The acts of the secretaries of executive departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Therefore, the Secretary of the Interior's suspension of a municipal mayor, done with the verbal approval or acquiescence of the President, is valid.

The case arose from an inquiry into the conduct of petitioner Jose D. Villena, Mayor of Makati, Rizal, by the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, requested by the Secretary of the Interior. This inquiry found Villena to have allegedly committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority, and unauthorized practice of law. Consequently, the Secretary of the Interior recommended Villena's suspension to the President to prevent coercion of witnesses, which the President verbally approved.

• The Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, investigated petitioner Jose D. Villena, Mayor of Makati, Rizal, and found him to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority, and unauthorized practice of law.
• On February 8, 1939, the Secretary of the Interior recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension of Villena to prevent possible coercion of witnesses.
• The President verbally granted this recommendation on the same day, February 8, 1939.
• The Secretary of the Interior suspended Villena from office on February 9, 1939, and instructed the Provincial Governor of Rizal to advise Villena accordingly.
• On February 13, 1939, the Secretary of the Interior wrote to Villena, specifying the charges and notifying him of the designation of Emiliano Anonas as special investigator.
• The formal investigation was eventually set for March 28, 1939, prompting Villena to file this petition for prohibition.

• The Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend municipal elective officials, prefer administrative charges against them, or decide the merits of such charges, as this power is lodged in other government agencies.
• The Secretary's acts of suspending the petitioner, preferring charges, and designating a special investigator are null and void.
• By suspending the petitioner, the Secretary exercised control over local governments, a power allegedly taken away from the President by the Constitution.
• Even if the Secretary has supervisory power, it must be exercised according to Section 2188 of the Administrative Code (governing trials of elective municipal officials), not the general provisions of Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code.
• The Secretary is acting arbitrarily by being both complainant and judge.
• The Secretary's action is not based on a sworn statement as required by Section 2188 of the Administrative Code.

• Section 79 (C) in relation to Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the Secretary of the Interior to order the investigation of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department and designate an investigator.
• Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code (empowering provincial governors to investigate) does not preclude the Secretary of the Interior from exercising powers vested by Section 79 (C) and Section 86, especially when read with Section 37 of Act No. 4007 (Reorganization Law of 1932).
• The petitioner initially did not question the Department of the Interior's jurisdiction to investigate but only contended that the charges were not under oath.
• The authority of a department head to order an investigation implies the authority to take necessary measures, like suspension, to accomplish the investigation's purpose, and the suspension was authorized by the Chief Executive.
• The petition does not allege facts warranting a preliminary injunction under Section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Courts of equity generally do not restrain public officers from performing official acts within their authority and discretion.

• Whether the Secretary of the Interior has the legal authority to order an investigation of the charges against the petitioner, the Mayor of Makati.
• Whether the Secretary of the Interior has the legal authority to decree the suspension of the petitioner pending the investigation of the charges.

• Yes, the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to order the investigation. Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code, allowing a Department Head to order investigations, should be interpreted in relation to Section 86, which grants the Department of the Interior "executive supervision" over local governments. Supervision implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions.
• Yes, the Secretary of the Interior's suspension of the petitioner is valid. While there is no express grant of power to the Secretary to suspend a mayor (this power is expressly lodged in the provincial governor by Section 2188), the Court sustained the suspension based on the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under the presidential system, heads of executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. Their acts, performed in the regular course of business, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive unless disapproved by him. The President's verbal approval of the suspension, as alleged by the Solicitor-General, or his acquiescence, validated the Secretary's act.

• Executive Supervision over Local Governments (Sec. 86, Revised Administrative Code) — This provision grants the Department of the Interior executive supervision over provinces, municipalities, chartered cities, and other local political subdivisions. The Court interpreted "supervision" as an active power that implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions to render the power real and effective, thus supporting the Secretary's authority to investigate the mayor.
• Power of Department Head to Investigate (Sec. 79 (C), Revised Administrative Code) — This section states that a Department Head may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department. This was used in conjunction with Sec. 86 to affirm the Secretary of the Interior's power to investigate the mayor, who is considered to be under the Department's executive supervision.
• Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (Alter Ego Principle) — This doctrine posits that under a presidential system, heads of executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. Their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. This doctrine was the primary basis for upholding the Secretary of the Interior's act of suspending the petitioner, as it was considered an act of the President, who has the power to suspend and remove municipal officials.
• Presidential Power of Control — The Constitution vests executive power in the President, who exercises control over all executive departments. The acts of department secretaries are subject to this control. The Court reasoned that the President is the Executive, and department heads are his alter egos in matters of their respective departments, making the President ultimately responsible for their administrative acts.

