The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative under domestic law to determine whether to espouse its nationals' claims against a foreign government, this being a political question involving foreign relations not subject to judicial review via certiorari, absent grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, under contemporary international law, there is no binding obligation on the Philippines to espouse the petitioners' claims for reparations against Japan, as diplomatic protection is a sovereign right of the State, not a duty owed to its nationals.

During World War II, the Japanese Imperial Army established a system of "comfort women," forcibly recruiting and enslaving women from occupied territories, including the Philippines, for sexual servitude in military brothels. Petitioners are survivors of this system who have endured immense physical, psychological, and emotional suffering. Since 1998, they have sought assistance from the Philippine government to pursue their claims against Japan, but the Executive Department declined, citing the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1956 Reparations Agreement between the Philippines and Japan as having settled all war-related claims.

• Petitioners are members of the MALAYA LOLAS, an organization aiding Filipina victims of rape by Japanese military forces during World War II.
• During the war, Japanese soldiers attacked petitioners' villages, systematically raped women, looted and burned houses, and tortured civilians.
• Petitioners were forcibly taken and held in "comfort stations" where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers, resulting in lasting physical injuries, pain, disability, and mental and emotional suffering.
• Since 1998, petitioners approached the Executive Department (DOJ, DFA, OSG) requesting assistance in filing claims against Japanese officials and military officers responsible for the comfort women system.
• The Executive Department declined to assist, maintaining that individual claims of comfort women were fully satisfied by Japan's compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
• Various international efforts to secure reparations for comfort women, including lawsuits in Japan and the US, UN investigations (Coomaraswamy and McDougal Reports), and resolutions by foreign governments (US, European Parliament, Canada, Netherlands, UK), have not resulted in legally binding reparations from Japan.
• Japan has issued various statements of remorse and apologies, and established the Asian Women's Fund (AWF) which provided "atonement money" and medical/welfare support, including to some Filipina comfort women through a Memorandum of Understanding with the Philippine government.

• The general waiver of claims by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void because the comfort women system constituted crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture, which are violations of jus cogens norms from which no derogation is permissible.
• By waiving these claims and failing to espouse them, the Philippine government breached its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.
• The Philippine government's acceptance of Japan's "apologies" and funds from the Asian Women's Fund (AWF) was contrary to international law and insufficient to address the petitioners' claims for official apology and reparations.
• Respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims.

• All claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to World War II were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
• Article 14(b) of the Treaty of Peace contains a waiver by the Allied Powers (including the Philippines) of all reparations claims and other claims arising out of actions taken by Japan during the war.
• The apologies made by Japan have been satisfactory, and Japan addressed individual claims through atonement money paid by the Asian Women's Fund (AWF).
• The decision to espouse claims of nationals against a foreign government is a matter of foreign policy within the exclusive domain of the Executive Department.

• Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the petitioners' claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals.
• Whether the Philippines is under any international legal obligation to espouse the petitioners' claims.

• The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
• From a domestic law perspective, the decision whether to espouse petitioners' claims against Japan is a political question within the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department. The conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative departments, and the propriety of their actions in this realm is not subject to judicial inquiry. The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations. The Executive's determination that espousing the claims would be inimical to foreign policy interests is a judgment the Court cannot overturn.
• From an international law perspective, the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners' claims. Diplomatic protection is traditionally a right of the State, not a duty owed to the individual. A State has absolute discretion whether to exercise this right, often influenced by political considerations.
• While rape, sexual slavery, and torture are morally reprehensible and legally prohibited, there is no established non-derogable international obligation for the Philippines to institute proceedings against Japan for monetary reparations on behalf of its nationals, absent consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a Security Council directive.
• The invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations does not alter this analysis. Petitioners failed to show that the crimes violated jus cogens prohibitions existing at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators (much less to demand state reparations) is an erga omnes obligation or has attained jus cogens status compelling such action by the Philippine government. The practical enforcement of erga omnes obligations remains limited.
• The Court sympathized with the petitioners' cause but stated it is not within its power to order the Executive Department to take up their cause, only to urge and exhort it.

