Publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable prerequisite for the effectivity of all statutes, presidential decrees, executive orders, and administrative rules intended to enforce or implement existing laws; the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code pertains only to the fifteen-day effectivity period and does not grant the legislature the power to dispense with the publication requirement itself.

This case arose from a prior petition where the petitioners demanded the publication of numerous presidential decrees issued during the Marcos administration, which had not been published as required by law. The Supreme Court's initial decision on April 24, 1985, ordered the government to publish all unpublished presidential issuances "which are of general application." Finding this directive ambiguous, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification to precisely define the scope of laws requiring publication, the meaning of "publication," and the proper medium and timing for such publication.

• Following the Supreme Court's April 24, 1985 decision ordering the publication of presidential issuances "of general application," petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification.
• Petitioners posed five specific questions to the Court: (1) What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?; (2) Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and those which are not?; (3) What is meant by "publication"?; (4) Where is the publication to be made?; and (5) When is the publication to be made?
• The government, through the Solicitor General, initially argued that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and that publication was not always mandatory, especially if a law provided for its own immediate effectivity.
• After the February 1986 Revolution, the new Solicitor General submitted that issuances for internal administration did not require publication but agreed that when necessary, publication must be in full in the Official Gazette.

• Petitioners argued that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those that are not; all laws must be published to be effective.
• They contended that "publication" must mean complete or full publication of the text of the law, not merely a notice of its existence, title, or number.
• They asserted that publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette as prescribed by law.

• The Solicitor General argued that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the requirement of publication was not always imperative.
• It was argued that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not need to be published.
• The government claimed that the original decision was not binding because it was not supported by a vote of eight members of the Court.
• It was also contended that the motion was an improper request for an advisory opinion and should be dismissed.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petitioners' motion for clarification constitutes an improper request for an advisory opinion.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code authorizes the legislature to dispense with the requirement of publication.
  • Whether a distinction should be made between laws of general application and laws that are not, for purposes of the publication requirement.
  • What constitutes "publication" for the purpose of a law's effectivity.
  • Where the publication of laws must be made.

• Procedural:
  • The Court found the claim that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion to be "untenable" and dismissed it without further discussion.
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code refers to the date of effectivity and not the requirement of publication itself. Publication is indispensable in every case and cannot be omitted. The legislature may only shorten or extend the 15-day period, but not dispense with publication.
  • The Court held that the term "laws" requiring publication includes all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, presidential decrees, executive orders exercising legislative power, and administrative rules intended to enforce or implement existing laws. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature are excluded.
  • The Court declared that publication must be in full, as its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law. The mere mention of a decree's number and title in the Official Gazette is not sufficient.
  • The Court pronounced that under the existing Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication must be made in the Official Gazette. While newspapers of general circulation may be more practical, the Court's duty is to apply the law as written, and any change must come from the legislature.

• Due Process of Law — The Court held that the omission of publication would offend due process because it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern them, potentially prejudicing individuals who are unaware of a law's existence.
• Conclusive Presumption of Knowledge of the Law — The principle that "every person is conclusively presumed to know the law" (ignorantia legis non excusat) is legally justifiable only if the law has been published and made accessible to the public. Secret laws cannot be the basis of this presumption.
• Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern — The Court linked the publication requirement to the constitutional right of the people to information, stating that this right "certainly applies to... legislative enactments of the government."
• Separation of Powers — The Court emphasized that its function is to interpret and apply the law, not to rule on its wisdom or to amend it. It stated that changing the medium of publication from the Official Gazette to a newspaper of general circulation is a matter for the legislature to decide.

• "The clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted."
• "We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature."
• "We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws."
• "The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance."
• "Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets."

• Article 2, Civil Code — This is the central provision interpreted by the Court. It mandates that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. The Court's ruling clarified that "unless otherwise provided" refers only to the effectivity date, not the publication requirement.
• Section 6, Bill of Rights (1973 Constitution) — Cited to support the publication requirement as an essential component of the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
• Local Government Code — Mentioned to clarify that the publication of municipal ordinances is governed by this specific code, not by the general rule in Article 2 of the Civil Code.

• Justice Fernan — Concurred with the main opinion and added observations on how the previous regime abused its law-making power by promulgating thousands of decrees without publication. He emphasized that the Court's ruling prevents such abuses and ensures the people's constitutional right to due process and information.
• Justice Feliciano — Concurred and added that a statute providing for its effectivity "immediately upon approval" should be interpreted to mean effective immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette, to avoid conflict with the due process clause. He also clarified that the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette is a statutory command under the Civil Code, not a constitutional one, and could be amended by the legislature.