
Republic vs. De Guzman Vda. de Joson (10th March 2014)	AK697117 728 Phil. 550 , 718 SCRA 228 , G.R. No. 163767	Rosario de Guzman Vda. de Joson applied for land registration based on her and her predecessors-in-interest's alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since 1926. The Republic opposed, arguing the land was unclassified forest land and not subject to private appropriation. The CFI and CA ruled in favor of De Joson, but the Republic appealed to the Supreme Court.	The application for land registration is denied because the applicant failed to discharge the burden of proving that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain, a prerequisite for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.	Property and Land Law
Republic vs. Bacas (20th November 2013)	AK418209 710 SCRA 411 , 721 Phil. 808 , G.R. No. 182913	President Quezon issued Proclamation No. 265 in 1938, reserving land for military purposes, creating Camp Evangelista. Despite this, the Bacases and Chabons filed separate land registration applications in 1964 and 1974, respectively, for parcels within the reservation. The Land Registration Court granted their applications, leading to Original Certificates of Title. The Republic then filed actions to annul these titles.	The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court decisions, holding that the Land Registration Court lacked jurisdiction to register inalienable public land, specifically land within a military reservation, and that the land titles obtained through fraudulent applications are void ab initio and must be cancelled.	Property and Land Law
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines (3rd September 2013)	AK741804 704 SCRA 561 , 717 Phil. 141 , G.R. No. 179987	Mario Malabanan applied for land registration in 1998 claiming ownership through purchase and continuous, open, public, and adverse possession for over 30 years, asserting the land was alienable and disposable public land. The Republic opposed, arguing failure to prove the land's alienable and disposable nature and insufficient possession as required by law.	The motions for reconsideration from both the petitioners and the respondent are denied, reaffirming the original decision that the petitioners failed to sufficiently prove their right to land registration because they did not establish possession and occupation of the property or by their predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945, nor did they fully comply with the requirements of Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.	Property and Land Law
Pilar Development Corporation vs. Dumadag (11th March 2013)	AK661257 693 SCRA 96 , 706 Phil. 93 , G.R. No. 194336	Pilar Development Corporation claimed ownership of a property within Pilar Village Subdivision, a portion of which was occupied by respondents who built shanties. PDC filed an accion publiciana to evict the respondents, arguing they built without consent on land designated for village recreational facilities. The respondents countered that the local government, not PDC, had jurisdiction over the area. The trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed PDC's complaint, finding the occupied area was a public easement.	Pilar Development Corporation cannot recover possession of the 3-meter strip of land designated for public easement because it is considered part of the public dominion. The proper party to institute an action concerning this public easement is the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General or the local government of Las Piñas City.	Property and Land Law
Matthews vs. Taylor (22nd June 2009)	AK576607 590 SCRA 394 , 608 Phil. 193 , G.R. No. 164584	Benjamin Taylor, a British citizen, and Joselyn Taylor, a Filipina, were married. Joselyn purchased a property in Boracay using funds allegedly provided by Benjamin and developed it into a resort. Later, without Benjamin's express consent, Joselyn leased the property to Philip Matthews. Benjamin filed a case to nullify the lease agreement arguing it was void without his consent as the property was community property and his funds were used for its acquisition.	The Agreement of Lease between Joselyn Taylor and Philip Matthews is valid because Benjamin Taylor, the alien husband, has no legal right to nullify the lease on property exclusively owned by his Filipino wife. Aliens are constitutionally prohibited from owning land in the Philippines, thus Benjamin's claim of ownership or need for consent is without legal basis.	Property and Land Law
Rufloe vs. Burgos (30th January 2009)	AK442785 577 SCRA 264 , 597 Phil. 261 , G.R. No. 143573	The case stems from a property originally owned by the Rufloe spouses. A Deed of Sale was forged, purportedly signed by the Rufloes, transferring the property to Elvira Delos Reyes. Delos Reyes then sold the property to the Burgos siblings, who later sold it to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. The Rufloes filed a case to nullify these transactions, claiming forgery and asserting their continued ownership.	The respondents, including the Burgos siblings and Leonarda Burgos, were not innocent purchasers for value. Consequently, they did not acquire a valid title to the property despite relying on Transfer Certificates of Title derived from a forged Deed of Sale. The original title of the Rufloe spouses was reinstated.	Property and Land Law
Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio (27th December 2007)	AK570269 541 SCRA 479 , 565 Phil. 766 , G.R. No. 169454	Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante owned a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 352. They had children, including Marcelino and Fortunato Doronio. Simeon and Cornelia executed a private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of Marcelino and his wife Veronica Pico. The description in the deed of donation differed slightly from OCT No. 352 regarding adjacent property owners. Petitioners, heirs of Marcelino, registered the deed through a petition case without naming respondents, heirs of Fortunato, leading to a new TCT in their predecessor's name, covering the entire property. Respondents contested this, claiming only half was intended for donation and the donation was invalid.	The private deed of donation propter nuptias of real property executed in 1919 under the Old Civil Code is void for not being in a public instrument; therefore, it conveyed no title.	Property and Land Law
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development Corporation (14th December 2007)	AK258876 540 SCRA 304 , 565 Phil. 59 , G.R. No. 123346 , G.R. No. 134385	The dispute centers on ownership claims over portions of the vast Maysilo Estate, all purportedly originating from OCT No. 994. Conflicting claims arose between Manotok Realty and Manotok Estate Corporation versus CLT Realty Development Corporation in one case, and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. versus the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson in the other. These cases reached the Supreme Court after conflicting decisions in the lower courts and the Court of Appeals concerning the validity of the parties' titles. Prior Supreme Court decisions in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals had previously addressed claims emanating from OCT No. 994, but inconsistencies and new factual evidence necessitated a re-examination.	The Supreme Court remanded the consolidated cases to a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to conduct further proceedings and factually determine which of the contending parties' titles, if any, are validly derived from the genuine Original Certificate of Title No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917, and to resolve other factual issues crucial to determining rightful land ownership. Titles purportedly derived from a non-existent OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 are declared void.	Property and Land Law
Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo vs. Rañon (5th September 2007)	AK869857 532 SCRA 391 , 559 Phil. 169 , G.R. No. 171068	Agrifina Rañon filed a complaint against spouses Montemayor to quiet title over a residential lot, claiming ownership based on long and continuous possession since 1962. The Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo intervened, asserting their rights as successors-in-interest of the original owners and claiming that Rañon's possession was not in good faith and did not ripen into ownership. The spouses Montemayor were later dropped as parties as they had repurchased the property from the Arzadons. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) initially ruled in favor of the Arzadon heirs, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed this decision, favoring the Rañons through acquisitive prescription. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision.	The respondents, Heirs of Agrifina Rañon, validly acquired ownership of the subject property through extraordinary acquisitive prescription because they demonstrated continuous, peaceful, public, notorious, uninterrupted, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for over thirty years.	Property and Land Law
Preysler, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals (11th July 2006)	AK116882 494 SCRA 547 , 527 Phil. 129 , G.R. No. 158141	Petitioner owned landlocked parcels adjacent to Respondent's Tali Beach Subdivision, needing access through the subdivision roads. Respondent initially allowed access but later barricaded the property. Petitioner sought a right of way and preliminary injunction. The trial court initially granted a preliminary injunction to remove barricades and allow passage. This was later amended to include passage for contractors, equipment, and power line installation.	The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision to reinstate the original writ of preliminary injunction (maintaining status quo). However, the Supreme Court recognized the petitioner's need for temporary easement for construction purposes under Article 656 of the Civil Code and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the proper indemnity for this temporary right of way. The installation of power lines was deemed a permanent easement not covered by the temporary easement provisions.	Property and Land Law
