The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) does not have the authority to regulate the content or size of political expressions made by private citizens who are not candidates, especially when such expressions involve an advocacy on a social issue, even if they incidentally name candidates and are posted during an election period; any such regulation must withstand strict constitutional scrutiny and is generally an impermissible infringement on the fundamental right to freedom of expression.

The case arose in the context of the 2013 national elections in the Philippines and the then-recent, highly controversial passage of Republic Act No. 10354, the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law). The RH Law was a divisive piece of legislation, with strong opposition from various sectors, including the Catholic Church, to which the petitioners belong. The tarpaulins in question were a direct response to the RH Law, linking candidates' stances on it to a "conscience vote."

• On February 21, 2013, petitioners, the Diocese of Bacolod, posted two tarpaulins, each approximately six feet by ten feet (6'x10'), on the front walls of the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City, a private compound, within public view.
• One tarpaulin, subject of the case, bore the heading "Conscience Vote" and listed electoral candidates for the 2013 elections under two categories: "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay," marked with a check, and "(Pro-RH) Team Patay," marked with an "X," based on their votes on Republic Act No. 10354 (the RH Law).
• Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
• On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a "Notice to Remove Campaign Materials" to petitioner Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, ordering the tarpaulin's removal within three days for being oversized, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 which prescribed a size of two feet by three feet (2'x3') for campaign posters.
• On February 27, 2013, the COMELEC Law Department, through Director Atty. Esmeralda Amora-Ladra, issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin, threatening to file an election offense against petitioners if they failed to comply.
• Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the COMELEC's notice and letter.

• The COMELEC's notice and letter ordering the removal of the tarpaulin are unconstitutional as they infringe upon their fundamental right to freedom of expression.
• The tarpaulin is an expression of their advocacy on the RH Law and a "conscience vote" call, not election propaganda subject to COMELEC regulation, as petitioners are private citizens and not candidates or political parties.
• COMELEC has no jurisdiction to regulate the expression of private citizens who are not candidates, especially on private property.
• The size limitation imposed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 is unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to their expression.
• The COMELEC's actions violate the principle of separation of church and state by interfering with their moral and religious advocacy.
• Direct resort to the Supreme Court is justified due to the transcendental importance of the issues, the novelty of the case, the threat to fundamental rights, and the lack of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies.
• The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy as the assailed notice and letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc.
• Petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by directly filing with the Supreme Court.
• Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies within the COMELEC.
• The tarpaulin constitutes election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space for candidates.
• The size limitation for election propaganda is a valid and constitutional exercise of COMELEC's regulatory power, aimed at minimizing election spending and ensuring orderly elections.
• The reasonableness of the size limitation is a political question not subject to judicial review.
• The petitioners' act of posting the tarpaulin violates the constitutional principle of separation of church and state.

• Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the COMELEC's notice and letter through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition.
• Whether the petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• Whether the subject matter is a political question outside the ambit of judicial review.
• Whether the tarpaulin is protected speech (expression) or regulable election propaganda/political advertisement.
• Whether the COMELEC possesses the authority to regulate the tarpaulin posted by petitioners, who are private citizens and not candidates, on private property.
• Whether the COMELEC's notice and letter ordering the removal of the tarpaulin for exceeding size limitations are unconstitutional for violating the petitioners' right to freedom of expression and right to property.
• Whether the COMELEC's actions or the petitioners' posting of the tarpaulin violate the principle of separation of church and state.

• The petition was GRANTED. The Supreme Court declared the COMELEC's Notice to Remove Campaign Materials dated February 22, 2013, and its letter dated February 27, 2013, unconstitutional. The temporary restraining order previously issued was made permanent.
• The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under its expanded power of judicial review (Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution) to determine grave abuse of discretion by any government instrumentality, including COMELEC, especially when fundamental rights are threatened. Rule 65 is an appropriate remedy.
• Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts (genuine issues of constitutionality, transcendental importance, first impression, constitutional body's act questioned) and exhaustion of administrative remedies (purely legal question, urgency, violation of due process, irreparable injury) apply.
• The issue is not a political question because it involves an alleged infringement of fundamental constitutional rights, specifically freedom of expression.
• The tarpaulin is protected political speech by private citizens on a matter of public concern (the RH Law and its implications for electoral choices), not merely election propaganda paid for or sponsored by candidates or political parties.
• COMELEC's regulatory powers over election propaganda under the Constitution and election laws (e.g., Fair Election Act, COMELEC Res. No. 9615) primarily apply to candidates and political parties, not to the expression of private citizens advocating on social issues, even if it names candidates.
• The COMELEC's size limitation on the tarpaulin, as applied to petitioners, is an unconstitutional abridgment of their freedom of expression. It is a content-based regulation (as it targets speech with political consequences related to elections) that fails the clear and present danger test, or, if considered content-neutral, fails the intermediate scrutiny test as it is not narrowly tailored and no substantial government interest justifies such a broad restriction on non-candidates' speech.
• The order to remove the tarpaulin from private property also infringes upon the petitioners' right to property without due process of law.
• While the tarpaulin was posted by a religious diocese and motivated by religious beliefs, its content was primarily political speech with secular consequences, and thus not shielded as purely religious speech from all forms of secular regulation, nor did its posting violate the separation of church and state. Conversely, COMELEC's overreach did not primarily implicate the free exercise clause but rather freedom of expression.

