Obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press under the First Amendment (as applied to the Federal Government) or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (as applied to the States); the appropriate standard for judging obscenity is whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.

The cases arose from separate prosecutions under federal and state laws aimed at curbing the dissemination of obscene materials. Roth operated a publication and sales business in New York, utilizing mails for circulars and advertising. Alberts ran a mail-order business in Los Angeles, selling books deemed obscene. These prosecutions reflected societal concerns and legislative efforts to regulate materials considered harmful to public morals, specifically those dealing with sex in a manner deemed offensive or appealing to prurient interest.

• Samuel Roth conducted a business in New York involving the publication and sale of books, photographs, and magazines, using circulars and advertising material to solicit sales. He was convicted by a jury in the District Court for the Southern District of New York on four counts of a 26-count indictment for mailing obscene circulars, advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of the federal obscenity statute (18 U.S.C. § 1461).
• David Alberts operated a mail-order business from Los Angeles. He was convicted by a Municipal Court judge in the Beverly Hills Judicial District (having waived a jury trial) under a misdemeanor complaint. The complaint charged him with lewdly keeping for sale obscene and indecent books, and with writing, composing, and publishing an obscene advertisement for them, in violation of the California Penal Code (§ 311).
• In both cases, the materials themselves were central to the charges, but the specific content of the materials was not a primary issue before the Supreme Court, which focused on the constitutionality of the statutes and the standards for defining obscenity.

• Roth argued that the federal obscenity statute (18 U.S.C. § 1461) violates the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and press.
• Roth contended that the federal statute violates due process under the Fifth Amendment because its terms are too vague to provide a clear standard of guilt.
• Roth asserted that the power to punish speech and press offensive to decency and morality is reserved to the States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, making the federal statute an unconstitutional encroachment.
• Alberts argued that the California Penal Code's obscenity provisions (§ 311) invade the freedoms of speech and press protected from state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Alberts contended that the California statute violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment due to vagueness.
• Alberts argued that Congress, by enacting the federal obscenity statute, preempted the field of regulating obscene material, particularly concerning mail-order businesses.
• Both petitioners implicitly argued that convictions could not be sustained without proof that the obscene material would create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct or would probably induce such conduct.

• The United States (in Roth) and California (in Alberts) argued that obscenity is not protected by the First or Fourteenth Amendments.
• They contended that the respective statutes provide reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt and are not unconstitutionally vague.
• The United States argued that the federal obscenity statute is a proper exercise of Congress's postal power under Article I, § 8, Clause 7.
• California argued that its statute does not impose a burden on or interfere with federal postal functions and is a valid exercise of state police power.
• Both respondents implicitly argued that a "clear and present danger" test is not required for obscenity, as it falls outside constitutional protection.

• Is obscenity material that is protected by the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and press, as applied to the federal government, or by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the states?
• Do the federal obscenity statute (18 U.S.C. § 1461) and the California Penal Code obscenity provisions (§ 311), when applied according to a proper standard for judging obscenity, violate the constitutional requirements of due process by failing to provide reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt?
• Does the federal obscenity statute unconstitutionally encroach upon powers reserved to the States by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments?
• Does the California obscenity statute, when applied to a mail-order business, unconstitutionally interfere with federal postal powers or is it preempted by federal legislation?

• The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in both cases, holding that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.
• The Court established that the standard for judging obscenity is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Material appealing to prurient interest is defined as material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.
• The Court found that both the federal and California statutes, when applied with this standard, do not violate due process for vagueness, as they give adequate warning of the proscribed conduct and provide sufficiently distinct boundaries for judges and juries.
• The Court rejected Roth's argument that the federal statute encroaches on state powers, holding that since obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment, Congress can properly regulate its dissemination through the mails under its postal power.
• The Court rejected Alberts' argument regarding federal preemption and interference with postal functions, stating the California statute punishes "keeping for sale" or "advertising" and does not interfere with federal mail services.
• The Court held that proof of a "clear and present danger" of antisocial conduct is not required for obscenity convictions because obscenity, like libel, is not constitutionally protected speech.

