Primary Holding

The Supreme Court held that flights by government aircraft at low altitudes directly over private property, which are so frequent and low as to directly interfere with the enjoyment and use of the land, constitute a "taking" of property for public use, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. This effectively created the concept of an "aerial easement."

Background

Historically, common law adhered to the doctrine cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum et ad infernos, granting property owners rights to the heavens and to the depths below. However, the advent of aviation in the 20th century rendered this archaic rule impractical and necessitated a re-evaluation of airspace rights. Early courts initially resisted change, but the necessity of flight for transportation and national defense forced a legal evolution recognizing that the airspace above "usable heights" was not exclusively owned by the landowner.

Facts

• 1. Respondent Causby owned farmland adjacent to a private airport in Greensboro, North Carolina, which was taken over by the U.S. military during World War II for training.
• 2. Military aircraft, including single and multi-engine planes, frequently used a north-south runway near Causby's property.
• 3. The glide path for this runway passed directly over Causby's home and chicken coop.
• 4. Aircraft flew at very low altitudes over Causby's property: not less than 83 feet over the ground, 67 feet over the barn, and 18 feet over the highest trees.
• 5. Approximately 4% of flights used this runway between 1942 and 1946.
• 6. The noise from low-flying aircraft was disruptive, frightening the family, causing chickens to be frightened and kill themselves by flying into walls, and reducing egg production.
• 7. The angle of ascent and descent was 30 feet to 1 foot, which was within CAB minimum requirements.

Arguments of the Petitioners

• 1. N/A (The article primarily discusses the ruling and does not detail specific arguments of the petitioner in the original Causby case. It focuses on the legal analysis and implications).

Arguments of the Respondents

• 1. N/A (Same as above. The article analyzes the legal implications rather than re-litigating the case arguments.)

Issues

• 1. Did frequent, low-altitude flights by government aircraft over private property constitute a "taking" of property under the Fifth Amendment?
• 2. Did the common law doctrine of cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum still apply in the age of aviation?
• 3. What is the extent of a landowner's right to the airspace above their property?
• 4. Could an "aerial easement" be created and constitute a taking requiring compensation?

Ruling

• 1. The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion, ruled in favor of Causby, finding a "taking" had occurred.
• 2. The Court rejected the traditional cujus est solum doctrine as it applied to modern aviation.
• 3. It established that while landowners do not own the airspace to an unlimited height, they do own the airspace necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of their land.
• 4. The Court reasoned that the frequent, low-altitude flights directly interfered with Causby's use of his land, effectively creating a servitude or easement in the airspace.
• 5. This "aerial easement" was deemed a taking for public use because the airport was used for public purposes, and thus required just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
• 6. The ruling was based on the specific factor of the glide pattern being below minimum altitudes prescribed by the Congress, though still within CAB/FAA regulations.

Doctrines

• 1. Fifth Amendment Taking Clause: The core doctrine. The Court determined the government action constituted a "taking" of private property for public use without just compensation.
• 2. Eminent Domain: Implicitly invoked as the government's action was considered a taking for public use, requiring the exercise of eminent domain through just compensation.
• 3. Aerial Easement Doctrine: Created by the Court as a new property concept recognizing a government right to use airspace over private land in a way that constitutes a taking.
• 4. Doctrine of Ancient Lights (English Doctrine): Referenced as an analogy, highlighting the landowner's claim to usable airspace as a modern counterpart.

Key Excerpts

• 1. "Cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum... Who's is the soil, his it is up to the sky. He who owns the soil, or surface of the ground, owns to an infinite height." (Cited to illustrate the traditional common law rule being overturned.)
• 2. "From the bowels of the earth to the heavens above, belongs the air and the earth to he who would own the surface." (Extension of cujus est solum, further emphasizing traditional property rights.)
• 3. "... when inroads are made upon the owner's use of it to an extent that as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in a course of time, there is a 'taking' of property..." (Quoted from U.S. v. Dickenson to define "taking").
• 4. "We think it is the function of [Congress] to decide what is a taking." (Quoted from U.S. ex rel TVA v. Welch, highlighting the tension between judicial and legislative determination of "taking").
• 5. "... nor be deprived of life, limb, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." (Fifth Amendment quote, the basis for the legal issue.)