• Freedom of Speech and Expression (Art. III, Sec. 4, Constitution) — This fundamental right protects the liberty to utter, publish, and express one's views on any matter, including political issues. It was applied to shield the petitioners' tarpaulin, deeming it political speech by non-candidates expressing an advocacy on a social issue (RH Law) and its relevance to electoral choices, which COMELEC cannot unduly restrict by imposing size limitations intended for candidate-sponsored campaign materials.
• Expanded Judicial Power (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2, Constitution) — This grants courts the duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. It was invoked to justify the Supreme Court's cognizance of the petition against COMELEC's actions, bypassing certain procedural hurdles.
• Hierarchy of Courts — This doctrine requires that litigants first resort to lower courts with concurrent jurisdiction before seeking relief from a higher court. The Court found that exceptions applied (genuine issues of constitutionality, transcendental importance, cases of first impression, acts of a constitutional organ) allowing direct resort to the Supreme Court.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — This principle requires that administrative remedies be first exhausted before seeking judicial relief. The Court held it inapplicable due to exceptions like purely legal questions, urgency, and violation of fundamental rights.
• Political Question Doctrine — This doctrine refers to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branches of government. The Court ruled it was not a political question as the case involved alleged infringement of the fundamental right to expression, which is subject to judicial review.
• Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech — Content-based regulations restrict speech based on its subject matter or viewpoint and are subject to strict scrutiny (requiring a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means). Content-neutral regulations restrict speech based on time, place, or manner, irrespective of content, and are subject to intermediate scrutiny (requiring a substantial government interest and means no greater than essential). The Court found the COMELEC's size restriction on the tarpaulin to be a content-based regulation as it specifically targeted election-related speech, or alternatively, even if content-neutral, it failed intermediate scrutiny.
• Clear and Present Danger Rule — A test for the validity of content-based restrictions on speech, requiring that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious, and the degree of imminence extremely high. The Court found that COMELEC failed to demonstrate such a danger posed by the oversized tarpaulin.
• Intermediate Scrutiny — A test for content-neutral regulations, requiring that the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the incidental restriction on speech is no greater than essential. The Court found that the size regulation, even if deemed content-neutral, did not pass this test as applied to petitioners.
• Right to Property (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution) — This protects a person from being deprived of property without due process of law. The Court held that COMELEC's order to remove the tarpaulin from the petitioners' private property, without sufficient justification, infringed this right.
• Separation of Church and State (Art. II, Sec. 6 & Art. III, Sec. 5, Constitution) — This principle mandates that the state shall not establish a religion or interfere with the free exercise thereof, and vice-versa. While petitioners invoked religious motivations, the Court found the tarpaulin's message to be primarily political speech with secular consequences, and COMELEC's actions were assessed mainly through the lens of free expression rather than free exercise of religion.

• "All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate during political contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated."
• "Nothing less than the electorate’s political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action."
• "Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its medium."
• "Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional."
• "Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made."
• "What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage."

• Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC — Cited by respondents to argue that only final en banc orders of COMELEC are reviewable. Distinguished by the Court as involving election protests and adjudicatory powers, unlike the present case concerning regulatory acts affecting non-candidates' free speech.
• Repol v. COMELEC — Cited by the Court to show exceptions (e.g., urgency, nullity of order) to the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc prior to SC review, even in electoral contests.
• ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC — Referenced for establishing exceptions to the general rule that only final orders of the COMELEC en banc are reviewable by the SC, particularly when fundamental rights like freedom of expression are involved or the assailed order is a nullity.
• Fortich v. Corona — Cited by petitioners to support direct resort to the SC due to "compelling reasons" or the "nature and importance of the issues raised," which the Court agreed applied.
• Sanidad v. COMELEC — Cited by the Court to support the principle that COMELEC's regulatory power during an election period over media (franchise holders) does not extend to regulating the expression of individuals (journalists in Sanidad, private citizens here) who are not candidates or franchise holders.
• National Press Club v. COMELEC — Cited by respondents. Distinguished by the Court because it primarily involved regulations on candidates and political parties concerning media access, and did not involve non-candidates expressing views on social issues.
• Primicias v. Fugoso — Cited to show that constitutional protection of free speech applies not just against laws but also against governmental acts (like a Mayor's refusal to issue a rally permit).
• Adiong v. COMELEC — Heavily relied upon by the Court. It held that a COMELEC prohibition on posting decals and stickers on private property (even in vehicles) was an overbroad restriction violating freedom of expression and property rights, as the restriction was not essential to any substantial government interest. Applied here to the tarpaulin on private church property.
• Osmeña v. COMELEC — Cited by respondents and discussed by the Court. It upheld COMELEC's power to regulate media to ensure equal opportunities among candidates. Distinguished because the present case involves speech by non-candidates, not regulation of candidate access to media.
• Chavez v. Gonzales — Cited for its discussion on the preferred status of political speech, the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations, and the strict scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions.
• Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu — Discussed in relation to symbolic speech and the accommodation of religious beliefs, though the Court ultimately found the tarpaulin's message to be primarily political.
• United States v. Bustos — Cited for the principle that free speech includes the right to criticize public officials and discuss public affairs, which is essential for good governance.
• Marcos v. Manglapus — Cited in the discussion of the political question doctrine, noting its limitations when grave abuse of discretion is alleged.
• Francisco v. HRET — Extensively quoted for its elaboration on the evolution of the political question doctrine and the expanded scope of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution.

