A party is barred by laches from invoking the defense of lack of jurisdiction when they have actively participated in the case proceedings through various stages for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, sought affirmative relief, and only raised the jurisdictional question after receiving an unfavorable decision on the merits.

The case originated from a simple collection suit for P1,908.00 filed by the spouses Tijam against the spouses Sibonghanoy in the CFI of Cebu shortly after the Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) took effect, which placed such amounts under the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts. A writ of attachment against the Sibonghanoys' property was dissolved upon the posting of a counter-bond by the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Surety).

• On July 19, 1948, Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog filed a suit in the CFI of Cebu to recover P1,908.00 from Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio.
• This filing occurred about a month after the Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) took effect on June 17, 1948, which vested exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions for sums not exceeding P2,000.00 (exclusive of interest and costs) in inferior courts.
• A writ of attachment was issued but dissolved when the defendants, along with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Surety), filed a counter-bond on July 31, 1948, making the Surety a quasi-party.
• After trial, the CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiffs; the judgment became final and executory.
• Execution against the principal defendants failed; plaintiffs moved for execution against the Surety's counter-bond.
• The Surety opposed the first motion for execution, citing failure to prosecute and lack of demand, and sought affirmative relief to be released from liability; the CFI denied the motion solely due to lack of prior demand.
• After demand was made, plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the Surety.
• At the hearing for the second motion (November 2, 1957), the Surety's counsel requested time to file an answer, which was granted, but the Surety failed to file one.
• The CFI granted the execution against the Surety (December 7, 1957), and a writ was issued.
• The Surety moved to quash the writ, arguing lack of the summary hearing required by the Rules of Court (Rule 59, Sec 17); this motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied by the CFI.
• The Surety appealed these denials to the Court of Appeals, raising only issues related to the alleged lack of summary hearing and the propriety of the execution order.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the CFI's orders on December 11, 1962.
• On January 12, 1963, nearly 15 years after becoming involved in the case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss in the Court of Appeals, raising for the very first time the issue that the CFI never had original jurisdiction over the case because the amount demanded (P1,908.00) was below the CFI's jurisdictional threshold established by RA 296.
• The Court of Appeals, finding the jurisdictional issue significant but noting the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such matters, set aside its own decision and certified the case to the Supreme Court.

• N/A (The petitioners were the appellees; the decision focuses on the Surety's arguments and the Court's reasoning. Appellees did not file a brief in the Court of Appeals).

• The CFI lacked original jurisdiction over the subject matter because the amount claimed (P1,908.00) was below the jurisdictional minimum set by the Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296), which took effect before the case was filed.
• The writ of execution issued against the Surety was invalid because it was issued without the required summary hearing under Section 17, Rule 59 (now Rule 57) of the Rules of Court.
• The CFI erred in denying the Surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and its motion for reconsideration.

• Whether the Surety company is barred by laches from questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance after participating actively in the case for almost fifteen years and only raising the issue after an adverse appellate decision.
• Whether the writ of execution against the Surety's counter-bond was properly issued (specifically, whether the requirement for a summary hearing was met).

• The Supreme Court affirmed the orders appealed from, holding that the Surety was barred by laches from raising the issue of the CFI's lack of jurisdiction.
• While jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and lack thereof can ordinarily be raised at any stage, this rule is not absolute and can be barred by laches.
• The Surety's failure to raise the jurisdictional question for almost 15 years, during which it actively participated by filing motions (including seeking affirmative relief) and appealing, constituted unreasonable and unexplained delay, warranting the application of laches.
• The Court condemned the practice of invoking a court's jurisdiction and participating in proceedings, only to attack that jurisdiction upon receiving an unfavorable judgment, deeming it contrary to public policy.
• Regarding the execution against the bond, the Court adopted the Court of Appeals' finding that the summary hearing requirement was met because the Surety was notified of the motion, appeared in court, requested time to answer (which was granted), but failed to file any answer or objection, thereby having had the opportunity to be heard.
• The liability of the surety on a counter-bond attaches automatically upon the judgment becoming executory and the execution against the principal debtor being returned unsatisfied, allowing for execution against the surety after notice and summary hearing within the same action.

• Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter — The authority of a court to hear and decide cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, conferred exclusively by law. The Court acknowledged the general rule that lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders proceedings void and can be raised at any stage, but held this rule was inapplicable here due to laches.
• Laches — The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Applied here to bar the Surety from raising the jurisdictional issue after nearly 15 years of silence and active participation.
• Estoppel by Laches — A principle barring a party from raising a question or asserting a right due to an unreasonable delay or negligence in asserting it, which has caused prejudice or disadvantage to the other party or goes against public policy. The Court explicitly stated the Surety was estopped by laches from belatedly questioning jurisdiction.
• Public Policy against Belated Jurisdictional Challenges — The principle that discourages the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting their case for decision and then attacking the court's jurisdiction only if the judgment is adverse. This principle underpinned the application of laches to prevent the Surety from repudiating the jurisdiction it had previously invoked or submitted to.
• Summary Hearing — A brief, expedited proceeding, not necessarily formal, where a party is notified and given an opportunity to be heard before a decision is made on an issue. The Court found the requirement was satisfied when the Surety was notified of the motion for execution, appeared, asked for time to respond, but then failed to do so.
• Surety's Liability on Counter-Bond — Under the Rules of Court, a counter-bond filed to discharge an attachment secures the payment of any judgment the plaintiff may recover, and the surety becomes liable automatically if the judgment becomes executory and execution against the principal debtor is returned unsatisfied. The Court affirmed that execution can issue against the surety in the same action after notice and summary hearing.

• "Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
• "The doctrine of laches or of 'stale demands' is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted."
• "Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the looser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court..."
• "We frown upon the 'undesirable practice' of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse..."
• "Were We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting."

• Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al. — Cited by the CA (and implicitly by the SC) as an example where the Supreme Court frowned upon the practice of attacking jurisdiction only after an adverse decision.
• Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al. — Cited similarly to Tyson Tan regarding the undesirability of belated jurisdictional challenges after submitting to the court's authority.
• Alfredo Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. — Also cited alongside Tyson Tan and Pindangan on the same principle against attacking jurisdiction post-adverse judgment.
• Dean vs. Dean — Cited for the principle that a party cannot invoke a court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief and then repudiate that same jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief, regardless of whether the court actually had jurisdiction, due to public policy against such practice.
• Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc. — Cited for the rule that it is too late for a losing party to question the court's jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting the cause and receiving an adverse decision on the merits.
• St. Louis etc. vs. McBride — Referenced alongside Pease supporting the principle against questioning jurisdiction after submission and adverse ruling.
• Littleton vs. Burgess — Cited for the principle that a party who affirmed and invoked a court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief cannot later deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
• Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. the Court of Industrial Relations et al. — Cited as another case where the Court frowned upon belated jurisdictional challenges after an adverse decision.
• Mejia vs. Lucas — Cited alongside the Young Men Labor Union case on the same point.
• Bautista vs. Joaquin — Cited to illustrate the rights acquired and obligations assumed by a surety upon filing a counter-bond under the Rules of Court.
• Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier — Cited similarly to Bautista vs. Joaquin regarding the surety's status and obligations after filing a counter-bond.

• Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), Section 44(c) — Relevant because it established the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, which (prior to amendments) excluded cases where the demand, exclusive of interest, was not more than P2,000.00.
• Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), Section 86(b) — N/A (This section deals with Justice of the Peace courts; Section 88 is the directly relevant provision for inferior court jurisdiction amount).
• Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), Section 88 — Relevant as it granted inferior courts (like Municipal Courts) original exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions where the value or demand does not exceed P2,000.00 (exclusive of interest and costs) at the time the action was filed. This was the basis for the Surety's jurisdictional challenge.
• Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), Section 31 — Relevant as it mandated the Court of Appeals to certify cases involving purely legal questions (like jurisdiction) to the Supreme Court.
• Rules of Court, Rule 59 (now Rule 57), Section 12 — Relevant as it provides for the discharge of attachment upon the defendant's posting of a counter-bond conditioned to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment recovered. Explains how the Surety became involved and liable.
• Rules of Court, Rule 59 (now Rule 57), Section 17 — Central to the Surety's procedural argument, this section outlines the procedure for recovery upon the counter-bond when execution against the principal debtor is returned unsatisfied, requiring notice and summary hearing in the same action before the surety becomes finally charged.