While a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong in itself, a person who, after making formal wedding preparations (such as applying for a license, sending invitations, and preparing for the ceremony), abruptly and unjustifiably cancels the wedding, causing public humiliation and injury, commits an act contrary to good customs and can be held liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer were engaged and had formally planned their wedding. This included securing a marriage license, distributing invitations, purchasing attire, and receiving bridal shower gifts. Two days before the set date, Velez suddenly left a note cancelling the wedding, citing his mother's opposition. He then sent a telegram promising to return but never did, prompting Wassmer to sue for damages due to the public humiliation and expenses incurred.

• Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer mutually promised to marry and set their wedding for September 4, 1954.
• On August 23, 1954, the couple applied for and were issued a license to contract marriage.
• Extensive preparations for the wedding were made, including the printing and distribution of invitations, the purchase of the bride's trousseau, party dresses, and other apparel, preparation of dresses for the maid of honor and flower girl, and the purchase of a matrimonial bed.
• Bridal showers were held, and the couple received wedding gifts.
• On September 2, 1954, just two days before the wedding, Velez left a note for Wassmer stating, "Will have to postpone wedding. My mother oppose it. Am leaving on the Convair today."
• The next day, September 3, 1954, Velez sent a telegram to Wassmer which read, "NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA."
• After sending the telegram, Velez did not appear again, nor was he heard from.
• Wassmer filed a suit for damages, and Velez, failing to file an answer, was declared in default.

• Beatriz Wassmer (plaintiff-appellee) argued that Velez's sudden and unjustified withdrawal from the wedding, after all preparations had been publicly made, caused her actual financial losses, public humiliation, frustration, and moral suffering, for which she was entitled to actual, moral, and exemplary damages.

• Francisco Velez (defendant-appellant) argued that the judgment against him was contrary to law because there is no provision in the Civil Code that authorizes an action for breach of promise to marry.
• He contended that his affidavit of merits was sufficient for a petition for relief, as his failure to marry was due to a "fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control."
• He claimed the judgment was void because evidence was received by the clerk of court as a commissioner without his consent.
• He asserted that the award of P25,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages was excessive and should be eliminated entirely.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether an affidavit of merits stating that the failure to marry was due to a "fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control" is valid to set aside a default judgment.
  • Whether the reception of evidence by a clerk of court, acting as a commissioner in a default proceeding, is valid without the consent of the party in default.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether damages can be recovered for a breach of promise to marry that is accompanied by acts contrary to good customs, such as cancelling a fully prepared wedding at the last minute.
  • Whether the award of moral and exemplary damages was appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances.

• Procedural:
  • The Court ruled that the defendant's affidavit of merits was invalid because it stated mere conclusions of fact ("fortuitous event") rather than the specific facts constituting the defense, as required by the Rules of Court.
  • The Court held that the reception of evidence by a clerk of court as commissioner is a procedure sanctioned by the Rules of Court in default cases, and the consent of the defendant was not necessary as he had lost his standing in court by being declared in default.
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that while a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, the defendant's actions went beyond a simple breach. The act of formally setting a wedding, making extensive public preparations, and then walking out just before the ceremony is an act contrary to good customs that willfully caused injury to the plaintiff, making the defendant liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
  • The Court affirmed the propriety of awarding moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages were justified under Article 2219(10) in relation to Article 21, and exemplary damages were justified under Article 2232 because the defendant acted in a wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner. However, the Court deemed the original amount of P25,000.00 excessive and reduced the combined moral and exemplary damages to P15,000.00.

• Acts Contra Bonus Mores (Article 21, Civil Code) — This doctrine holds that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The Court applied this to hold Velez liable, not for the mere breach of promise to marry, but for the unjustifiable and humiliating manner in which he cancelled the fully prepared wedding, which was deemed an act contrary to good customs.
• Breach of Promise to Marry — The Court reiterated the established doctrine that a "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not, by itself, an actionable wrong under Philippine law, as Congress deliberately omitted provisions that would have made it so. However, the Court distinguished this case by focusing on the injurious acts surrounding the breach.
• Affidavit of Merits — The Court applied the procedural rule that an affidavit of merits, required for a petition for relief from judgment, must state the specific facts that constitute a valid defense, not just general denials or conclusions of law or fact. Velez's affidavit was found insufficient for failing to meet this standard.

• "Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation, and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid."

• Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals — Cited as the controlling precedent establishing that a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. The Supreme Court distinguished the facts of the present case from Hermosisima to justify the award of damages under Article 21.
• Vaswani vs. P. Tarachand Bros. — Referenced to support the ruling that an affidavit of merits must state facts, not mere conclusions or opinions, to be considered valid for a petition for relief from judgment.
• Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc — Cited to affirm the validity of the procedure where a clerk of court is designated as a commissioner to receive evidence in a case where a party has been declared in default.
• Velez vs. Ramas — Cited to establish that a defendant who has been declared in default has no standing in court, and therefore his consent is not required for procedural steps like the reception of evidence by a commissioner.

• Article 21, Civil Code — This was the primary legal basis for the ruling, allowing for the recovery of damages for acts that, while not necessarily illegal, are contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy and cause injury to another.
• Article 2219 (10), Civil Code — Cited as the provision that expressly allows for the recovery of moral damages in cases involving acts mentioned in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
• Article 2232, Civil Code — Cited as the basis for awarding exemplary damages, as the Court found that the defendant had acted in a "wanton, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
• Section 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court — This rule was applied to invalidate the defendant's petition for relief, as his accompanying affidavit of merits failed to state facts constituting a valid defense.
• Rule 34 (now Rule 33), Rules of Court — This rule was cited to uphold the trial court's procedure of having the clerk of court receive evidence after the defendant was declared in default.