• "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation."
• "...under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the Exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."
• "The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that 'The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.' This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other."
• "...each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority." (Quoting Myers vs. United States)

• Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228) — Referenced to define "supervision" as an active power implying authority to inquire into facts, supporting the Secretary of the Interior's power to investigate.
• Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U. S., 543 — Cited as a leading U.S. Supreme Court case establishing the principle that acts of department heads are presumptively acts of the Chief Executive.
• U. S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet, 291 — Cited along with Runkle and others to support the doctrine of qualified political agency.
• Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S., 202 — Cited along with Runkle and others to support the doctrine of qualified political agency.
• Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755 — Cited along with Runkle and others to support the doctrine of qualified political agency.
• Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet, 498 — Cited along with Runkle and others to support the doctrine of qualified political agency.
• Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21; 272 U. S., 52 — Quoted for Chief Justice Taft's characterization of a department head as the "President's alter ego" in departmental matters where the President must exercise authority.

• Section 79 (C), Revised Administrative Code — Provides that a Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may order investigations. This was used to affirm the Secretary's power to investigate the petitioner.
• Section 86, Revised Administrative Code — Grants the Department of the Interior "executive supervision" over local governments. This was interpreted with Sec. 79(C) to support the Secretary's investigatory power.
• Section 2188, Revised Administrative Code — Empowers the provincial governor to receive and investigate complaints against municipal officers and suspend them. The Court noted this power is not necessarily exclusive and does not preclude the Secretary of the Interior (acting for the President) from exercising a similar power.
• Section 2191 (as amended), Revised Administrative Code — Grants the President the power to remove municipal officials. The Court reasoned that the greater power of removal implies the lesser power of suspension for the President.
• Section 37, Act No. 4007 (Reorganization Law of 1932) — Provides that powers entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division, or service are also conferred upon the proper Department Head. The Solicitor-General argued this supported the Secretary's power to suspend, but the Court found this interpretation too sweeping and potentially destructive of local autonomy, preferring the qualified political agency doctrine.
• Article VII, Section 1, Constitution of the Philippines — Vests the executive power in the President of the Philippines. This was foundational to the Court's reasoning on the singular nature of the Executive and the derivative authority of department secretaries.
• Article VII, Section 12, paragraph 1, Constitution of the Philippines — Provides for the continuation of existing executive departments. This was cited to show that department secretaries operate as adjuncts to the Chief Executive.
• Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 3, Constitution of the Philippines — Mentions the President's power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law as examples of powers to be exercised by the President in person.
• Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 6, Constitution of the Philippines — Mentions the President's pardoning power as an example of a power to be exercised by the President in person.

• Justice Villa-Real — Concurred in the result. He opined that the Secretary of the Interior is not explicitly given the power to suspend a municipal elective officer, and such power cannot be implied. However, he stated that the implied approval by the President of the Philippines validated the unauthorized suspension by the Secretary.
• Justice Imperial — Concurred in the result based on two points: (1) the President has the power to suspend municipal officials, and the suspension appeared to be ordered by virtue of that authority (with the President stating no objection); and (2) the Secretary of the Interior acted within his powers under Sec. 79(C) and 86 of the Administrative Code in ordering the investigation.

• Justice Imperial — While concurring in the result, he dissented from the majority's broad conclusion that acts of department secretaries are presumptively deemed acts of the executive under the doctrine of qualified political agency. He found this principle dangerous and without legal sanction, arguing that officials have their own powers and duties, and the Secretary himself sought express presidential authority for the suspension.
• Justice Moran — Concurred in the result but dissented from the majority's broad application of the qualified political agency doctrine. He argued that if the President's power of suspension could be exercised by the Secretary in his own name, it would lead to serious implications (e.g., Secretary of Justice suspending a judge). He believed department secretaries have powers conferred by law separate from the President, unless acting under direct presidential instruction for powers vested personally in the President. He found the Secretary's authority to suspend in this case derived from Section 37 of Act No. 4007, which confers upon Department Heads the powers of chiefs of divisions (provinces/municipalities) under them.