An employee who, by virtue of their position (e.g., accountant, cashier, teller), has access to and physical possession of company funds but does not have juridical possession over them, commits qualified theft, not estafa, if they take and appropriate such funds with grave abuse of confidence and intent to gain.

Petitioner Grace San Diego was employed as an accountant for Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from January 1993 to March 11, 1997. Her responsibilities included accounting for all business transactions, performing cashier and teller functions, granting loans, check discounting, recording bank transactions, and handling pre-signed blank checks. She also temporarily acted as cashier and teller on separate occasions, giving her complete access to cash vaults and cooperative documents.

• Petitioner Grace San Diego was the accountant of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from January 1993 to March 11, 1997, responsible for all business transactions, acting as cashier and teller, granting loans, check discounting, and handling pre-signed blank checks.
• From November 18, 1996, to January 6, 1997, petitioner acted as cashier, and from January 13-30, 1997, as teller, giving her complete access to cash vaults and cooperative documents.
• Petitioner stopped reporting for work on March 12, 1997.
• An audit revealed a discrepancy: petitioner reported cash on hand in bank as Php9,590,455.17 as of March 11, 1997, but the actual audited figure was Php3,712,442.80, showing a shortage of Php6,016,084.26 (later adjusted by CA to Php2,080,000.00).
• The cooperative's savings account passbooks and bank statements were missing when the discrepancy was investigated.
• The prosecution's expert witness, Alfonso Piscasio, testified that his audit was based on standard procedures and supported by bank certifications.
• Petitioner's expert witness, Criselda Sarmiento-Oplas, admitted focusing her review on bank reconciliation and not on primary books of accounts or commercial documents.
• Petitioner admitted in a letter to her father to withdrawing Php200,000 from his account and Php20,000 from her sister-in-law's account in the cooperative.
• Petitioner deposited Php1,050,000 and Php250,000 to her personal PCI Bank account on August 13, 1996, and May 28, 1996, respectively.

• The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that the prosecution's proof was sufficient to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
• The Court of Appeals erred in characterizing the offense as qualified theft, arguing that the proof adduced, if any, would indicate estafa.
• The Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law in the penalty imposed.
• There was no proof in the audit that the cooperative actually had the funds alleged to be missing.
• The prosecution failed to present any witness who categorically testified that petitioner took the missing funds; any discrepancies only proved incompetence, not criminal authorship.

• The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that impleading the CA as respondent was procedurally improper, as the real party-respondent-in-interest is the People of the Philippines.
• The OSG prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition.
• The prosecution's evidence, including the audit report by an independent auditor based on standard procedures and bank certifications, was sufficient to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• The petitioner's own expert witness failed to effectively dispute the prosecution's audit report.
• Circumstantial evidence sufficiently established petitioner's guilt for qualified theft.
• The petitioner did not have juridical possession of the funds, only material possession as a custodian, making the crime qualified theft and not estafa.

• Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to prove petitioner's guilt for qualified theft beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether the offense committed was qualified theft or estafa.
• Whether the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was correct.

• The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's decision with modification as to the penalty.
• The Court found that the prosecution's evidence, particularly the audit report and supporting bank certifications, coupled with circumstantial evidence, was sufficient to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for qualified theft.
• The Court ruled that the crime committed was qualified theft, not estafa, because the petitioner, as an accountant/cashier/teller, had only physical or material possession of the cooperative's funds, not juridical possession. Juridical possession, which gives the transferee a right over the thing transferred even against the owner, was not vested in the petitioner.
• The Court modified the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. It determined that the correct penalty for qualified theft, considering the amount stolen (Php2,080,000.00), is reclusion perpetua. The RTC's imposition of "reclusion perpetua for forty years without pardon" was corrected as it improperly limited the President's pardoning power.
• The Court also imposed an interest rate of 6% per annum on the indemnification amount from the finality of the decision until full payment.