Portic vs. Cristobal (22nd April 2005)	AK058410 456 SCRA 577 , 496 Phil. 456 , G.R. No. 156171	Spouses Portic sold property to Anastacia Cristobal under an agreement that included conditions about payment of a balance. A dispute arose when Cristobal registered the title in her name despite allegedly not fully paying the balance, and Spouses Portic sought to quiet title, claiming the sale was void due to non-payment.	The Supreme Court held that the agreement was a contract to sell, and because the vendee failed to fully pay the purchase price, ownership of the property did not transfer to her. Consequently, the action for quieting of title filed by the vendors was deemed proper and not prescribed as they remained in possession and legal owners of the property.	Property and Land Law
National Housing Authority vs. Court of Appeals (13th April 2005)	AK266478 456 SCRA 17 , 495 Phil. 693 , G.R. NO. 148830	President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 481 reserving a 120-hectare NHA-owned land for the National Government Center (NGC). Later, Proclamation No. 1670 segregated seven hectares from the NGC and granted MSBF usufructuary rights over it, to be determined by future survey. MSBF occupied an area exceeding seven hectares and leased a portion to BGC. NHA, under Memorandum Order No. 127 which revoked the reserved status of the remaining 50 hectares, sought to demolish BGC's facilities, leading BGC to file for injunction.	The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court to order a joint survey by NHA and MSBF to determine the precise metes and bounds of the seven-hectare usufruct granted to MSBF, ensuring contiguity and inclusion of MSBF's major existing facilities as much as possible within that area, while also ensuring MSBF respects the seven-hectare limit and vacates any area exceeding it.	Property and Land Law
Baloloy vs. Hular (9th September 2004)	AK688555 438 SCRA 80 , 481 Phil. 398 , G.R. No. 157767	Alfredo Hular claimed ownership of land originally owned by his father, Astrologo Hular, part of Lot No. 3347. He alleged that Iluminado Baloloy fraudulently secured a Free Patent and OCT over Lot No. 3353, which included a portion of his father's land (later found to be 1,405 square meters, not 287 sqm as initially thought). Hular sought to quiet title, nullify the Baloloy's OCT, and reconveyance, citing prior ownership and acquisitive prescription. Baloloys, heirs of Iluminado, argued their title's sanctity and Hular's lack of cause of action.	The petition is granted. The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside. The complaint of the respondent is dismissed. The respondent failed to implead indispensable parties and failed to prove his claim of ownership by preponderance of evidence sufficient to overcome the petitioners' Torrens title.	Property and Land Law
Heirs of Emiliano Navarro vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (13th October 1997)	AK197612 345 Phil. 810 , G.R. No. 68166	The case involves a land dispute where the Heirs of Navarro originally filed a Petition for Review. The Supreme Court issued a Decision on February 12, 1997, which the Heirs of Pascual found confusing, particularly the dispositive portion in relation to the body of the decision regarding the public domain nature of the land. This confusion led to the Omnibus Motion seeking clarification, reconsideration, and remand.	The Supreme Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Remand but granted the Motion for Clarification by rectifying specific typographical and clerical errors within its previous Decision dated February 12, 1997, ultimately granting the Petition for Review and reinstating the decision of the Court of First Instance.	Property and Land Law
Sia vs. Court of Appeals (5th May 1997)	AK070235 272 SCRA 141 , 338 Phil. 652 , G.R. No. 108222	Atty. Rodolfo N. Pelaez originally owned the land and leased it to Henry L. Sia's parents who built a structure on it with permission in 1970. After Rodolfo Pelaez passed away, the land was inherited by his son, Atty. Pacifico Pelaez, who then sold it to Torre de Oro Development Corporation. Henry L. Sia succeeded his parents as lessee. Torre de Oro Development Corporation and Sia entered into a new one-year lease contract in 1988. Upon expiry, the lessor decided not to renew the lease and sought to eject Sia, leading to this legal dispute concerning Sia's rights as a lessee with improvements on the land.	A lessee of land who constructs improvements thereon is not considered a builder in good faith under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code and therefore does not have the right to retain possession until reimbursed for the full value of the improvements. The rights of a lessee regarding improvements are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which limits reimbursement to one-half of the improvement's value at the lessor's option and does not grant a right of retention.	Property and Land Law
Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals (9th February 1996)	AK813360 253 SCRA 391 , 323 Phil. 462 , G.R. No. 105944	Pedro Calapine donated land to his niece, Helen Doria. Later, he claimed that a second deed of donation conveying the entire property was forged by Doria and sought to revoke the donation due to her ingratitude. Doria then sold the land to Spouses Eduarte. The lower courts sided with Calapine, revoking the donation and declaring the Eduartes buyers in bad faith, leading to this appeal.	The Supreme Court held that while the revocation of the donation was valid due to the donee's ingratitude through forgery, the petitioner-spouses were purchasers in good faith. Consequently, the deed of absolute sale to the petitioners and their title were upheld, but the fraudulent donee was held liable for damages to the original donor.	Property and Land Law
Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co (8th April 1991)	AK658021 195 SCRA 748 , 273 Phil. 115 , G.R. No. 90596	Solid Manila Corporation claimed a right-of-way over a private alley located on property owned by Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. This alley was established by a prior owner and annotated on Bio Hong's title. Bio Hong constructed steel gates obstructing the alley, leading Solid Manila to file for injunction to remove the gates and enforce the easement.	The easement of right-of-way in favor of the public was validly constituted and was not extinguished by merger when Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. acquired the property; therefore, Bio Hong must respect and maintain the easement, removing any obstructions.	Property and Land Law
Ronquillo vs. Court of Appeals (20th March 1991)	AK198213 195 SCRA 433 , 272-A Phil. 412 , G.R. No. 43346	Rosendo del Rosario and his daughters claimed ownership of a dried-up estero portion adjacent to their titled land, asserting riparian rights. Mario Ronquillo occupied this portion and claimed it was public land. The Director of Lands and Development Bank of the Philippines were later impleaded as respondents.	The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land, not private property of the riparian owners, because its drying up was caused by human intervention and not a natural change in the course of the waters.	Property and Land Law
Jagualing vs. Court of Appeals (4th March 1991)	AK813608 194 SCRA 607 , 272 Phil. 439 , G.R. No. 94283	The Eduaves, private respondents, filed an action to quiet title over a parcel of land that had become an island in the Tagoloan River against the Jagualings, petitioners, who were in possession of the island. The Eduaves claimed ownership through inheritance and presented evidence of tax declarations and acts of ownership on the land prior to its becoming an island. The Jagualings claimed ownership through adverse possession.	The owner of the land along the margin nearest to an island formed in a non-navigable and non-floatable river has a better right to the island than those in actual possession of it, based on the principle of riparian ownership and accretion as provided in Article 465 of the Civil Code.	Property and Land Law
Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (4th June 1990)	AK579538 186 SCRA 88 , 264 Phil. 450 , G.R. No. 73085	Private respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title, asserting ownership over land based on a Spanish title. The Republic of the Philippines argued that the land was part of a forest reserve and national park, making it inalienable public land not subject to private ownership. The trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court initially ruled in favor of the private respondents.	Forest lands and national parks are not subject to private appropriation; Spanish titles are not valid proof of ownership for unregistered lands after Presidential Decree No. 892.	Property and Land Law
Spouses Del Campo vs. Abesia (15th April 1988)	AK305738 160 SCRA 379 , 243 Phil. 532 , No. L-49219	Spouses Del Campo and Bernarda Abesia were co-owners of a small parcel of land. During a partition action, it was discovered that Abesia's house slightly encroached onto the portion allocated to the Del Campos. The core issue was whether Abesia, as a co-owner builder, could invoke the rights of a builder in good faith under Article 448.	Article 448 of the Civil Code can apply to resolve disputes between former co-owners after partition, concerning constructions made in good faith that encroach on another co-owner's allocated portion.	Property and Land Law
Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (12th November 1987)	AK429625 239 Phil. 563 , 155 SCRA 577 , No. L-71283	The case originates from a cadastral proceeding where Miguel Escritor claimed ownership of a land lot based on inheritance. The Court of First Instance initially adjudicated the land to Escritor. Years later, Simeon Acuna filed a petition for review alleging fraud and misrepresentation in Escritor's acquisition. This petition was eventually granted, and the land was adjudicated to Acuna. Acuna then sued Escritor's heirs for damages for unlawful possession of the land during the period between the initial adjudication and its reversal.	A possessor who initially acquired property based on a court decision, even if later reversed, is considered a possessor in good faith until they are actually aware of a defect in their title. Bad faith is personal and not transmissible to heirs unless they have personal knowledge of the flaw. Good faith is presumed, and the burden of proving bad faith lies with the one alleging it.	Property and Land Law
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (29th December 1986)	AK048318 146 SCRA 509 , 230 Phil. 590 , No. L-73002	Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. sought to register five parcels of land acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe, through land registration proceedings under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. The Director of Lands opposed the registration, arguing that because the proceedings started after the 1973 Constitution came into effect, the corporation was disqualified from owning public land according to the new constitution.	The Supreme Court held that the land acquired by Acme Plywood from the Infiels in 1962 was already private land by operation of law due to the Infiels' immemorial possession, and thus Acme Plywood, as a successor-in-interest, had a registrable title despite being a corporation and despite the 1973 Constitution’s restrictions, because the right vested prior to the 1973 Constitution.	Property and Land Law
Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (29th November 1983)	AK724137 126 SCRA 69 , 211 Phil. 260 , No. L-27873 , No. L-30035	The case originated from an application for land registration filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz for Lot No. 885. Several oppositions were filed, including one from the Director of Forestry, who argued the land was forest land. The Court of First Instance partially granted the application to private litigants, but this was appealed.	Possession of forest lands, regardless of duration, cannot ripen into private ownership. Forest lands remain in the public domain and are not subject to registration for private individuals unless there is a positive act from the government declassifying them as agricultural or disposable land.	Property and Land Law
People vs. Narvaez (20th April 1983)	AK862181 121 SCRA 389 , 206 Phil. 314 , Nos. L-33466-67	Narvaez, a settler in South Cotabato, was embroiled in a land dispute with Fleischer and Company. He had been leasing a portion of the land in contention, but the company sought to remove him and other settlers. The deceased victims, Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were secretary-treasurer and assistant manager of Fleischer & Co. respectively, and were fencing the land when Narvaez shot them.	Narvaez is guilty of two counts of homicide, not murder, due to incomplete self-defense and mitigating circumstances. His sentence is reduced to four months of arresto mayor, and he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased with a reduced amount of damages, leading to his immediate release given his lengthy pre-trial detention.	Property and Land Law
Azarcon vs. Vallarta (28th October 1980)	AK487327 100 SCRA 450 , 188 Phil. 481 , No. L-43679	The contested land was originally owned by Dr. Jose V. Cajucom, who sold it in two separate transactions. First, to the Vallartas' predecessors in 1932, and later to the Azarcons in 1959. Both parties subsequently obtained titles, leading to conflicting claims of ownership over the same property.	The Original Certificate of Title held by the Vallartas is valid and superior, while the Free Patent Title held by the Azarcons is declared null and void and ordered cancelled.	Property and Land Law
Purugganan vs. Paredes (21st January 1976)	AK605464 69 SCRA 69 , 161 Phil. 91 , No. L-23818	Plaintiff Purugganan owned lots burdened by a registered easement of drainage in favor of Defendant Paredes' adjacent property. Paredes constructed a house that exceeded the easement's specifications, causing rainwater to improperly drain onto Purugganan's property. Purugganan sued to enforce the easement, while Paredes claimed her house was pre-existing and not in violation.	A summary judgment was correctly rendered because the defendants-appellants violated the conditions of a registered easement of drainage and failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that would necessitate a full trial. Furthermore, any prescriptive easement of light and view was extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System without such easement being annotated.	Property and Land Law
