The Supreme Court's jurisdiction as the sole judge of presidential election contests under Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution is limited to post-election disputes and cannot be invoked to rule on a candidate's qualifications before the election; challenges to a candidate's qualifications based on alleged material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy fall under the COMELEC's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, reviewable by the Supreme Court via certiorari, where the petitioner must prove not just falsity but deliberate misrepresentation.

The cases arose in the lead-up to the May 10, 2004 national elections, following the filing of a certificate of candidacy for President by respondent Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), wherein he declared himself a natural-born Filipino citizen.

• Respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for President on December 31, 2003, stating he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, born in Manila on August 20, 1939.
• Petitioner Fornier filed a petition with the COMELEC (SPA No. 04-003) to disqualify FPJ, alleging material misrepresentation regarding his citizenship.
• Fornier claimed FPJ's mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was American, and his father, Allan F. Poe, was Spanish (son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject).
• Fornier argued that even if Allan F. Poe were Filipino, FPJ was illegitimate (born before his parents' marriage) and thus followed his American mother's citizenship, citing an alleged prior marriage of Allan F. Poe to Paulita Gomez.
• Fornier presented FPJ's birth certificate, an affidavit by Paulita Gomez regarding a bigamy case, certifications about lack of records for Lorenzo Pou's entry/residence and Allan F. Poe's birth in the National Archives.
• FPJ presented evidence including certifications of no available records for Allan F. Poe's birth or marriage to Paulita Gomez, FPJ's birth certificate, Lorenzo Pou's land title and tax declarations, Lorenzo Pou's death certificate (stating Filipino citizenship), the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe (stating Filipino) and Bessie Kelley (stating American) dated September 16, 1940, and certification of destroyed birth records in San Carlos City during WWII.
• FPJ's birth certificate indicated he was born August 20, 1939, to Allan F. Poe (Filipino) and Bessie Kelley (American), who were stated as married.
• The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley indicated they married on September 16, 1940.
• The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou indicated he died September 11, 1954, aged 84, Filipino, resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan.

• (Fornier) FPJ committed material misrepresentation in his CoC by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
• (Fornier) FPJ's father, Allan F. Poe, was a Spanish national, son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject who never became Filipino.
• (Fornier) Even if Allan F. Poe was Filipino, FPJ is illegitimate (born August 1939, parents married September 1940) and must follow the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American.
• (Fornier) Allan F. Poe had a prior subsisting marriage to Paulita Gomez, making his marriage to Bessie Kelley void and FPJ illegitimate.
• (Fornier) Jurisprudence (Morano, Chiongbian, Serra, Paa) dictates that illegitimate children follow the mother's citizenship.
• (Tecson/Velez) The Supreme Court, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution, has original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the qualifications (including citizenship) of presidential candidates, not the COMELEC.

• (FPJ) He is a natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution as his father, Allan F. Poe, was a Filipino citizen.
• (FPJ) Allan F. Poe was Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines in 1899, became Filipino through mass Filipinization under the Treaty of Paris and Philippine Bill of 1902, not having elected to retain Spanish allegiance.
• (FPJ) Lorenzo Pou's death certificate identifies him as Filipino.
• (FPJ) The 1935 Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 1(3)) confers citizenship to children whose fathers are citizens, without distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate children.
• (FPJ) The alleged prior marriage to Paulita Gomez is based on doubtful/fabricated evidence.
• (FPJ) Petitioner Fornier failed to discharge the burden of proving deliberate material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• (COMELEC) It has jurisdiction under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to hear petitions to deny due course or cancel a CoC based on material misrepresentation, including citizenship claims.
• (COMELEC) Petitioner Fornier failed to present substantial evidence to prove FPJ made a false material representation regarding his citizenship.

• Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of a presidential candidate based on qualifications.
• Whether the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution to determine the qualifications of a presidential candidate before the elections.
• Whether respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
• Whether respondent FPJ committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy regarding his citizenship.
• Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Fornier's petition.

