Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals

A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of a second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of its celebration for the purpose of extinguishing criminal liability for bigamy; the crime is consummated upon the very act of contracting a second marriage while a prior marriage is still valid and subsisting.

The case arose from the multiple marriages contracted by petitioner Veronico Tenebro. He first married Hilda Villareyes in 1986. While this marriage was subsisting, he married Leticia Ancajas in 1990. After Tenebro left Ancajas to cohabit with his first wife, he contracted a third marriage with Nilda Villegas in 1993. Upon learning of the third marriage, Ancajas verified the existence of the first marriage and subsequently filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Tenebro for contracting their marriage (the second one) while his first marriage was still valid.

• Petitioner Veronico Tenebro married Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
• On April 10, 1990, while his first marriage was still subsisting, Tenebro married private complainant Leticia Ancajas.
• Tenebro and Ancajas lived together until late 1991, when Tenebro confessed his prior marriage to Villareyes and left their conjugal dwelling.
• On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted a third marriage with Nilda Villegas.
• After learning of this third marriage, Ancajas verified the existence of the first marriage with Villareyes and subsequently filed a complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.
• During the pendency of the bigamy case, a separate civil case resulted in a judicial declaration on November 20, 1995, that Tenebro's second marriage to Ancajas was null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• On November 10, 1997, the RTC convicted Tenebro of bigamy, a decision later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

• Petitioner denied the existence of his first marriage to Hilda Villareyes, claiming no marriage ceremony took place and presenting certifications from the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila stating they had no record of such a marriage.
• Petitioner argued that the judicial declaration of nullity of his second marriage to Leticia Ancajas on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration, effectively meaning the second marriage was void from the beginning and thus an essential element of bigamy—a valid second marriage—was lacking.

• The prosecution argued that the first marriage was sufficiently proven through a certified copy of the marriage contract, which, as a public document, is the best evidence of its contents and should be given more weight than certifications of "no record."
• The prosecution maintained that the crime of bigamy was already consummated when the petitioner contracted the second marriage, and the subsequent judicial declaration of its nullity is irrelevant to his criminal liability.

• Procedural Issues:
  • N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the existence of the first marriage between the petitioner and Hilda Villareyes was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Whether the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense to extinguish criminal liability for bigamy.

• Procedural:
  • N/A
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that the first marriage was sufficiently proven, as the certified copy of the marriage contract presented by the prosecution is a public document and serves as positive evidence that enjoys greater credence than the defense's certifications merely attesting to the absence of a record.
  • The Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a valid defense in a bigamy prosecution. The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage while a prior one is subsisting. The nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of no moment to the State's penal laws, as the crime had already been consummated upon the celebration of the second marriage.

• Elements of Bigamy — The Court enumerated the four elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage. The Court found all elements present in this case.
• Public Document as Evidence — The Court applied Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, holding that a certified copy of a marriage contract, being a public document, is admissible as the best evidence of its contents and is accorded full faith and credence, outweighing certifications of "no record" of such marriage.
• Non-Retroactivity of Judicial Nullity in Criminal Law — The Court established that a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity) does not retroact to erase criminal liability for bigamy. While such a declaration has civil effects, it does not negate the fact that the crime was perfected when the offender performed the illegal act of contracting a second marriage.

• "We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity."

• Mariategui v. Court of Appeals — Cited to support the ruling that the mere absence of a record of a marriage in the civil registry does not invalidate the marriage, as long as all the requisites for its validity are present.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 349 (Bigamy) — This is the central provision defining the crime for which the petitioner was charged and convicted. The Court's analysis focused on interpreting its elements and the point of consummation of the offense.
• Family Code, Article 36 (Psychological Incapacity) — This was the legal basis for the civil court's declaration of nullity of the petitioner's second marriage, which he invoked as his primary defense. The Court ruled that this provision's effects are not applicable to extinguish criminal liability.
• Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 7 (Evidence admissible when original document is a public record) — This rule was applied to give superior evidentiary weight to the certified copy of the petitioner's first marriage contract over the certifications of "no record" he presented.

• Justice Vitug — In his separate opinion, he concurred with the dismissal of the petition, emphasizing that psychological incapacity is a ground for nullity distinct from other grounds that relate to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage. He argued that since psychological incapacity does not prevent the perfection of the marriage contract, its subsequent declaration of nullity does not negate the fact that a bigamous marriage was indeed contracted, thus making the charge of bigamy consequential.

• Justice Carpio — He argued that the majority opinion reversed a well-settled doctrine that for bigamy to exist, the second marriage must be valid were it not for the first. If the second marriage is void ab initio on a separate ground like psychological incapacity, then no second marriage legally exists, and an essential element of the crime is absent. He emphasized that penal laws must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and that the majority's ruling effectively amends the Revised Penal Code.
• Justice Callejo, Sr. — He dissented, stating that once the second marriage was declared void ab initio by a final judgment in a civil case, it is considered to have never existed in the contemplation of criminal law. This finding is binding on the State and removes an essential element of the crime of bigamy, thereby warranting the petitioner's acquittal.