Tan-Andal vs. Andal

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a legal, not a medical, concept, and it is not a mental incapacity or a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion; its existence must be established by clear and convincing evidence showing a party's failure to comprehend and comply with their essential marital obligations due to a genuinely serious psychic cause that is grave, has juridical antecedence, and is incurable in a legal sense (i.e., enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner).

The interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code on psychological incapacity has been historically restrictive, primarily due to the landmark cases of Santos v. Court of Appeals and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. The Molina doctrine, in particular, established a set of eight stringent guidelines that courts were required to follow, including the requirement that the incapacity be medically or clinically identified, proven by experts, and shown to be grave, permanent, and incurable. This rigid framework was criticized in subsequent cases like Ngo Te v. Yu-Te for being a "strait-jacket" that was inconsistent with the legislative intent of making the provision humane and resilient. The present case provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to restate the doctrine in light of evolving science, jurisprudence, and contemporary circumstances, aiming to create a more nuanced and humane application of the law.

• Rosanna L. Tan-Andal and Mario Victor M. Andal married on December 16, 1995, and had one child, Ma. Samantha, born in 1996.
• Before the marriage, Mario exhibited troubling behavior, including being unaccounted for, postponing his return to his job in Italy, and eventually quitting it without informing Rosanna.
• After the marriage, Mario's behavior worsened; he had no job, was financially irresponsible, and continued his "emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and psychological imbalance."
• Mario admitted to Rosanna that he was using marijuana but promised to stop, a promise he did not keep, as Rosanna later found packets of shabu among his belongings.
• Mario was neglectful as a husband and father; he did not assist Rosanna after she gave birth and was neglectful when their daughter was hospitalized for dengue fever, even showing signs of paranoia.
• Mario's drug use led to the financial ruin of the construction company Rosanna had set up, as he took large cash advances to fund his habit.
• Multiple incidents of erratic and dangerous behavior occurred, including Mario attempting to take their child, being found with travel documents for a child to Europe, and relapsing into drug use in a small room he had built in their duplex, even bringing their daughter into the room while he smoked.
• Mario underwent detoxification and was committed to rehabilitation centers multiple times but escaped and failed to complete his programs.
• Rosanna presented expert witness Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia, a psychiatrist, who diagnosed Mario with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features, based on interviews with Rosanna, their daughter, and Rosanna's sister, as well as a personal history handwritten by Mario himself.
• Dr. Garcia concluded that Mario's condition was grave, deeply rooted in his character with juridical antecedence, and incurable, rendering him psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

• Rosanna argued that the totality of evidence presented was sufficient to prove Mario's psychological incapacity, which was manifested through his chronic drug use, irresponsibility, and failure to perform his essential marital obligations.
• She contended that the expert opinion of Dr. Garcia was reliable and competent, even without a personal interview of Mario, as it was based on collateral information from family members and documents written by Mario himself, and was subjected to cross-examination.
• Rosanna asserted that the strict guidelines laid down in Republic v. Molina have become burdensome and have unjustifiably intruded on a person's rights to autonomy and human dignity, and should be revisited.
• She claimed that psychological incapacity is not strictly a medical illness and that expert opinion is not the only form of competent evidence to establish its existence.
• Rosanna maintained that drug addiction can be a manifestation of a grave personality disorder constituting psychological incapacity, and not merely a ground for legal separation.
• She argued that the duplex and the lot on which it was built were her exclusive properties, as the lot was donated to her and Mario made no contribution to the construction of the house.

• Mario countered that it was Rosanna who was psychologically incapacitated, claiming she was uncontrollable, violent, and insisted on living with her parents who constantly intruded into their marital life.
• He argued that his past drug use was, at best, only a ground for legal separation and not for the nullity of their marriage due to psychological incapacity.
• Mario denied Rosanna's allegations of neglect, claiming he was a good father and worked as the operations manager of the construction firm to support the family.
• He contended that psychological incapacity must be truly incurable, meaning medically or clinically permanent, and should be absolute, not just relative to the current spouse.
• Mario claimed that the house and lot in Parañaque were community property, having been acquired during the marriage.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether an expert opinion on a party's psychological incapacity is competent evidence if it is based solely on collateral information from the other spouse and their relatives, without a personal interview of the person being diagnosed.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the guidelines for psychological incapacity laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina should be modified or abandoned.
  • Whether Mario Andal is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
  • Whether the quantum of proof required to establish psychological incapacity is a preponderance of evidence or clear and convincing evidence.
  • Whether half of the duplex and the lot on which it is situated are community properties of the parties.
  • Whether the custody of the child, Ma. Samantha, was rightfully awarded to Rosanna.