• Circumstantial Evidence — A mode of proof where conviction can be based on a series of circumstances, provided: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Applied here as there were no eyewitnesses, but a chain of circumstances (petitioner's access, discrepancy, missing documents, unexplained deposits, cessation of work, admissions) pointed to her guilt.
• Qualified Theft (Article 310, Revised Penal Code) — Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence. The Court found petitioner, as accountant/cashier/teller with access to funds, committed theft with grave abuse of the confidence reposed in her by the cooperative.
• Distinction between Theft and Estafa (particularly under Art. 315, par. 1(b) RPC) — In theft, the offender takes the property without the owner's consent and without juridical possession; in estafa with abuse of confidence, the offender receives the property in trust or on commission or for administration, thereby acquiring both material and juridical possession, and then misappropriates it. The Court ruled it was theft because petitioner only had material/physical possession of the funds as a custodian, not juridical possession which would give her a right over the money even against the owner.
• Juridical Possession — A type of possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing transferred, which they may set up even against the owner. The Court found petitioner lacked juridical possession of the cooperative's funds; her possession was merely that of a custodian or keeper, akin to a bank teller.
• Penalty for Qualified Theft (Article 310 in relation to Article 309, Revised Penal Code) — The penalty is two degrees higher than that for simple theft. For amounts exceeding P22,000.00, an incremental penalty is added. The Court applied these provisions to calculate the penalty, ultimately imposing reclusion perpetua due to the large amount stolen, noting that the 20-year cap for simple theft does not apply to qualified theft when the penalty exceeds 20 years, leading to the next higher penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Pardoning Power of the President — The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the court, save only when it contravenes constitutional limitations. The Court corrected the RTC's sentence that imposed reclusion perpetua "for forty years without pardon" as an improper limitation on this power.

• "Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt."
• "Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing transferred and this he may set up even against the owner."
• "Payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent, autonomous right to retain the money or goods received in consequence of the agency..."

• People v. Mateo (G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640) — Referenced for the procedural rule requiring appeals from the RTC imposing reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment to be first reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
• Libuit v. People (506 Phil. 591, 599 (2005)) — Cited for the principle that factual findings of the appellate court are generally conclusive, especially when affirming the trial court, absent glaring errors or grave abuse of discretion.
• People v. Ragon (346 Phil. 772, 779 (1997)) — Cited for the rule that resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable when there are no eyewitnesses to a crime.
• People v. Danao (313 Phil. 178, 184 (1995)) — Cited for the principle that courts can rule based on circumstantial evidence if certain requisites are met.
• People v. Nieves De Vera (43 Phil. 1000, 1004 (1922)); People v. Jaranilla (G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974, 55 SCRA 563) — Cited by petitioner to argue that if the thing is received and then appropriated, the crime is estafa. The Court distinguished this by focusing on the nature of possession.
• Guzman vs. CA (99 Phil. 704, 707 (1956)) — Cited in relation to the nature of a teller's possession of funds as mere custodianship, not juridical possession.
• Nacar v. Gallery Frames (G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439) — Cited as the basis for imposing a 6% per annum interest rate on the monetary award from the finality of the judgment until full payment.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 308 (Who are liable for theft) — Defines theft as committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, intimidation, or force, takes personal property of another without the latter's consent. Relevant as the basic crime of which qualified theft is a graver form.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 309 (Penalties [for theft]) — Specifies the penalties for simple theft based on the value of the property stolen. Relevant for determining the base penalty from which the penalty for qualified theft (two degrees higher) is derived, including the incremental penalty.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 310 (Qualified theft) — Defines qualified theft and states that its penalty shall be next higher by two degrees than that specified in Article 309 if committed with grave abuse of confidence, among other circumstances. This is the primary article under which the petitioner was charged and convicted.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 40 (Accessory penalties of death) — Mentioned by the RTC in its original decision regarding accessory penalties. (Note: The death penalty itself was not imposed, but its accessory penalties were referenced).
• Revised Penal Code, Article 315, par. 1(b) (Swindling/Estafa) — Defines estafa by misappropriating or converting money, goods, or other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration. Discussed extensively to distinguish it from the crime of qualified theft committed by the petitioner, based on the absence of juridical possession.
• Constitution (implied, regarding pardoning power) — Referenced in discussing the President's pardoning power, stating it may not be controlled by the legislature or courts save for constitutional limitations.