• Philippine Constitution, Article III, Section 4 (Freedom of Speech, Expression, Press, Assembly, Petition) — The primary constitutional provision invoked by petitioners and upheld by the Court to protect their right to post the tarpaulin.
• Philippine Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 4 (COMELEC power to supervise/regulate media during election period) — Invoked by COMELEC as basis for its authority. The Court found this provision does not grant COMELEC power to regulate the expression of non-candidates like petitioners in this manner.
• Philippine Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 2(3) (COMELEC power to decide questions affecting elections) — Invoked by COMELEC. The Court clarified this does not divest the SC of jurisdiction over constitutional questions involving free speech.
• Philippine Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 2(7) (COMELEC power to recommend measures to minimize election spending) — Invoked by COMELEC. The Court found this interest insufficient to justify the restriction on petitioners' free speech.
• Philippine Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 (Expanded Judicial Power) — The Court cited this as the basis for its power to review acts of COMELEC for grave abuse of discretion, especially concerning fundamental rights.
• Philippine Constitution, Article III, Section 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses) — The right to property aspect of due process was deemed infringed by COMELEC's order to remove the tarpaulin from private property.
• Philippine Constitution, Article II, Section 1 (Sovereignty resides in the people) — Referenced to underscore the importance of the electorate's participation and expression in a democracy.
• Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), Section 3 (Lawful Election Propaganda) — The Court interpreted this to apply primarily to candidates and political parties, not to advocacy by private citizens.
• Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), Section 9 (Posting of Campaign Materials) — The Court noted this section refers to "parties" and "candidates," supporting its interpretation that the law's restrictions are aimed at them.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, Section 6(c) (Size of Posters) — The specific rule implementing the size limitation (2'x3') which the COMELEC sought to enforce against the petitioners' 6'x10' tarpaulin. This was declared unconstitutional as applied.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, Section 1(4) (Definition of "political advertisement" or "election propaganda") — Discussed by the Court, noting that the tarpaulin, while containing names of candidates, was primarily an advocacy by non-candidates and not paid for by candidates.
• Rules of Court, Rule 65 (Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus) — The procedural vehicle used by petitioners to bring the case before the Supreme Court.
• Philippine Constitution, Article III, Section 5 (Non-Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion) — Discussed, but the Court concluded the tarpaulin's message was primarily political speech, not religious speech, although religiously motivated.

• Carpio, J. — Concurred in setting aside the COMELEC notices but argued that Section 3.3 of RA 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution 9615 are content-neutral regulations of general applicability that are nevertheless unconstitutional because the fixed size limit (2x3 feet) is an unreasonable restriction on free speech, as it is not narrowly tailored and is greater than essential to further governmental interest, especially when posters are viewed from a distance.
• Perlas-Bernabe, J. — Concurred that the COMELEC issuances are null and void but viewed them as content-neutral regulations (restricting manner, not content). She found they failed the intermediate scrutiny test because they did not advance an important or substantial governmental interest sufficient to warrant restricting the Diocese's personal advocacy on a social issue posted on its own private property.

• Brion, J. — Argued that the petition was prematurely filed, violating procedural rules (failure to exhaust administrative remedies, bypassing COMELEC en banc) and that the issues were moot. Substantively, he contended the tarpaulin was election propaganda under RA 9006 as it intended to promote/oppose candidates. He viewed the size restriction as a valid content-neutral regulation that passes the intermediate scrutiny test, serving substantial government interests like ensuring equal opportunity, minimizing election spending, and maintaining orderly elections. He emphasized that freedom of speech is not absolute and must be balanced with other constitutional values related to fair elections.