• The petitions in G.R. No. 161434 (Tecson) and G.R. No. 161634 (Velez) were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity; the Supreme Court's power under Article VII, Section 4, par. 7, as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, applies only to post-election contests involving the proclaimed President or Vice-President.
• The petition in G.R. No. 161824 (Fornier) was dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC; the COMELEC correctly exercised jurisdiction under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code over the petition alleging material misrepresentation in FPJ's CoC.
• The Court found that petitioner Fornier failed to substantiate his claim that FPJ made a deliberate and willful material misrepresentation; the evidence presented did not conclusively prove FPJ was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, and indeed, preponderated in his favor.
• The Court held that under the 1935 Constitution (the law applicable at FPJ's birth), children follow the citizenship of their Filipino fathers (jus sanguinis), and the Constitution makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children for this purpose.
• Based on the evidence (Lorenzo Pou's death certificate, residency, and lack of evidence of preserving Spanish allegiance), it is presumed Lorenzo Pou became Filipino under the Philippine Bill of 1902, thus his son Allan F. Poe was also Filipino.
• Therefore, FPJ, son of Allan F. Poe, is a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution; being a citizen from birth based on his father's citizenship, without needing any act to perfect it, he is a natural-born citizen.

• Jurisdiction of COMELEC (Sec. 78, OEC) — The COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy based exclusively on the ground that a material representation required under Section 74 (including qualifications like citizenship) is false. The Court affirmed COMELEC's jurisdiction in Fornier's case.
• Jurisdiction of Supreme Court as Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution) — The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. This jurisdiction is exercised only in post-election scenarios (election protest or quo warranto) after a winner has been proclaimed, not before the election. The Tecson and Velez petitions were dismissed based on this.
• Natural-Born Citizen (Art. IV, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution) — Defined as citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. The Court analyzed FPJ's status based on this definition, considering the laws at his birth.
• Jus Sanguinis — The principle of citizenship based on blood relationship. This is the primary basis for Philippine citizenship under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. The Court applied this, holding that FPJ followed the citizenship of his presumed Filipino father, Allan F. Poe, under the 1935 Constitution.
• Citizenship under 1935 Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 1(3)) — Provides that "Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" are citizens. The Court explicitly ruled this provision does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children; proof of paternity by a Filipino father is sufficient.
• Citizenship under Philippine Bill of 1902 / Treaty of Paris — Spanish subjects residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and their children born subsequently, were deemed citizens of the Philippine Islands unless they elected to preserve Spanish allegiance. The Court applied this to Lorenzo Pou, FPJ's grandfather, presuming his Filipinization due to lack of evidence he preserved Spanish allegiance.
• Material Misrepresentation (Sec. 78, OEC) — To cancel a CoC under Sec. 78, the false representation must be material (referring to qualifications) and, according to jurisprudence like Romualdez-Marcos, must be deliberate and willful. The Court found Fornier failed to prove FPJ's statement was a deliberate falsehood.
• Public Documents as Prima Facie Evidence (Rule 130, Sec. 44) — Entries in official records made by a public officer in performance of duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated. Applied to birth, marriage, and death certificates presented, though their probative value was weighed against conflicting entries and circumstances.
• Proof of Filiation (Civil Law vs. Political Law) — While Civil Code/Family Code provisions govern proof of paternity for civil purposes (support, succession), the Court suggested these strict rules might not be exclusively controlling for determining citizenship, a political status, where pedigree evidence or other means might suffice, though it ultimately relied on the constitutional provision regarding fathers.
• Obiter Dictum — Statements in prior court decisions that are incidental and not necessary to the resolution of the case do not establish binding precedent. The Court dismissed Fornier's reliance on statements in Morano, Chiongbian, Serra, and Paa regarding illegitimate children following the mother's citizenship as obiter dicta.
• Equal Protection Clause — The Court, through amici curiae opinions it found convincing, reasoned that distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate children for citizenship purposes under the 1935 Constitution would violate equal protection as the distinction is not germane to the purpose of ensuring allegiance.
• Judicial Review of COMELEC Decisions (Rule 64/65) — Decisions of the COMELEC are reviewable by the Supreme Court via certiorari under Rule 64/65, limited to determining if there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court applied this standard to Fornier's petition.

