Members of recognized guerrilla units who were lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the service of the Philippine Army during wartime are subject to military law and the jurisdiction of courts-martial for offenses committed during such service, and Article 93 of the Articles of War, which allows courts-martial to impose death or life imprisonment for murder in time of war, is constitutional as courts-martial are executive, not judicial, bodies.

The case arose during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II. Ramon Ruffy, a Major in the Philippine Constabulary, along with other petitioners, formed a guerrilla unit called the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro after refusing to surrender. This unit was later recognized by and integrated into the 6th Military District of the Philippine Army, which itself was recognized by General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area command. The petitioners were accused of murdering Lieutenant Colonel Enrique L. Jurado, who had been sent by the 6th Military District to command the Bolo Combat Team, on October 19, 1944.

• At the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was a Provincial Commander, Prudente M. Francisco a junior officer, and Andres Fortus a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary in Mindoro.
• Following the Japanese landing in Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Major Ruffy retreated, disbanded his company, and organized a guerrilla unit known as the Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area.
• Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus, and Jose L. Garcia (a civilian) joined Ruffy's organization in late 1942; Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan (civilians) joined in 1943.
• The 6th Military District, led by Brigadier-General Macario Peralta, Jr., was recognized by General MacArthur's Headquarters in Australia on February 13, 1943, as a military unit.
• On January 2, 1943, Col. Peralta appointed Major Ruffy as Acting Commander for Mindoro and Marinduque.
• Members of the Bolo Area, including the petitioners, received appointments and assignments from the 6th Military District (e.g., Francisco as S-3, Garcia and Adeva as 3rd Lieutenants, Fortus as probationary 3rd Lieutenant).
• The 6th Military District dispatched Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to Mindoro to assume operational control over the Bolo Area.
• On June 8, 1944, Col. Jurado relieved Major Ruffy as Commanding Officer of the Bolo Battalion, replacing him with Captain Esteban P. Beloncio.
• On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was allegedly murdered by the petitioners.
• After this alleged crime, the petitioners reportedly seceded from the 6th Military District.
• The petitioners were subsequently placed on trial before a General Court-Martial of the Philippine Army for the murder of Lt. Col. Jurado.

• Petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense (murder of Lt. Col. Jurado) was committed.
• The National Defense Act and all laws governing the Philippine Army, including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance during the Japanese belligerent occupation, particularly for Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus.
• Article 93 of the Articles of War is unconstitutional because it allows for penalties of death or life imprisonment without providing for review by the Supreme Court, allegedly violating Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4 of the Constitution (which grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction over criminal cases with such penalties).

• Petitioners were subject to military law by virtue of their acceptance of appointments and service within the Bolo Area, a recognized contingent of the 6th Military District, Philippine Army, which operated under the United States Army.
• The laws governing the Philippine Army, including the Articles of War, remained applicable to its members, even those operating as guerrillas during enemy occupation.
• The rule that laws of a political nature are suspended during military occupation applies to civil inhabitants, not to members of the defending army.
• Article 93 of the Articles of War is constitutional because courts-martial are not part of the judiciary but are executive agencies.

• Whether the petitioners were subject to military law and the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial at the time of the alleged murder of Lt. Col. Jurado.
• Whether Article 93 of the Articles of War is unconstitutional.

• Yes, the petitioners were subject to military law and the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial. The Court held that by their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area, which was a recognized contingent of the 6th Military District and under the operational control of the United States Army, they became members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War. Their status was determined by their relation to the Philippine government and Army, not by the enemy's perception of guerrillas. The suspension of political laws during occupation does not apply to the internal discipline of an army.
• No, Article 93 of the Articles of War is not unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that courts-martial are agencies of executive character, not part of the judiciary. The constitutional provision regarding the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over criminal cases with penalties of death or life imprisonment (Article VIII, Sec. 2, par. 4) applies to the judicial branch, not to executive instrumentalities like courts-martial, which are tools for the President as Commander-in-Chief to enforce discipline in the armed forces.

• Persons Subject to Military Law (Article 2, Articles of War) — This article defines who is subject to military law. The Court applied sub-paragraph (a), specifically "all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same." The petitioners fell under this provision by accepting appointments and serving in the Bolo Area, a recognized unit of the Philippine Army.
• Courts-Martial as Executive Agencies — This doctrine posits that courts-martial are not part of the judicial branch but are instrumentalities of the executive power, established to aid the Commander-in-Chief in maintaining military discipline. This was used to counter the argument that Article 93 of War was unconstitutional for not providing Supreme Court review, as the constitutional provisions on judicial power and Supreme Court jurisdiction do not apply to these executive bodies in the same way they apply to civil courts.
• Suspension of Political Laws During Belligerent Occupation — This rule states that laws of a political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during military occupation. The Court held this rule is intended for the governing of civil inhabitants of the occupied territory and does not bind the enemies in arms or prevent an army from maintaining discipline within its own ranks.

• "The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms."
• "The official and military status of guerrillas was to be judged not by the concept of the enemy but by their relations to the government and the army of the country for which they fought."
• "Courts-martial are agencies of executive character... Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary."
• "Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein..."

• Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2nd Edition — Cited extensively for principles regarding military jurisdiction over soldiers even during enemy occupation (for certain offenses), the nature of courts-martial as executive agencies, and their role in maintaining military discipline. For example, it was used to support the idea that officers and soldiers, even if not in active duty or held as prisoners of war, could still be subject to military jurisdiction for certain offenses. It was also the primary source for the Court's characterization of courts-martial as executive, not judicial, bodies.

• Article 2, Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) — Defines "Persons Subject to Military Law." The Court found petitioners fell under subparagraph (a) as "other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service."
• Article 93, Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) — Ordains that "any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court-martial may direct." Its constitutionality was upheld.
• Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, Constitution of the Philippines — Provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." Petitioners argued Article 93 of War violated this. The Court held this provision applies to the judiciary, not executive agencies like courts-martial.

• Perfecto, J. — Argued that the silence of the Articles of War regarding Supreme Court review of court-martial decisions imposing death or life imprisonment should not be interpreted as negating such power, especially when it is constitutionally guaranteed. He contended that the National Assembly, in approving the Articles of War, understood that court-martial decisions would be subject to Supreme Court review and that courts-martial are inferior courts within the judicial system, not merely executive agencies. He believed the majority erred in relying on Winthrop's, which is based on the U.S. Constitution, whose provisions on judicial power differ from the Philippine Constitution, particularly regarding the Supreme Court's non-deprivable appellate jurisdiction in capital cases. He opined that the petition should be granted to allow Supreme Court review of the court-martial's jurisdiction.