• First Amendment (Freedom of Speech and Press) — Guarantees freedom of expression. The Court held that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment because it is "utterly without redeeming social importance." This was based on historical understanding that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.
• Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) — Prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; incorporates fundamental rights, including freedom of speech, against state action. The Court held that obscenity is not protected liberty under this clause and that the California statute, under the proper standard, did not violate due process.
• Vagueness Doctrine (Due Process) — Requires criminal laws to state explicitly and definitely what conduct is punishable, providing fair warning. The Court held that the terms "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy" (federal) and "obscene or indecent" (California), when interpreted by the "prurient interest" standard, are not unconstitutionally vague.
• Obscenity Test (Roth Standard) — A legal test for determining whether material is obscene. The Court established the standard: "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." This replaced the Hicklin test, which judged material by its effect on the most susceptible persons and isolated passages.
• Federal Postal Power (Article I, § 8, Clause 7) — Grants Congress the power to establish post offices and post roads. The Court affirmed this power includes regulating what may be carried in the mails, and thus Congress can prohibit the mailing of obscene materials.
• Ninth and Tenth Amendments (Reserved Powers) — Provide that powers not delegated to the U.S. nor prohibited to the States are reserved to the States or the people. Roth's argument that obscenity regulation was a reserved state power was rejected because obscenity is unprotected speech, allowing federal action within its delegated powers (e.g., postal).
• Federal Preemption — Doctrine that federal law can supersede state law in areas of concurrent power or exclusive federal concern. Alberts' argument that federal obscenity laws preempted California's statute was rejected as the state statute regulated different conduct (keeping for sale/advertising) and did not interfere with federal functions.
• Exclusion of Categories of Speech from First Amendment Protection — The principle that certain classes of speech (e.g., libel, fighting words) receive no, or limited, First Amendment protection. The Court explicitly placed obscenity in this category, stating it is "utterly without redeeming social importance."

• "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests; but implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."
• "We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."
• "The standard for judging obscenity, adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity, is whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest."
• "Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."

• Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 — Cited for the proposition that libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech, and thus a "clear and present danger" test is unnecessary for such unprotected speech, a principle extended to obscenity.
• Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 — Referenced for identifying "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech," including "the lewd and obscene," the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
• Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L. R. 3 Q. B. 360 — The former leading standard for obscenity, which judged material by the effect of isolated passages upon particularly susceptible persons. The Court explicitly rejected this standard as unconstitutionally restrictive of speech and press.
• Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 — Cited in the context of the argument that the obscenity statutes were void for vagueness, establishing that statutes must provide reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt.
• United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 — Cited for the principle that the Constitution does not require impossible standards of precision in statutes; language is sufficient if it conveys a definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.
• Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 — Referenced to support the federal government's power to regulate the mails, including the exclusion of objectionable matter.
• United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 — Cited to support the principle that when a federal power is granted by the Constitution, objections based on infringement of rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments must fail if the power is properly exercised.
• Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 — Quoted for its broad definition of freedom of speech and press as embracing the liberty to discuss publicly all matters of public concern, highlighting the importance of protecting even controversial ideas, which the Court then distinguished from obscenity.

• 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (Federal Obscenity Statute) — The statute under which Roth was convicted for mailing obscene materials. Its constitutionality was upheld.
• § 311 of West's California Penal Code Ann., 1955 (California Obscenity Statute) — The statute under which Alberts was convicted for keeping for sale and advertising obscene materials. Its constitutionality was upheld.
• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Its guarantees of freedom of speech and press were held not to extend to obscenity.
• Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Due Process Clause) — Roth argued the federal statute violated this due to vagueness; the Court found no violation when the statute was applied with the new obscenity standard.
• Ninth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Invoked by Roth in his argument that obscenity regulation was a power reserved to the states; the Court rejected this.
• Tenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Invoked by Roth similarly to the Ninth Amendment; the Court rejected this argument.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Due Process Clause) — Alberts argued the California statute violated this by infringing on free speech and being vague; the Court found no violation when the statute was applied with the new obscenity standard.
• Article I, § 8, Clause 7, U.S. Constitution (Postal Power) — Cited as the constitutional basis for the federal government's authority to enact 18 U.S.C. § 1461 and regulate obscene materials in the mail.

• Chief Justice Warren — Concurred in the result, but emphasized limiting the decision to the facts of the cases and the validity of the statutes as applied. He stressed that the defendants were engaged in the commercial exploitation of materials appealing to prurient interest ("the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers"), and it is this conduct that the State and Federal Governments can constitutionally punish, rather than broadly regulating arts, sciences, or general communication.
• Justice Harlan (concurring in Alberts, dissenting in Roth) — In Alberts, Harlan concurred, arguing that states have broader power to regulate obscenity under the Fourteenth Amendment due to their primary concern with local moral standards. He believed California's judgment that such materials could "deprave or corrupt" was a rational exercise of power, and upon independent perusal, the material was suppressible.

• Justice Harlan (dissenting in Roth) — Argued that the federal government has a more limited interest in regulating obscenity than states. He contended that the First Amendment imposes stricter limitations on federal power, and a national ban on books risks "a deadening uniformity" and infringes on free thought. He believed the federal statute, as applied with a charge focusing on "thoughts," was too broad and could condemn much of great literature, extending beyond "hard-core" pornography, which might be the limit of federal power.
• Justice Douglas (joined by Justice Black) — Dissented in both cases, arguing that the First Amendment's command is absolute and does not allow for obscenity to be an exception. He contended that the Court's standard, punishing based on thoughts provoked or offensiveness to community conscience, makes the legality of a publication turn on the purity of thought, which is a dangerous and unconstitutional encroachment on free speech. He argued that speech should only be punishable if it is "so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it," and that there was no reliable evidence that obscene literature causes antisocial conduct.