Section 6(b) and (c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended, are unconstitutional insofar as they authorize the remaining trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines Board to fill vacancies in the Board by election, as this mechanism infringes upon the President's constitutional power of appointment and power of control.

Presidential Decree No. 15 created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) as a non-municipal public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. PD 15, as amended, provided that vacancies in the Board were to be filled by election by a majority of the remaining trustees. Only if the Board became entirely vacant could the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies. This case arose from a dispute between a group of trustees appointed by then-President Joseph E. Estrada (Rufino group) and the incumbent trustees (Endriga group) who claimed their terms had not yet expired and that vacancies should be filled according to PD 15.

• On December 22, 1998, then-President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board (the Rufino group) for a four-year term, replacing the Endriga group and two other incumbent trustees.
• The Endriga group, whose terms (except for one member) were set to expire on February 6, 1999, and one member whose term was to expire on July 26, 1999, questioned President Estrada's appointments.
• The Endriga group argued that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board should be filled by election by a majority of the remaining trustees, and only if the Board is entirely vacant can the President appoint trustees.
• They asserted that at the time of President Estrada's appointments, only one seat was vacant (due to term expiration), and ten incumbent trustees remained who had the statutory power to fill any vacancy.
• The Rufino group (except for Zenaida R. Tantoco, who expressed no interest) took their oaths and assumed office in early January 1999.
• During the pendency of the case, then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the Presidency in January 2001. The Rufino group tendered their resignations. On July 12, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed 11 new trustees, including members from the Endriga group, who were subsequently elected by the CCP Board to the same positions.

• (Rufino group in G.R. No. 139554) The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling on the constitutionality of Section 6(b) of PD 15, which they argued was an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power and deprived the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the CCP.
• (Rufino group in G.R. No. 139554) The Endriga group did not have a clear legal right to be incumbent trustees because they were estopped from instituting the quo warranto action, their terms did not legally commence as they were not validly elected under PD 15, or their terms had expired on December 31, 1998.
• (Rufino group in G.R. No. 139554) The quo warranto petition should have been dismissed for being moot.
• (Endriga group in G.R. No. 139565) A writ of quo warranto involving a public office should be declared self-executing and immediately executory under Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

• (Endriga group in G.R. No. 139554, as petitioners before the CA) Section 6(b) of PD 15 clearly mandates that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by election by a majority of the trustees.
• (Endriga group in G.R. No. 139554, as petitioners before the CA) The President of the Philippines can only fill vacancies in the CCP Board if the Board is entirely vacant.
• (Endriga group in G.R. No. 139554, as petitioners before the CA) Presidential action was not justified as there were still 10 incumbent trustees with the statutory power to fill any vacancy.
• (Endriga group in G.R. No. 139554, as petitioners before the CA) The CCP enjoys autonomy of policy and operation under Section 3 of PD 15.

• Whether the quo warranto petition filed by the Endriga group had become moot and academic.
• Whether Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees to fill vacancies in the Board, is unconstitutional.
• (In G.R. No. 139565) Whether a writ of quo warranto involving a public office should be declared self-executing and immediately executory.

• The Supreme Court ruled that the case was not moot. Although supervening events (resignation of Rufino group, expiration of Endriga group's terms, appointment of new trustees by President Macapagal-Arroyo) might suggest mootness, the constitutional question regarding the validity of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is capable of repetition yet evading review and is of paramount importance, thus warranting a decision on the merits.
• The Supreme Court declared Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 unconstitutional. It held that these provisions violate Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which grants the President the power to appoint government officers. While Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of "other officers lower in rank" in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards, CCP trustees are not "lower in rank" to the CCP Board Chairperson (the head of the CCP) or to the other trustees who would be electing them; they are of equal rank. Thus, the CCP trustees cannot elect their co-trustees.
• Furthermore, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 violate Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which grants the President control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. The CCP is an office in the Executive branch. The provisions of PD 15, by allowing the CCP Board to be a self-perpetuating entity, effectively insulate the CCP from the President's control, which is unconstitutional. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
• In view of the ruling in G.R. No. 139554 declaring Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 unconstitutional, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on G.R. No. 139565 concerning the immediate execution of the CA's decision. The petition in G.R. No. 139554 was granted.