Precedents Cited

• 1. U.S. v. One Pitcairn Biplane (Cited as an example of early court resistance to changes in airspace law).
• 2. U.S. v. Dickenson (Cited for defining "taking" in property law).
• 3. U.S. ex rel TVA v. Welch (Cited to show the Congressional role in defining "taking").
• 4. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (Cited in the context of determining "taking").
• 5. Paul v. Virginia and Southeastern Underwriters v. United States (Cited to illustrate the commerce clause power of the Federal Government).
• 6. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer (Cited to discuss the limits of war powers, and as a point of contrast to the Causby decision's rationale).
• 7. U.S. v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co. (Cited in relation to the concept of "taking").
• 8. U.S. v. Welch (217 U.S. 333) and Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Co. (Cited in relation to the definition of "taking" and constitutional property protection).
• 9. Woods v. Lloyd W. Miller Co. (Cited in the context of war powers and emergency regulations).
• 10. Gibbons v. Ogden, The Trade Mark Cases, The Lottery Cases, The License Cases, The Daniel Ball, Granger Law Cases, the Shreveport Case, Pipe Line Case, In re Debs, Sugar Trust Case, The Danbury Hatters' Case (Cited as examples supporting Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, related to air traffic regulation).
• 11. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Co. (Cited regarding "usable airspace" theory and limitations on landowner's airspace rights).
• 12. Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst (Cited in relation to FAA regulations and preemption).
• 13. Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S. and U.S. v. Central Eureka Mining Co. (Cited extensively regarding consequential damages in takings cases).
• 14. U.S. v. Sharp and U.S. v. Petty Motor Co. (Cited concerning damages calculation and tenant rights).
• 15. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U.S. (Cited in relation to "just compensation").
• 16. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.R. (Cited in relation to conditions for exercising eminent domain).
• 17. Ft. Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe (Cited concerning federal jurisdiction over military property).
• 18. U.S. v. California (Cited regarding federal sovereignty over air commerce and territorial waters).
• 19. Jacobs v. U.S. and U.S. v. Great Falls Mfg. Co. (Cited regarding eminent domain procedure).
• 20. Many other cases are cited throughout the article to illustrate various points of law and context.

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions

• 1. Genesis 1:1 (Biblical verse, quoted to illustrate historical property concepts).
• 2. CO. LITT. 4a (Coke on Littleton, cited for cujus est solum doctrine).
• 3. 1 COKE, Inst. (19th Ed., 1832), c. 1, § 1(4)(a) (Coke's Institutes, cited for cujus est solum doctrine).
• 4. 4 CO. LITT. 4a, 2 Bl. Comm. (1902) 18, 3 Kent Comm. (1896) 621 (Further citations for common law property rules).
• 5. U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment (Takings Clause, central to the case).
• 6. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 2 (Commerce Clause, basis for federal air traffic regulation).
• 7. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause, further support for commerce clause).
• 8. U.S. Constitution, Tenth Amendment (States' Rights, relevant to preemption).
• 9. 49 U.S.C. 180, 10A F.C.A. 49, § 180 (Statute related to CAB/FAA authority).
• 10. Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505, 28 U.S.C. 1402 (Jurisdiction for claims against the government).
• 11. 49 U.S.C. c. 9 et seq. (Air Commerce Act).
• 12. 49 U.S.C. § 551(a)(7) & 601(a)(7) and 49 U.S.C. § 551(a)(7) & 601(a)(7) (Sections of the Civil Aeronautics Act related to CAB/FAA altitude authority – although citation seems repetitive).
• 13. 50 Stat. 751, 752, c. 754, 28 U.S.C. 349(a), F.C.A. (title 28) 349(a) (Housing and Rent Act of 1947, in context of war powers).
• 14. 72 Stat. 1565, 70A Stat. 148, 10 U.S.C. 2663 and 10 U.S.C. 9773(d)(3), 10 U.S.C. 2662, 52 Stat. 1029, 49 U.S.C. 174(a), 72 Stat. 806, 44 Stat. 570, 52 Stat. 1028; 1940 Reorg. Plan, No. 4, § 7, 5 F.R. 2421, 49 U.S.C. 174(e), 54 Stat. 1235, 61 Stat. 501 (Various statutes related to governmental authority, eminent domain, air force powers, and air traffic regulations).
• 15. Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954; 42 U.S.C. 2011, 60 Stat. 755 and 72 Stat. 798, 49 U.S.C. 1508(a) (Atomic Energy Acts and statutes related to eminent domain).
• 16. 8 C.F.R. Cum. Supp., Title 14, c. 1, C.A.R. pt. 61, § 61.7400, 61 7401 (CAB/FAA regulations on altitude).
• 17. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 194 (Restatement of Torts, regarding privileged aircraft flight).
• 18. H.R. Rep. No. 262, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 39-40 (1874) and H.R. Rep., 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10. (House Reports, cited for legislative history and intent).
• 19. 28 U.S.C. 1331, 28 U.S.C. 1201, 28 U.S.C. 1491 (Ct. Cl.): 28 U.S.C. 1313 (D.C.); 88 U.S.C. 1201 (S. Ct.) (Federal jurisdictional statutes).