Tan, Jr. vs. Matsuura

The Court of Appeals correctly exercised its power to review the Department of Justice's findings for grave abuse of discretion, and there was no probable cause to indict the respondents for falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as the elements of the crime, including alteration changing the document's meaning and damage, were not sufficiently established during the preliminary investigation.

The case arose from an intra-corporate dispute in TF Ventures, Inc., involving Tan and Matsuura, where Tan accused Matsuura and others of stealing company properties, including a pre-signed blank Deed of Trust; this led to a qualified theft case against Matsuura and associates, and Tan later claimed the deed was filled and notarized without his consent as part of a compromise attempt, prompting falsification charges amid ongoing hostilities and legal battles before the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Tan filed a complaint on March 31, 1998, alleging that between December 21, 1996, and January 9, 1997, Matsuura, Hiroko Matsuura, and Ruben Jacinto stole company properties and Tan's personal belongings, including a pre-signed blank Deed of Trust; a qualified theft case (Criminal Case No. 98-040) was filed against them in RTC Makati Branch 132; Tan claimed the deed was later filled with 28,500 shares, dated January 20, and witnessed by Hiroko Matsuura and Lani C. Camba without his consent; on June 19, 1997, the deed was notarized by Cua, despite Tan never appearing before her, as relations were hostile; Matsuura and Tanjutco used the documents in SEC cases; the Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on July 13, 1998, for lack of probable cause, noting Tan's voluntary signing and no damage shown; the Department of Justice initially affirmed dismissal but later reversed upon reconsideration, directing informations, though later modified to exclude Cua; the Court of Appeals granted respondents' certiorari petitions, finding grave abuse by the Department of Justice.

Tan argued that the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the certiorari petitions as prosecutors have discretion in determining probable cause and courts cannot intervene once an information is filed; he claimed the Deed of Trust was stolen and filled/notarized without his consent, with differences in print/font indicating falsification; he asserted probable cause existed based on evidence like the unnotarized copy in SEC filings and the five-month gap between execution and notarization, causing him damage in the corporate dispute; Tan also contended the Court of Appeals violated rules by granting Cua's extension to file her petition.

Matsuura denied involvement in falsification, claiming the deed transfer was a voluntary compromise by Tan in their TF Ventures dispute, with Tan arranging notarization; Tanjutco argued Tan's pre-signing proved voluntary assignment of shares, she had no participation in falsification, and she did not know Matsuura at the time of notarization; Cua stated that on June 19, 1997, a person identifying as Tan appeared with his CTC, was sworn in, and she notarized in good faith, reporting duplicates to the Clerk of Court, denying any connection to Tanjutco or interest in the matter; all respondents emphasized lack of evidence of their participation, no damage to Tan, and presumption of regularity in notarial acts.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the certiorari petitions to review the Department of Justice's findings on probable cause, assuming the role of a reviewing authority over prosecutorial discretion.
• Substantive Issues: Whether probable cause existed to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco, and Cua for falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, based on the alleged unauthorized filling and notarization of the Deed of Trust.

• Procedural: The Court held that courts, including the Court of Appeals, retain the power to review Department of Justice findings for grave abuse of discretion under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, particularly where successive contradictory resolutions indicate misapprehension of facts, ensuring protection from baseless prosecutions without usurping executive functions.
• Substantive: The Court ruled no probable cause existed, as Tan failed to show elements of falsification such as actual participation by respondents in alterations changing the document's meaning, damage to a third party, or conspiracy with Cua for the notarization charge; presumptions of regularity in notarial acts and Tan's voluntary signing were not overcome by bare denials, rendering the Department of Justice's directives unsupported by evidence and amounting to grave abuse.

• Probable Cause in Preliminary Investigations — Defined as facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and the accused is probably guilty; applied here to require evidence beyond mere suspicion, leading the Court to find insufficient basis for indicting respondents and prevent unwarranted trials.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Exists when a public official acts capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily, including gross misapprehension of facts; invoked to justify Court of Appeals' reversal of Department of Justice resolutions that ignored lack of evidence on falsification elements and contradicted initial prosecutorial findings.
• Presumption of Regularity — A person takes ordinary care of concerns and official acts are regular unless rebutted by clear evidence; used to uphold Cua's notarial performance and the deed as a public document, as Tan's denial without proof failed to overcome it.
• Elements of Falsification under Article 171(6) RPC — Requires alteration or intercalation in a genuine document changing its meaning; interpreted to necessitate proof of respondents' participation and damage, which Tan did not provide, resulting in no probable cause for private individuals under Article 172(2).

• "Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof."
• "While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play."
• "It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties."

• Garcia v. Court of Appeals — Cited as controlling precedent for the elements of falsification under Article 171(6) of the RPC, including alteration changing the document's meaning, applied to assess if Tan proved intercalations in the deed.
• Tan v. Ballena — Referenced to affirm courts' power to review Department of Justice findings for grave abuse, distinguishing it from routine deference to prosecutors and justifying Court of Appeals intervention here.
• Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals — Invoked for the presumption that a person takes ordinary care and does not sign documents without knowing contents, used to rebut Tan's claim of signing a blank deed.
• Vallejo v. Court of Appeals — Cited illustratively for allowing procedural lapses in meritorious cases to promote justice, supporting the Court of Appeals' grant of extension to Cua despite rule violations.
• Social Security System v. Department of Justice — Followed for courts' constitutional duty to review executive acts for grave abuse, ensuring probable criminals are prosecuted while protecting the innocent.

• Article 171(2) and (6), Revised Penal Code — Defines falsification by public officers or notaries, including causing appearance of participation in acts and making alterations changing meaning; relevant as basis for charges against Cua and conspiracy claims against private respondents.
• Article 172(2), Revised Penal Code — Penalizes private individuals for falsifying private documents to third-party damage; applied to evaluate if insertions in the deed caused Tan damage, found lacking.
• Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Grants judicial power to determine grave abuse of discretion by government instrumentalities; central to upholding Court of Appeals' review authority over Department of Justice.
• Section 3(d), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Presumes a person takes ordinary care of concerns; used to infer Tan knowingly signed the complete deed.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. 00-2-03-SC) — Governs filing of certiorari petitions within 60 days, with limited extensions; referenced in excusing Cua's delay for substantial justice.