• Power of Appointment (Article VII, Section 16, 1987 Constitution) — This provision outlines the President's power to appoint various government officials. It specifies that Congress may by law vest the appointment of "other officers lower in rank" in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The Court applied this by stating that CCP trustees are not "officers lower in rank" to the CCP Board (acting as a body) or its Chairperson, and therefore, the power to elect/appoint fellow trustees cannot be vested in the CCP Board itself. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, by allowing trustees to elect their co-trustees (officers of equal rank), was found to be an unconstitutional delegation.
• Presidential Power of Control (Article VII, Section 17, 1987 Constitution) — This provision states that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Control means the power to alter, modify, or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Court applied this by reasoning that the CCP, being part of the Executive branch, is subject to the President's control. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, by creating a mechanism for the CCP Board to perpetuate itself without presidential intervention (unless entirely vacant), makes the CCP virtually outside the President's control, which is unconstitutional.
• Moot and Academic Principle (Exception: Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review) — A case is moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy due to supervening events. However, courts may decide a moot case if the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," or if it involves a matter of paramount public interest, or if the constitutional question needs to be resolved to prevent future recurrence of the same controversy. The Court applied this exception, stating that the constitutional validity of filling CCP Board vacancies is likely to recur with every change in presidency unless resolved.
• Hierarchy of Courts — This principle generally requires that a case must be initiated at the lowest court with jurisdiction, and parties must follow the established rungs of the judicial ladder. The Court noted its observance when it initially referred the quo warranto petition to the Court of Appeals.
• Separation of Powers — This doctrine divides governmental power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, each with distinct functions, to prevent concentration of power and provide checks and balances. The Court implicitly applied this by stating that usurpation of the President's fundamentally executive power to appoint by another branch or body violates this system.

• "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." (Quoting Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution)
• "The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." (Quoting part of Art. VII, Sec. 16 of the Constitution)
• "Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis."
• "Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence."
• "A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis."

• Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government — Cited for the definition of an actual case or controversy and when a case becomes moot.
• Board of Optometry v. Hon. Colet — Cited for the requisites before courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question, including the "earliest opportunity" rule, which the Court brushed aside due to paramount importance.
• Calderon v. Carale — Cited in the context of the Court's duty to apply the Constitution as it is written.
• Endencia v. David — Cited to emphasize that the Court has the final word on what the law means.
• Santos v. Macaraig — Cited regarding the usurpation of the President's executive power to appoint as a violation of separation of powers.
• Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Torres — Cited in the dissenting opinion regarding the self-executing nature of the President's power to appoint. (The main opinion implies this for certain appointments).
• National Electrification Administration v. COA — Cited for the extent of the President's power of control.
• Mondano v. Silvosa — Cited for the definition of "control" as the power to revise or reverse acts of a subordinate.
• Villena v. Secretary of the Interior — Cited in relation to the unitary nature of the Executive branch under the President's control.

• 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 16 (Power of Appointment) — This is the central constitutional provision used to invalidate PD 15, Sec. 6(b) and (c). The Court held that the CCP trustees cannot appoint their co-trustees because they are not "officers lower in rank" than the appointing body (the Board itself or its head).
• 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 17 (Power of Control) — This provision was also a primary basis for declaring PD 15, Sec. 6(b) and (c) unconstitutional. The Court ruled that allowing the CCP Board to be self-perpetuating places it outside the President's control over executive offices.
• Presidential Decree No. 15 (CCP Charter), Section 2 — Cited for the purpose and objectives of the CCP.
• Presidential Decree No. 15 (CCP Charter), Section 3 — Cited for the CCP's "autonomy of policy and operation." The Court held this autonomy does not free CCP from the President's control.
• Presidential Decree No. 15 (CCP Charter), Section 6(b) — This specific provision, detailing the election of trustees by remaining trustees to fill vacancies, was declared unconstitutional.
• Presidential Decree No. 15 (CCP Charter), Section 6(c) — This provision, limiting reelection and implying the power of trustees to reelect, was also declared unconstitutional in conjunction with 6(b).
• Presidential Decree No. 15 (CCP Charter), Section 8 — Cited to show that the CCP Chairman is the head of the CCP, relevant to the discussion on who can appoint "lower-ranked" officers.
• Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, Title II, Chapter 8, Section 23 — Cited to support the classification of CCP under the Office of the President as an agency not placed under any specific department.
• Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(1) — Cited for the definition of "Supervision and Control."

• Justice Tinga — Justice Tinga dissented, arguing that Section 6 of the CCP Charter, allowing the CCP Board to fill its own vacancies, is constitutional. He contended that the CCP is an "agency" and its "head" for purposes of the Appointments Clause (Art. VII, Sec. 16) is the CCP Board of Trustees itself, not just the Chairperson. Thus, the Board, as the head, can appoint its own members who are "lower in rank" than the Board as a collective entity. He further argued that the President's power of control (Art. VII, Sec. 17) does not extend to removing officials with fixed terms provided by law, especially those in GOCCs with original charters like the CCP, which are also covered by civil service rules on security of tenure. He emphasized that the CCP Charter's provision for autonomy aims to foster free artistic expression, a laudable public purpose that legislative enactments can promote. He warned that the majority's ruling unduly expands executive power at the expense of legislative prerogative and the delicate balance of powers.