The action of a State in making it compulsory for children in public schools to salute the flag and pledge allegiance violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as it compels an affirmation of belief and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which the First Amendment reserves from all official control.

Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, which upheld a similar compulsory flag salute, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require courses in history, civics, and the Constitutions to foster Americanism. The West Virginia State Board of Education then adopted a resolution making the flag salute a regular part of public school activities, requiring all teachers and pupils to participate. Refusal was deemed insubordination, leading to expulsion and potential delinquency proceedings for the child, and fines or jail time for parents. This resolution directly impacted Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious beliefs forbid them from saluting any flag, as they consider it a form of worshipping a graven image, contrary to Exodus 20:4-5.

• The West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution on January 9, 1942, requiring all teachers and pupils in public schools to participate in a "stiff-arm" salute to the American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."
• Refusal to participate was deemed an act of insubordination, punishable by expulsion from school.
• Readmission was denied until compliance. Expelled children were considered "unlawfully absent" and could be proceeded against as delinquents.
• Parents or guardians of such children were liable to prosecution, with penalties including fines up to $50 and jail terms up to thirty days.
• Appellees, Jehovah's Witnesses, and their children refused to participate in the salute, believing it violated their religious convictions based on Exodus 20:4-5, which prohibits bowing down to or serving graven images. They consider the flag an "image" under this command.
• Children of the appellees were expelled from school for non-compliance and threatened with exclusion. Officials threatened to send them to reformatories for criminally inclined juveniles.
• Parents of these children were prosecuted and threatened with further prosecutions for causing delinquency.
• Appellees sued in federal district court to enjoin enforcement of these laws and regulations, claiming they violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

• The State Board of Education argued that the compulsory flag salute was a permissible means of fostering national unity and patriotism, essential for national security.
• They contended that the regulation was within the State's power to prescribe the curriculum and conduct in public schools.
• They relied on the Supreme Court's previous decision in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, which upheld a similar requirement, arguing that the Court should defer to legislative judgment in matters of educational policy aimed at promoting good citizenship.
• The Board asserted that the State has the power to condition access to public education on compliance with such regulations.
• They argued that interfering with the authority of educational officers would effectively make the Court the school board for the country.
• They maintained that the issue was one for legislative determination rather than judicial intervention, as long as effective means of political change were left open.

• Appellees (Barnette et al.) argued that the compulsory flag salute and pledge violated their rights to freedom of speech and freedom of religion, protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
• They asserted that the obligation imposed by the law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government, and saluting the flag constituted worship of a graven image, forbidden by their religious beliefs.
• They contended that the law and regulations compelled them to affirm a belief and an attitude of mind, which is beyond the legitimate power of government.
• They argued that their refusal to participate did not interfere with the rights of others or disrupt peace and order.
• They distinguished the case from situations where the State might regulate conduct, emphasizing that this involved compelled utterance and expression.
• They claimed the state's interest in national unity did not justify compelling a declaration of belief, especially one that conflicted with deeply held religious convictions.

• Does a state law compelling students in public schools to salute the flag and pledge allegiance, with penalties for non-compliance including expulsion and prosecution of parents, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution?
• Is the state's interest in promoting national unity sufficient to justify compelling an individual to affirm a belief through a symbolic act like the flag salute, particularly when it conflicts with religious scruples?
• Should the Court reconsider and overrule its prior decision in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis?

• Yes, the compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance in public schools violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court affirmed the District Court's injunction.
• The Court reasoned that the flag salute is a form of utterance and symbolism, and compelling it forces an individual to declare a belief. This transcends constitutional limitations on governmental power and invades the "sphere of intellect and spirit" protected by the First Amendment.
• The Court held that the state's aim of achieving national unity, while legitimate, cannot be achieved by compelling citizens to affirm beliefs they do not hold. Coercion in such matters is not a permissible means under the Constitution.
• The Court explicitly overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, finding its reasoning flawed, particularly its assumption of state power to impose such discipline and its deference to legislative judgment in matters impinging on fundamental rights.
• The Court emphasized that fundamental rights like freedom of speech and worship are not subject to vote and depend on the outcome of no elections; they are withdrawn from the vicissitudes of political controversy.
• The fact that the refusal was based on religious grounds was noted but did not control the decision; the core issue was the compelled affirmation of belief, regardless of the motivation for refusal.

• Freedom of Speech (First Amendment) — This doctrine protects an individual's right to express their views and, importantly in this case, the right to refrain from speaking or affirming beliefs. The Court held that compelling the flag salute and pledge is a form of compelled speech, forcing students to "utter what is not in his mind," which violates this freedom.
• Free Exercise of Religion (First Amendment) — This doctrine protects an individual's right to practice their religion without government interference. While the Court's decision was primarily based on freedom of speech, the religious convictions of the Jehovah's Witnesses were the reason for their refusal, and the Court acknowledged that religion supplied the appellees' motive. However, the Court stated the issue did not turn on the possession of particular religious views but on the broader principle against compelled affirmation of belief.
• Due Process Clause (Fourteenth Amendment) — This clause prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. It has been interpreted to incorporate most of the protections of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment's freedoms of speech and religion, making them applicable to state actions. The Court found the West Virginia regulation to be a violation of these incorporated First Amendment rights.
• Incorporation Doctrine — This doctrine refers to the process by which provisions of the Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court applied the First Amendment's protections for speech and religion to the actions of the West Virginia State Board of Education through this doctrine.
• Preferred Freedoms — While not explicitly named as such in this opinion, the Court's reasoning aligns with the idea that First Amendment freedoms hold a preferred position, and legislation abridging them is subject to stricter scrutiny than legislation affecting economic interests. The Court stated that freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and worship may not be infringed on "slender grounds" and are susceptible to restriction only to prevent "grave and immediate danger."
• Judicial Review — The Court asserted its role in protecting fundamental constitutional rights against infringement by state authorities, even in areas like public education where state officials have discretionary functions. It rejected the notion that courts lack competence or should defer entirely to legislative bodies when fundamental rights are at stake.
• Overruling Precedent (Stare Decisis) — The Court explicitly overruled its prior decision in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis (1940). This demonstrates that while stare decisis (adherence to precedent) is a guiding principle, the Court can and will overturn prior decisions when it believes they were wrongly decided, especially in matters of fundamental constitutional rights.

