A state, in the exercise of its police power, may constitutionally punish those who abuse the rights of free speech and assembly by knowingly becoming a member of, or assisting in organizing, an association that advocates, teaches, or aids and abets criminal syndicalism, defined as doctrines advocating unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political change, without violating the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The case arose during a period of heightened concern over radical political movements and labor unrest in the United States following World War I and the Russian Revolution. California, like several other states, enacted a Criminal Syndicalism Act to counter organizations perceived as advocating for violent overthrow of the government or unlawful industrial and political change. Ms. Whitney, a niece of former Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field and a social activist, became involved with the Communist Labor Party.

• Charlotte Anita Whitney was a member of the Local Oakland branch of the Socialist Party, which sent delegates to a 1919 national convention in Chicago that split into "radical" and "old-wing" factions.
• The Oakland delegates, adhering to the "radicals," were ejected and subsequently formed the Communist Labor Party of America (CLPA).
• The CLPA's platform declared harmony with revolutionary working-class parties, adherence to Communist principles from the Third International at Moscow, and aimed to create a unified revolutionary working-class movement in America to overthrow capitalist rule and establish a "Dictatorship of the Proletariat."
• The CLPA advocated for mass action, revolutionary industrial unions, and strikes as political weapons, commending the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).
• Whitney participated as a delegate in a November 1919 Oakland convention to organize a California branch of the CLPA, taking out temporary membership.
• At this convention, Whitney served as chairman of the Credentials Committee and was a member of the Resolutions Committee, signing a resolution advocating political action by the working class.
• This resolution on political action was ultimately defeated in favor of the National Program of the CLPA.
• Whitney was elected an alternate member of the State Executive Committee of the newly formed Communist Labor Party of California (CLP-CA), which affiliated with the CLPA and subscribed to its program.
• Whitney remained in the convention until it adjourned, later attended one or two meetings of the State Executive Committee, and stated at trial she was then a member of the Communist Labor Party.
• Whitney testified it was not her intention that the CLP-CA should be an instrument of terrorism or violence, nor her purpose or that of the convention to violate any known law.
• The jury found that Whitney became a member of and assisted in organizing the CLP-CA, and that this organization was formed to advocate, teach, aid, or abet criminal syndicalism as defined by the California Act.

• The California Criminal Syndicalism Act, as construed and applied, deprived Whitney of her liberty without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment because her actions at the Oakland convention were made unlawful by a subsequent event (the adoption of a program she opposed) without a showing of her specific intent to join in the forbidden purpose.
• The Act is repugnant to the due process clause due to vagueness and uncertainty of definition, not fixing an ascertainable standard of guilt.
• The Act violates the equal protection clause by arbitrarily discriminating between those who advocate violent methods for changing industrial/political conditions and those who might advocate such methods for maintaining them.
• The Act, as applied, is repugnant to the due process clause as an unconstitutional restraint on the rights of free speech, assembly, and association.

• The question of Whitney's knowledge of the unlawful character and purpose of the Communist Labor Party was a question of the weight of evidence, foreclosed by the jury's guilty verdict and approved by the state court, not a constitutional question reviewable by the Supreme Court.
• The Criminal Syndicalism Act is sufficiently clear and explicit to satisfy due process, defining "criminal syndicalism" specifically and the prohibited acts clearly.
• The Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the distinction it makes is not arbitrary but within the State's discretionary power to legislate against perceived evils. The Act is not class legislation as it affects all who come within its terms.
• The Act is a valid exercise of the State's police power to penalize acts that endanger public peace and security, and does not unreasonably infringe on free speech, assembly, or association when these rights are abused.

• Did the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, as applied to Whitney, violate her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due to alleged vagueness or by penalizing her for association without specific intent for the group's unlawful purposes?
• Did the California Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by its classification of prohibited advocacy?
• Did the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, as applied to Whitney, unconstitutionally restrict her rights to free speech, assembly, and association under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

• The Court affirmed the judgment of the California Court of Appeal, upholding Whitney's conviction.
• The Court found that Whitney's argument regarding lack of intent or foresight about the convention's character was an attempt to review the weight of evidence, a matter of fact foreclosed by the jury's verdict and not a constitutional question. Her continued participation after the adoption of the National Program and her subsequent membership supported the finding of knowing involvement.
• The Court held that the Criminal Syndicalism Act is not unconstitutionally vague, as its definitions of "criminal syndicalism" and the prohibited acts are sufficiently explicit to inform individuals of what conduct is unlawful.
• The Court rejected the equal protection challenge, stating that a state may direct its legislation against what it deems an existing evil without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and the classification was not arbitrary. The Act applies to all who engage in the prohibited conduct.
• The Court ruled that the Act, as applied, did not unconstitutionally restrain free speech, assembly, or association. It affirmed that freedom of speech is not absolute and a state, under its police power, can punish utterances inimical to public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government. The state legislature's determination that such associations pose a danger to public peace and security is entitled to great weight.