• “Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a ‘precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,’ that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.”
• “Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.”
• “The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.”
• “But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy…”
• “Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are ‘those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.’ There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.”

• Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912) — Established the principle of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth) which was later abandoned. Referenced for historical context on citizenship modes.
• Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947) — Reversed Roa, definitively abandoning jus soli and affirming jus sanguinis as the primary basis for Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution. Crucial precedent establishing the governing principle.
• Morano vs. Vivo (1967), Chiongbian vs. de Leon (1949), Serra vs. Republic (1952), Paa vs. Chan (1967) — Cases cited by petitioner Fornier containing statements that illegitimate children follow the mother's citizenship. The Court analyzed these and dismissed the relevant statements as obiter dicta, not controlling precedent for FPJ's situation.
• Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC (1995) — Cited for the rule that material misrepresentation under Sec. 78 OEC must be deliberate and willful. The Court applied this standard in assessing Fornier's claim against FPJ.
• Lopez vs. Roxas (1966) — Highlighted the previous lack of a designated tribunal for presidential election contests under the 1935 Constitution, leading to the enactment of R.A. 1793 and later the specific provision in the 1987 Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 4).
• Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster (1913) — Cited to illustrate the principle that laws relating to family rights, status, condition, and legal capacity (civil law matters) follow the person's nationality (lex nationalii). Used to distinguish civil status (legitimacy) from political status (citizenship).
• Tijing vs. Court of Appeals (2001) — Mentioned regarding the potential use and strong weight of DNA testing in proving paternity, although not applied in this case.
• People vs. Cayat (1939) — Cited by amicus curiae Bernas regarding the requirements for valid classifications under the equal protection clause, arguing that distinguishing citizenship based on legitimacy lacks a rational basis related to public service.
• Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals (1983) — Cited regarding the retroactive application of Civil Code provisions on recognition of natural children.

• 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 2 — Sets the qualifications for President, requiring the candidate to be a natural-born citizen. Central provision defining the qualification FPJ was alleged to lack.
• 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 — Designates the Supreme Court as the sole judge of presidential/vice-presidential election contests. Interpreted by the Court to apply only post-election, thus dismissing Tecson/Velez petitions.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 1 — Enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines. Referenced as the current framework, incorporating principles from previous constitutions.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2 — Defines "natural-born citizens." Key definition applied to FPJ's circumstances based on the laws at his birth.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-A, Section 7 — Provides for Supreme Court review of COMELEC decisions via certiorari. Basis for the Court's jurisdiction over Fornier's petition.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 2 — Outlines COMELEC powers, including enforcement of election laws and deciding questions affecting elections (par. 1 & 3), and jurisdiction over contests for regional/provincial/city officials (par. 2). Basis for COMELEC's jurisdiction over Sec. 78 petitions.
• 1935 Constitution, Article IV, Section 1(3) — States "Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" are citizens. The governing provision at FPJ's birth, interpreted by the Court as conferring citizenship irrespective of legitimacy.
• Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Section 78 — Governs petitions to deny due course or cancel a CoC due to false material representation. The provision under which Fornier filed his petition at the COMELEC.
• Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Section 74 — Specifies the required contents of a certificate of candidacy, including eligibility. Referenced by Sec. 78 regarding what constitutes a "material representation."
• Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Section 52 — Grants COMELEC general powers to enforce election laws. Cited as part of the basis for COMELEC's jurisdiction.
• Rules of Court, Rule 64 & Rule 65 — Govern review of COMELEC judgments (Rule 64) and certiorari (Rule 65). Procedural basis for Fornier's petition to the Supreme Court.
• Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 3 (d) — Exception to the original document rule for public records. Basis for admitting certified copies of public documents.
• Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 44 — Entries in official records as prima facie evidence. Basis for the evidentiary value of the certificates presented.
• Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 39 — Admissibility of act or declaration about pedigree. Discussed in relation to Ruby Kelley Mangahas' affidavit, but found inapplicable as it was made post litem motam.
• Treaty of Paris (1898), Article IX — Provided terms for Spanish subjects in the Philippines after cession to the US, including the process for retaining Spanish allegiance or acquiring nationality of the territory. Applied to Lorenzo Pou's presumed Filipinization.
• Philippine Bill of 1902, Section 4 — Deemed inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, and their children, as citizens of the Philippine Islands. Key provision for Lorenzo Pou's citizenship.
• Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916), Section 2 — Reaffirmed the citizenship provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
• Spanish Civil Code (Old Civil Code), Article 131 — Governed acknowledgment of natural children under the law applicable at FPJ's birth. Discussed regarding proof of filiation.
• Family Code, Articles 172, 173, 175, 256 — Current provisions on establishing filiation and their retroactive effect. Discussed but deemed less central than the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