• Political Question Doctrine — This doctrine refers to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the conduct of foreign relations, including the decision to espouse claims of nationals against a foreign government, is committed to the Executive Department and is not subject to judicial inquiry, as it involves policy determinations beyond the judiciary's competence.
• President as the Sole Organ of the Nation in External Relations — This principle, derived from U.S. jurisprudence and adopted in the Philippines, posits that the President is the primary architect and representative of the nation in its dealings with foreign states. The Court used this to affirm that the Executive Department, headed by the President, has the discretion to determine foreign policy, including whether or not to pursue the petitioners' claims against Japan.
• Diplomatic Protection — This is the right of a State to take diplomatic and other action against another State on behalf of its national whose rights and interests have been injured by the latter. It is traditionally viewed as a right of the State, not a duty owed to the national. The Court invoked this to explain that the Philippines has the discretion, but not a mandatory legal obligation under international law, to espouse the petitioners' claims. The decision to exercise this right can be based on political or other considerations.
• Jus Cogens (Peremptory Norms) — These are fundamental principles of international law that are accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. Petitioners argued that the crimes committed against them violated jus cogens norms, thus voiding the waiver in the Peace Treaty. The Court found that petitioners did not sufficiently demonstrate that these norms existed as jus cogens at the time of the treaty or that they create an obligation for the Philippine government to espouse their specific claims for state reparations. The Court also noted the lack of consensus on the full content and criteria for identifying jus cogens norms.
• Erga Omnes Obligations — These are obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole, in the protection of which all States have a legal interest. Petitioners implied that the duty to seek redress for them was an erga omnes obligation. The Court acknowledged the concept but stated that its practical application, particularly in compelling a state to espouse claims for reparations, is limited and did not alter its conclusion that the Philippine government was not under a binding duty to act as petitioners demanded.

• "The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions, exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain." (Quoting In Re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation)
• "It would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy."
• "The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches."
• "By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law." (Quoting the PCIJ in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case)
• "Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available..." (Quoting the ICJ in Barcelona Traction)
• "Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners' cause. Ours is only the power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners' cause."

• Baker v. Carr — Cited as the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine, outlining its characteristics.
• Tañada v. Cuenco — Philippine jurisprudence defining political questions as those dependent on wisdom rather than legality, delegated to political branches.
• Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. — Cited for the principle that the conduct of foreign relations is committed to the political departments and not subject to judicial inquiry.
• Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp. — Cited for the caution that decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and best undertaken by those directly responsible to the people.
• US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. — Seminal U.S. case holding the President as the sole organ of the nation in its external relations; cited to support the Executive's broad discretion in foreign affairs.
• Bayan v. Executive Secretary — Philippine case incorporating the Curtiss-Wright doctrine regarding the President's role in foreign affairs.
• Pimentel v. Executive Secretary — Philippine case also affirming the President's dominant role in foreign affairs, drawing from Curtiss-Wright.
• Secretary of Justice v. Lantion — (Chief Justice Puno's dissent) Cited for its articulation of the President's comprehensive information and wide discretion in foreign affairs.
• Ware v. Hylton — U.S. case cited for the principle that a treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and war-related claims are buried in oblivion unless provided for in the treaty.
• Dames & Moore v. Regan — U.S. case upholding the President's authority to settle claims of nationals against foreign governments as an established international practice.
• In Re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation — U.S. case dismissing claims of American POWs against Japan based on the 1951 Peace Treaty, cited for its policy considerations regarding the treaty's goal to settle reparations once and for all for lasting peace.
• Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (PCIJ) — Cited for the traditional international law principle that when a State takes up a national's case, it asserts its own right, and the State is the sole claimant.
• Barcelona Traction Case (ICJ) — Cited for the principle that a State has discretion in exercising diplomatic protection and that individuals have no remedy in international law if their State does not adequately protect their rights; also cited for its recognition of erga omnes obligations.
• Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan — U.S. lawsuit by comfort women, dismissal of which was affirmed, illustrating the difficulties faced by victims in seeking judicial redress.

• Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951), Article 14 — This article, particularly 14(b), was central to the respondents' argument that all reparations claims by Allied Powers and their nationals arising from Japan's actions during the war were waived. The Court acknowledged this treaty as the basis for the Executive's position.
• Rules of Court, Rule 65 — The petition was filed under this rule for Certiorari, seeking to correct alleged grave abuse of discretion by the respondents. The Court ultimately found no such grave abuse.
• Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Art. 53 — Referenced in the discussion of jus cogens, as it codifies the concept of peremptory norms.
• Slavery Convention of 1926 — Mentioned in a footnote defining slavery, relevant to petitioners' claims of sexual slavery.
• Convention Against Torture, Article 1.1 — Mentioned in a footnote defining torture, relevant to petitioners' claims of torture.
• Nuremberg Charter, Article 6(c) — Mentioned in a footnote regarding crimes against humanity, relevant to petitioners' characterization of the abuses they suffered.
• 1949 Geneva Conventions (and Protocol I) — Referenced in footnotes discussing the prohibition and criminalization of rape and sexual violence in armed conflict.

• Puno, C.J. — Concurred "in the result," indicating agreement with the dismissal of the petition but not necessarily with all aspects of the ponencia's reasoning.
• Carpio, J. — Concurred on the specific ground that petitioners' claims are barred by the Peace Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and Japan.
• Carpio Morales, J. and Peralta, J. — Joined Justice Nachura's separate opinion.
• Nachura, J. — Issued a separate opinion concurring "in the result," implying agreement with the outcome but potentially offering different or additional reasoning (details not fully elaborated in the main decision text provided beyond this notation).