• Police Power — The inherent authority of a state to enact laws and regulations to protect and promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens. The Court found that California's Criminal Syndicalism Act was a legitimate exercise of its police power to protect public peace and security from the dangers posed by organizations advocating violence and unlawful methods for political or industrial change.
• Due Process of Law (Fourteenth Amendment) — A fundamental principle that government action must be fair and reasonable and that individuals must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of life, liberty, or property. Whitney argued the Act violated substantive due process by its vagueness and by punishing her without sufficient proof of intent. The Court held the Act was not vague and that her intent was a factual matter decided by the jury.
• Equal Protection of the Laws (Fourteenth Amendment) — A constitutional guarantee that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, meaning laws must apply equally to all persons similarly situated. Whitney argued the Act created an arbitrary distinction. The Court held the classification was reasonable and within legislative discretion, not constituting arbitrary discrimination.
• Freedom of Speech and Assembly (as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment) — Fundamental rights, though not absolute, that protect individuals' ability to express themselves and gather with others. Whitney claimed the Act unconstitutionally restricted these rights. The Court held these rights can be restricted when their exercise abuses public welfare or incites crime, and the state has the power to punish such abuses.
• Presumption of Constitutionality — The legal principle that statutes enacted by a legislative body are presumed to be valid and constitutional, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the challenger. The Court gave great weight to the California legislature's determination that the prohibited acts posed a danger to public peace and security.
• Clear and Present Danger Test (elaborated in concurrence) — A doctrine articulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States and extensively discussed by Justice Brandeis in his concurrence here, stating that speech can be prohibited only if it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Justice Brandeis argued that for a restriction on free speech to be valid, there must be a clear and imminent danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. He suggested Whitney could have challenged the Act by showing no such emergency existed but failed to do so.

• "That the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom...is not open to question." (Majority Opinion)
• "The essence of the offense denounced by the Act is the combining with others in an association for the accomplishment of the desired ends through the advocacy and use of criminal and unlawful methods. It partakes of the nature of a criminal conspiracy." (Majority Opinion)
• "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means." (Justice Brandeis, concurring)
• "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears." (Justice Brandeis, concurring)
• "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression." (Justice Brandeis, concurring)
• "To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion." (Justice Brandeis, concurring)

• Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 — Referenced for the principle that a state, in exercising its police power, may punish those who abuse freedom of speech by utterances inimical to public welfare, tending to incite crime, or endanger organized government.
• Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 — Cited in Justice Brandeis' concurrence as establishing the "clear and present danger" test for restrictions on free speech.
• Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 — Cited for the principle that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute.
• Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 — Referenced for the due process requirement that a penal statute be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to it what conduct will render them liable.
• Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 — Cited for the principle that the equal protection clause allows states a wide scope of discretion in classifying for police laws, and a classification will only be overturned if it is purely arbitrary.
• Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368 — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court acquires no jurisdiction to review a state court judgment unless a federal question was presented and decided by the state court. (This was relevant to the initial jurisdictional challenge).
• Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179 — Referenced for the sufficiency of a state court certificate to show a federal question was considered and decided, relevant for establishing Supreme Court jurisdiction.
• Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 — Cited in Justice Brandeis' concurrence to support the idea that fundamental rights like free speech, teaching, and assembly are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from state invasion, though not absolute.

• Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States — Specifically its Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were central to Whitney's challenge. The Court analyzed whether the California Criminal Syndicalism Act violated these provisions.
• California Criminal Syndicalism Act (Statutes, 1919, c. 188, p. 281) — The state statute under which Whitney was prosecuted.
  • Section 1 — Defines "criminal syndicalism" as any doctrine advocating crime, sabotage, or unlawful acts of force and violence or terrorism to effect political or industrial change.
  • Section 2, subd. 4 — Makes it a felony for any person to organize or assist in organizing, or knowingly become a member of, any organization assembled to advocate, teach, or aid and abet criminal syndicalism. This was the specific provision under which Whitney was convicted.
  • Section 4 (of the Act, as recited in Brandeis' concurrence) — Legislative declaration of emergency, stating the act is necessary for immediate preservation of public peace and safety due to persons advocating criminal syndicalism.

• Justice Brandeis (joined by Justice Holmes) — While concurring in the judgment to affirm Whitney's conviction, Justice Brandeis wrote a highly influential opinion elaborating on the "clear and present danger" test. He argued that fundamental rights like free speech and assembly are not absolute and can be restricted if necessary to protect the state from destruction or serious injury. However, such restriction is only justified if speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil that the state constitutionally may prevent. He emphasized that fear of serious injury alone is not enough; there must be reasonable ground to believe the danger is imminent and the evil serious. Brandeis suggested Whitney failed to properly raise the issue of whether such a clear and present danger existed in California in 1919 that would justify the restriction on her activities. He also noted that even if a danger is imminent, the restriction must not be unduly harsh or oppressive. He concluded that because there was evidence upon which a jury could have found such a danger existed (related to IWW activities and potential for serious crimes), and Whitney did not specifically challenge this finding or request it be determined, the conviction should stand.