Tumalad vs. Vicencio (30th September 1971)	AK332768 41 SSCRA 143 , 148-B Phil. 625 , No. L-30173	Defendants-Appellants executed a chattel mortgage over their house, built on rented land, to Plaintiffs-Appellees to secure a loan. Upon default, Plaintiffs-Appellees extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the house at auction. Plaintiffs-Appellees then filed an ejectment case against Defendants-Appellants in the municipal court to recover possession and collect rent.	A house constructed on rented land can be validly constituted as personal property and subject to a chattel mortgage if the parties to the contract agree to treat it as such. Furthermore, the mortgagor is not obligated to pay rent to the purchaser during the one-year redemption period following an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, unless the purchaser legally obtains possession through proper court procedures and posting of a bond.	Property and Land Law
Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga (28th March 1968)	AK384710 22 SCRA 1334 , 131 Phil. 446 , No. L-24440	The Municipality of Zamboanga was the capital of Zamboanga Province. Commonwealth Act 39 converted the Municipality into Zamboanga City and stipulated that the City would purchase provincial properties in Zamboanga City when the capital moved. The capital moved to Dipolog, and later Republic Act 711 divided Zamboanga Province into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Republic Act 3039 later amended Commonwealth Act 39 to transfer the properties to Zamboanga City for free, leading to this legal challenge by Zamboanga del Norte, seeking payment for its share of the properties.	Republic Act 3039 is constitutional insofar as it transfers properties of the former Zamboanga province used for governmental purposes (public properties) to Zamboanga City without compensation, but unconstitutional for properties not used for such purposes (patrimonial properties), as the latter requires due process and just compensation for valid transfer.	Property and Land Law
Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Felias (30th June 1960)	AK597591 108 Phil. 873 , No. L-14309	Caltex sought to enforce a judgment against Felisa Felias's husband, Simeon Sawamoto, by levying and selling a land parcel (Lot No. 107) originally owned by Felisa Felias's parents and later donated to her. Caltex claimed the land became conjugal property due to the construction of a conjugal house on it during the marriage and was thus subject to levy for the husband’s debt.	Paraphernal property of the wife is not liable for the debts of the husband, even if a conjugal house is built on it, if the land was exclusively owned by the wife prior to the construction and debt incurrence.	Property and Land Law
Evangelista vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc. (23rd April 1958)	AK523989 103 Phil. 401 , No. L-11139	Santos Evangelista sued Ricardo Rivera for a sum of money and obtained a writ of attachment on a house Rivera built on leased land. Later, Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. claimed ownership of the same house based on a prior auction sale resulting from a separate case against Rivera. Evangelista sued to establish his title and gain possession.	A house constructed on leased land is considered immovable property, not personal property, for purposes of attachment and execution, regardless of agreements between private parties treating it as chattel. Therefore, the rules for attaching immovable property must be followed.	Property and Land Law
Espique vs. Espique (28th June 1956)	AK645404 99 Phil. 448 , No. L-8029	The case stemmed from a partition action where plaintiffs claimed common ownership of land and sought damages for lost profits. The defendant asserted sole ownership based on a donation propter nuptias received in 1906 and his subsequent adverse possession for over 40 years, arguing for prescription and lack of cause of action for partition.	An invalid donation of immovable property, while not transferring title, can serve as a valid basis for acquisitive prescription if accompanied by open, continuous, adverse, and public possession in the concept of owner for the period required by law.	Property and Land Law
Cruz vs. Pahati (13th April 1956)	AK018322 98 Phil. 788 , No. L-8257	Plaintiff Cruz owned an automobile. He entrusted it to Belizo, along with a letter intended to request a new registration certificate, under the pretext that Belizo would find a buyer. Belizo, however, fraudulently altered the letter into a deed of sale and sold the car to Bulahan, who then sold it to Pahati. Cruz filed a replevin action to recover the automobile.	The original owner of a movable property, who was unlawfully deprived of it due to fraud, has a better right to recover possession than a subsequent purchaser, even if the latter acted in good faith and for value.	Property and Land Law
Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo (7th August 1935)	AK655680 61 Phil. 709 , No. 40411	Davao Saw Mill operated a sawmill business on land it leased. They erected a building and installed machinery within it, some affixed to cement foundations. A lease agreement stipulated that improvements and buildings would become the property of the landowner upon lease expiration, but specifically excluded machineries from these improvements.	Machinery installed in a leased building by the lessee for its own industry, which is movable by nature and not intended to be a permanent fixture belonging to the landowner, especially when the lease agreement explicitly excludes machineries from improvements passing to the lessor, retains its character as personal property and is therefore subject to chattel mortgage and execution as such.	Property and Land Law
Sibal vs. Valdez (4th August 1927)	AK944731 50 Phil. 512 , No. 26278	This case arose from a dispute over sugar cane and palay (rice) crops planted on land previously owned by the plaintiff, Leon Sibal, but later involved in execution sales. Sibal attempted to redeem sugar cane sold to the defendant, Emiliano Valdez, and sought to prevent Valdez from harvesting palay on the same land. The core issue revolves around the classification of standing crops as either personal or real property under Philippine law.	Standing sugar cane, when produced by annual crops and yearly labor, is considered personal property and is therefore not subject to redemption as real property under the provisions of the Civil Code regarding redemption of real estate.	Property and Land Law
Pensader vs. Pensader (7th February 1924)	AK902639 47 Phil. 959 , No. 21271	The case centers on a claim of inheritance versus a claim of ownership through donation and adverse possession. The plaintiffs, nephews of the deceased Canuto Pensader, sought to partition land they considered common inheritance. The defendants, niece and grand-nephew of Canuto, asserted exclusive rights based on donations made by Canuto and decades of uninterrupted possession. The legal context is property rights, inheritance laws, donation, and the principle of prescription through adverse possession.	The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs' action for partition was barred by prescription because the defendants and their predecessors had been in continuous, adverse possession of the coconut land for over thirty years, under claim of ownership.	Property and Land Law
Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co. (30th March 1921)	AK543470 41 Phil. 531 , No. 16544	D. Antonio Osorio had a share in a shipping business with Ynchausti & Co. Upon his death, his estate, including this share, was to be partitioned among his heirs, including his widow Da. Petrona Reyes. Before the formal partition, Da. Petrona Reyes donated a portion of her expected inheritance to her son, Leonardo Osorio. This donation later became contested when the shares of stock representing the inherited business interest were inventoried as part of Da. Petrona Reyes' estate after her death.	The donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes to Leonardo Osorio of her share in her deceased husband's inheritance, even before formal adjudication, is valid because she had a vested right to the inheritance at the time of donation, and such inheritance is not considered "future property" in the prohibitive sense of Article 635 of the Civil Code.	Property and Land Law
Mendoza vs. De Leon (15th February 1916)	AK987030 33 Phil. 508 , No. 9596	Marcos Mendoza was granted an exclusive ferry privilege by the municipality of Villasis under Act No. 1634. After operating the ferry for over a year, the municipal council, composed of the defendants, revoked his lease and awarded a franchise to another person, leading to Mendoza's forcible ejection. Mendoza then sued the individual council members for damages.	The municipal council members are held jointly and severally liable for damages sustained by Marcos Mendoza due to the unlawful rescission of his ferry lease contract because their actions were not in good faith and were not a mere error in judgment, but a clear disregard of Mendoza's contractual rights for no valid reason.	Property and Land Law
Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby (2nd October 1915)	AK159516 31 Phil. 590 , No. 8936	Two owners of adjacent lots in Manila, Legarda and Saleeby, both registered their lands under the Torrens system. A stone wall situated on Legarda's property was mistakenly included in both their initial registration and Saleeby's subsequent registration, leading to conflicting claims over the wall and the land it occupied.	In cases of double registration under the Torrens system, the certificate of title earlier in date prevails over the later one; registered title holders are not obligated to continuously monitor subsequent land registration proceedings to protect their already registered title.	Property and Land Law