• Procedural:
  • Yes, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity is competent evidence even if based on collateral information. The Court held that personal examination of the person alleged to be incapacitated is not required for a declaration of nullity. The credibility of an expert witness's testimony is determined by their special knowledge, skill, and methodology, not by whether they personally interviewed the subject. The totality of evidence presented is what ultimately determines the finding of psychological incapacity.
• Substantive:
  • Yes, the Molina guidelines are modified. The Court abandoned the requirements that psychological incapacity must be a medical or clinical illness and that it must be proven by an expert. The Court held that psychological incapacity is a legal, not a medical, concept. The quantum of proof is now clear and convincing evidence. The requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability (in a legal, not medical, sense) are retained.
  • Yes, Mario Andal is psychologically incapacitated. The totality of evidence, including testimonies about his chronic irresponsibility, drug abuse, impulsivity, lack of empathy, and failure to perform his duties as a husband and father, proved with clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a durable personality structure existing at the time of the marriage that rendered him truly incapable of fulfilling his essential marital obligations.
  • The property is not community property. The Court ruled that under Article 147 of the Family Code, which governs property relations in void marriages, the Parañaque lot is exclusively owned by Rosanna as it was acquired through donation, and Mario has no share in the duplex as he did not contribute to its acquisition and failed to provide care and maintenance for the family.
  • The issue of custody is moot. Ma. Samantha had already reached the age of majority in 2014, terminating parental authority and allowing her to choose her relationship with her father.

• Psychological Incapacity (as restated) — Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a legal concept, not a medical one. It refers to a party's lack of understanding and inability to comply with their essential marital obligations due to a genuinely serious psychic cause. It must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability in a legal sense, meaning it is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner that it causes the irreparable breakdown of the marriage.
• Modification of the Molina Doctrine — The Court explicitly abandoned the second Molina guideline requiring the root cause of the incapacity to be "medically or clinically identified" and "sufficiently proven by experts." It clarified that while expert opinion may be presented, it is no longer an indispensable requirement to prove psychological incapacity.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence as Quantum of Proof — The Court established that in psychological incapacity cases, the plaintiff-spouse must prove their case with clear and convincing evidence, which is a standard of proof higher than preponderance of evidence but lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is required to overcome the presumption of the validity of marriage.
• Totality of Evidence Rule — The determination of psychological incapacity must be based on the totality of evidence presented by the parties. This means the judge must consider all factual evidence, including the testimony of ordinary witnesses who observed the person's behavior, and not rely solely on an expert's clinical diagnosis.
• Article 147 of the Family Code — This article governs the property regime of parties to a void marriage who were legally capacitated to marry each other. Under this rule, properties acquired through joint efforts are owned in common, but property acquired solely through one party's effort, where the other party did not contribute to the care of the family, belongs exclusively to the party who acquired it.

• "Given the variability and intensity of intimate human relationships, Article 36 of the Family Code on psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage was intended to be humane and evolved on a case-to-case basis, but resilient in its application. However, diametrically opposed to this intent, this Court's interpretation of the provision—beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina—has proven to be restrictive, rigid, and intrusive on our rights to liberty, autonomy, and human dignity."
• "Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality, called 'personality structure,' which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family."
• "To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not required."
• "[W]e now hold that the plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. This is a quantum of proof that requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt."

• Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina — This is the landmark 1997 case that established the eight stringent guidelines for interpreting and applying Article 36. The present ruling explicitly modifies and moves away from the rigid application of these guidelines, particularly the requirement of a medical diagnosis proven by an expert.
• Santos v. Court of Appeals — This was the first case where the Supreme Court interpreted Article 36, defining psychological incapacity as a mental (not physical) incapacity and introducing the three essential characteristics: gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The current case refines these characteristics, clarifying they should be understood in a legal, not medical, sense.
• Marcos v. Marcos — This case was cited to support the ruling that personal examination of the allegedly incapacitated spouse by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not a mandatory requirement for a declaration of nullity, and that the totality of evidence is sufficient.
• Ngo Te v. Yu-Te — The Court referenced this 2009 case for its strong criticism of the Molina guidelines, which it described as a "strait-jacket" that was inappropriately rigid and had led to unintended negative consequences.
• Tortona v. Gregorio — This case was discussed extensively to establish the proper standards for admitting expert opinion evidence. The Court adopted its reasoning that the admissibility of expert testimony hinges on the expert's qualifications and the scientific validity of their methodology, not just their conclusions or whether they had direct, personal knowledge of the facts.
• Valdes v. Regional Trial Court — Cited to explain the application of Article 147 of the Family Code regarding the property relations of parties to a void marriage, defining "capacitated" as being legally able to contract marriage.

• Family Code, Article 36 — This is the central provision of the case, establishing psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring a marriage void ab initio. The Court's decision is a comprehensive reinterpretation of this article.
• Family Code, Articles 68-71 — These articles enumerate the essential marital obligations between husband and wife, such as the duty to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support, which are central to determining incapacity.
• Family Code, Articles 220, 221, and 225 — These articles detail the obligations of parents to their children. The Court clarified that while these are important, the primary obligations relevant to Article 36 are those between the spouses themselves.
• Family Code, Article 147 — This article was applied to determine the property relations of Rosanna and Mario, as their marriage was declared void. It governs co-ownership for parties who were capacitated to marry but whose marriage is void.
• Family Code, Article 213 — This provision on child custody was cited, but the issue was rendered moot as the child had reached the age of majority.
• Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 49 — This rule on the opinion of an expert witness was applied to affirm the competency of Dr. Garcia's testimony despite the lack of a personal interview with Mario.

• Perlas-Bernabe, J. — Argued that psychological incapacity is not a mental illness but a defect in the object of consent, rooted in Canon Law. She supported the shift to "clear and convincing evidence" and proposed a refined legal understanding of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, emphasizing that essential marital obligations primarily concern the spousal relationship (Articles 68-71).
• Caguioa, J. — Concurred with the result but argued that the "clear and convincing" standard stems from the State's policy to protect marriage as an inviolable institution, not from the general presumption of validity. He emphasized that the reformulation of the Molina guidelines is a clarification faithful to the framers' original intent, not a redefinition of the concept.
• Hernando, J. — Concurred in the result but maintained the soundness of the Molina guidelines as clarified in Ngo Te. He expressed concern about liberalizing the interpretation of Article 36, emphasizing the moral and social importance of marriage as a stable, lasting institution.
• Lazaro-Javier, J. — Concurred in the result on different grounds, expressing that the final ponencia did not go far enough. She argued for a more rights-based approach centered on liberty and personal autonomy, rather than retaining a focus on "personality structure" which still necessitates expert-like analysis that judges are not equipped to make.
• Inting, J. — Concurred with the amendments to the Molina guidelines, agreeing that the root cause need not be medically identified or proven by expert testimony. He emphasized that the guidelines should be revisited and refined to reflect the intent of the law without being overly rigid.
• M. Lopez, J. — Concurred, clarifying that while psychological incapacity is a legal concept, its root cause can still be a mental or personality disorder, making expert opinion important. He argued that the requirement of "incurability" is antithetical and should be removed, as a person declared incapacitated should not be barred from remarrying.
• Delos Santos, J. — Concurred, positing that the State's interest in marriage justifies the higher quantum of proof (clear and convincing evidence). He viewed the Molina guidelines not as a stringent checklist but as evidentiary guideposts, and agreed that a finding of incapacity need not be grounded on a specific personality disorder alone.
• Gaerlan, J. — Concurred, but raised additional points about the fluid concept of family and suggested that the legislature should re-examine the juridical antecedence requirement in Article 36, which he found to be onerous and inconsistent with the goal of protecting the family.
• Lopez, J., J. — Concurred, focusing on the shift of psychological incapacity to a legal, not medical, concept. He introduced the concept of "personality structure" as a yardstick and emphasized that incapacity is relative to a specific spouse, thus it is not medically "incurable" in an absolute sense.