• "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
• "To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind."
• "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
• "Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."
• "Freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."
• "We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."

• Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 — Overruled by the present case. Gobitis had upheld a Pennsylvania school board's requirement for students to salute the flag, even against religious objections. The Court in Barnette found Gobitis was wrongly decided.
• Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 — Distinguished. Hamilton upheld a state university's requirement for military training for students who voluntarily enrolled. Barnette distinguished this because public school attendance was not optional in the same way, and the state's power to raise a militia is distinct from compelling an affirmation of belief.
• Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 — Cited as precedent for the idea that symbolic speech (display of a red flag as opposition to government) is protected under free speech guaranties. Here, the state was employing a flag as a symbol of adherence, and compelling individuals to accept it.
• Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 — Cited as an example of the Court's history of reconsidering precedent decisions.
• Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting and then changing views) — Referenced in the concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas as a point where they began to reconsider their position in Gobitis.
• Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 — Referenced in Justice Frankfurter's dissent to explain the origin and proper context of the "clear and present danger" test, arguing it was misapplied by the majority to educational policy.
• Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 — Cited in Justice Frankfurter's dissent to support the idea that while states cannot compel attendance at public schools, they can impose conditions on those who choose to attend public schools.

• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Its protections for freedom of speech and religion are central to the ruling. The Court found the compulsory flag salute violated these freedoms.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Specifically its Due Process Clause, which incorporates First Amendment protections against state action. The Court held that state action (by the West Virginia Board of Education) violated these incorporated rights.
• West Virginia Code (1941 Supp.), § 1734 — This statute required schools to conduct courses in history, civics, and the Constitutions for the purpose of teaching Americanism. The Board of Education's flag salute resolution was adopted pursuant to this.
• West Virginia Code (1941 Supp.), § 1851 (1) — This statute provided for the expulsion of students for non-compliance with school regulations and treated such students as unlawfully absent.
• West Virginia Code (1941 Supp.), § 4904 (4) — This statute made parents or guardians liable to prosecution if their child was unlawfully absent from school.
• Judicial Code § 266 (28 U.S.C. § 380) — Referenced as the basis for the three-judge District Court that initially heard the case and granted the injunction.
• Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5 (Bible) — Cited by the appellees (Jehovah's Witnesses) as the religious basis for their refusal to salute the flag, as they interpret it to forbid bowing down to graven images.

• Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas — They stated their substantial agreement with the Court's opinion and explained their change of view since joining the majority in Gobitis. They acknowledged that their reluctance to make the Federal Constitution a rigid bar against state regulation of conduct thought inimical to public welfare was a controlling influence in Gobitis, but long reflection convinced them that its application in that case was wrong. They believed the West Virginia statute failed to accord full scope to the freedom of religion secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They emphasized that words uttered under coercion are proof of loyalty only to self-interest and that love of country must spring from willing hearts and free minds.
• Mr. Justice Murphy — He agreed with the Court's opinion, emphasizing that the right to freedom of thought and religion includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking. He concluded that the requirement of a declaration of allegiance is not essential to the maintenance of effective government and orderly society and that official compulsion to affirm what is contrary to one's religious beliefs is the antithesis of freedom of worship. He viewed the enforced ceremonial as more likely to defeat than serve its purpose when applied to conscientious objectors, becoming a "handy implement for disguised religious persecution."

• Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Reed — They stated they adhered to the views expressed by the Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis. (No further elaboration provided in the main text for their specific dissent beyond this adherence).
• Mr. Justice Frankfurter — He dissented at length, arguing for judicial self-restraint and deference to legislative judgment in matters of educational policy. He asserted that his personal views on the wisdom of the law were irrelevant; the only material question was whether reasonable legislators could have enacted such a law. He contended that the Court's role is not to act as a super-legislature and that the Constitution does not grant greater veto power over "liberty" than over other legislative concerns. He argued that all provisions of the Bill of Rights have equal constitutional dignity and that the Court is not the primary protector of any particular liberty. He emphasized that the requirement was a condition for attending public schools, which students were not compelled to attend (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters). He distinguished the flag salute from an oath test and argued that it did not suppress belief or curb its expression. He expressed concern that the Court was overturning a consistent line of previous decisions based on a shift in the opinion of only two Justices and warned against reducing the Constitution to the "fugitive importance of mere legislation." He invoked James Bradley Thayer's views on judicial restraint and the importance of allowing the democratic process to correct legislative errors.