• Davide, Jr., C.J. — Agreed with the ponencia, emphasizing that Fornier conceded paternity and that under the 1935 Constitution, filiation to a Filipino father, regardless of legitimacy, confers citizenship. Affirmed COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion.
• Puno, J. — Provided an extensive historical analysis of citizenship laws and jurisprudence, strongly arguing against distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate children for jus sanguinis under the 1935 Constitution, deeming prior contrary statements as obiter dicta. Found Fornier failed to prove FPJ was not natural-born or that he committed deliberate misrepresentation.
• Ynares-Santiago, J. — Concurred fully with Justice Puno's separate opinion.
• Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. — Concurred with the ponencia and Justice Puno's opinion, stressing that the illegitimacy of FPJ is inconsequential under the 1935 Constitution's citizenship provision and that Fornier failed to prove his case before COMELEC.
• Austria-Martinez, J. — Agreed with the dismissal, finding COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction under Sec. 78 OEC and did not commit grave abuse of discretion as Fornier failed to meet the burden of proof. Argued the 1935 Constitution's use of "fathers" includes fathers of illegitimate children (Ubi lex non distinguit).
• Callejo, Sr., J. — Concurred in dismissing all petitions, finding COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion as Fornier failed to prove the essential elements under Sec. 78, particularly deliberate false representation. Agreed that the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish legitimacy for citizenship derived from the father.
• Azcuna, J. — Held that under the Civil Code and Family Code provisions applied retroactively, FPJ should be deemed legitimated from birth due to his parents' subsequent marriage, thus following his father's citizenship. Found Fornier failed to prove FPJ was not a Filipino citizen at birth.

• Carpio, J. — Argued FPJ is not a natural-born citizen. Stressed that FPJ, being illegitimate (born before parents' marriage), follows the mother's (American) citizenship under the laws and jurisprudence prevailing in 1939 (Ching Leng doctrine). Maintained acknowledgment/legitimation after birth cannot confer natural-born status, which requires citizenship from birth without needing any subsequent act. Criticized the majority for abandoning established doctrine and failing to require FPJ to meet the burden of proving his citizenship.
• Carpio-Morales, J. — Maintained FPJ is not a natural-born citizen. Found the evidence insufficient to establish Lorenzo Pou's or Allan F. Poe's Filipino citizenship. Argued that even assuming Allan Poe was Filipino, FPJ's illegitimacy means he followed his American mother's citizenship at birth under prevailing law (Ong Tianse, Ching Leng). Stated that subsequent laws on legitimation cannot retroactively confer natural-born status. Criticized COMELEC for grave abuse of discretion in failing to rule definitively on citizenship and not stating factual bases.
• Tinga, J. — Argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to rule definitively on the citizenship issue and not basing its decision on stated facts. Found the evidence insufficient to establish FPJ's paternity by Allan F. Poe or Lorenzo Pou's Filipino citizenship. Believed the case should have been remanded for proper reception and appreciation of evidence, but since the Court opted to rule, concluded FPJ failed to prove he is natural-born. (Joined by Quisumbing, J.)