Republic of the Philippines vs. Ruby Cuevas Ng a.k.a. Ruby Ng Sono

A foreign divorce obtained by mutual agreement between a Filipino spouse and a foreign spouse is within the ambit of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code and may be judicially recognized in the Philippines, as the law does not distinguish between divorces obtained through judicial proceedings and those obtained through other means, so long as the divorce is validly obtained abroad and capacitates the foreign spouse to remarry.

Respondent Ruby Cuevas Ng, a Filipino citizen, married Akihiro Sono, a Japanese national, in the Philippines in 2004. They subsequently moved to Japan and had a child. After their relationship soured, they jointly secured a "divorce decree by mutual agreement" in Japan in 2007. This led Ng to file a petition in the Philippines for the judicial recognition of their foreign divorce to allow her to remarry under Philippine law.

• On December 8, 2004, respondent Ruby Cuevas Ng, a Filipino citizen, and Akihiro Sono, a Japanese national, married in Quezon City and later had a child.
• The couple moved to Japan, where their relationship deteriorated, leading them to secure a "divorce decree by mutual agreement" on August 31, 2007.
• The divorce was evidenced by a Divorce Certificate issued by the Embassy of Japan, an Authentication Certificate from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and a Certificate of Acceptance of Notification of Divorce.
• The fact of divorce was duly recorded in the Civil Registry of Japan, as shown by an original copy of the Family Registry of Japan issued by the Mayor of Nakano-Ku, Tokyo.
• On May 28, 2018, Ng filed a petition before the Quezon City RTC for the judicial recognition of the foreign divorce and a declaration of her capacity to remarry.
• To prove the Japanese law on divorce, Ng submitted an unauthenticated photocopy of pertinent portions of the Japanese Civil Code with a corresponding English translation.

• The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the RTC erred in recognizing a foreign divorce obtained by mere mutual agreement, as this modality is not worthy of recognition in Philippine jurisdiction.
• The petitioner contended that for a foreign divorce to be recognized, it must be decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction through an adversarial proceeding, not simply by agreement.
• The petitioner further asserted that the respondent failed to sufficiently prove the existence of the Japanese law on divorce because she did not present an authenticated copy of the Japanese Civil Code as required by the Rules on Evidence.

• Ruby Cuevas Ng argued that the divorce she and her husband jointly obtained in Japan is covered by the exception provided in Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
• Citing the ruling in Republic v. Manalo, she asserted that a divorce by mutual agreement may be recognized in the Philippines, given that the national law of her foreign spouse (Japan) allows for it.
• She maintained that her failure to present a fully authenticated copy of the foreign law is not a sufficient ground to dismiss her petition, consistent with the Court's liberal approach in similar cases like Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the respondent sufficiently proved the applicable Japanese law on divorce in accordance with the Philippine Rules on Evidence.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a foreign divorce obtained by mutual agreement between a Filipino spouse and a foreign spouse is valid and recognizable in the Philippines under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

• Procedural:
  • No, the respondent failed to sufficiently prove the Japanese law on divorce. The Court held that an unauthenticated photocopy of the Japanese Civil Code does not comply with the evidentiary requirements under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Revised Rules on Evidence for proving foreign laws. While the respondent successfully proved the fact of the divorce, the foreign law sanctioning it must also be proven as a fact. However, following the policy of liberality in cases involving the status of Filipino citizens in mixed marriages, the Court ruled that outright dismissal was improper and instead remanded the case to the trial court to allow the respondent to present the required evidence.
• Substantive:
  • Yes, a foreign divorce obtained by mutual agreement is recognizable in the Philippines. The Court affirmed that Article 26(2) of the Family Code does not distinguish between divorces obtained through judicial proceedings and those obtained through administrative or mutual agreement processes. A plain reading of the law only requires that a divorce be "validly obtained abroad" by the alien spouse, capacitating him or her to remarry. This interpretation serves the legislative intent to correct the anomalous situation where a Filipino is tied to a marriage while the foreign spouse is free. The Court also held that recognizing such divorces does not violate public policy against divorce or collusion, as "agreement" is distinct from "collusion," and Article 26(2) is a specific exception to the general prohibition on divorce for Filipinos in mixed marriages.

• Plain Meaning Rule (Verba Legis) — This principle of statutory construction dictates that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning. The Court applied this to Article 26(2) of the Family Code, holding that since the law simply states "a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad" without specifying the mode, it includes divorces by mutual agreement and not just those from judicial proceedings.
• Proof of Foreign Laws and Judgments — Foreign laws are not subject to judicial notice by Philippine courts and must be pleaded and proven as facts in accordance with the Rules on Evidence. In this case, the Court applied this doctrine to rule that while the respondent proved the fact of her divorce with authenticated documents, she failed to prove the Japanese law that authorized it, as she only submitted an unauthenticated photocopy of the Japanese Civil Code.
• International Comity — This refers to the recognition that one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation. The Court invoked this principle to support the recognition of foreign divorces, regardless of their modality (judicial or non-judicial), as a matter of respect for the sovereign acts of other countries, provided they do not contravene established local public policy.
• Nationality Principle — Embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, this principle states that Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, and legal capacity are binding on Filipino citizens, even if they are living abroad. The Court clarified that Article 26(2) of the Family Code was specifically crafted as a corrective measure and an exception to this principle for Filipinos in mixed marriages.

• “A plain reading of Article 26(2) of the Family Code reveals that it only requires that the divorce be 'validly obtained abroad.' To insist that the divorce be obtained through judicial proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction is to insert a condition not provided in the law.”
• “The legislative spirit animating Article 26(2) of the Family Code is precisely to correct this anomalous situation where the foreign spouse is free to contract a subsequent marriage while the Filipino spouse cannot.”

• Republic v. Manalo — Cited as the controlling precedent establishing that Article 26(2) of the Family Code applies regardless of who initiated the divorce (Filipino or foreign spouse), as long as it was validly obtained abroad and capacitates the foreign spouse to remarry.
• Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka, Basa-Egami v. Bersales, and Republic v. Bayog-Saito — Referenced as a consistent line of jurisprudence where the Court has uniformly recognized foreign divorces obtained by mutual agreement, particularly those from Japan.
• Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. — Explained as the foundational 1985 case that established the principle of recognizing the effects of a foreign divorce on a Filipino spouse to avoid an unjust situation, which later became the basis for the enactment of Article 26(2) of the Family Code.
• Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas and Garcia v. Recio — Cited to reinforce the hornbook rule that foreign laws and judgments are not subject to judicial notice and must be proven as facts under Philippine rules of evidence.
• Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila — Referenced to support the Court's decision to remand the case for reception of evidence on the foreign law, rather than outright dismissal, in the interest of substantial justice.

• Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code — This is the central legal provision at issue, which allows a Filipino spouse in a mixed marriage to have a foreign divorce recognized in the Philippines, thereby capacitating them to remarry.
• Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Revised Rules on Evidence — These procedural rules detail the requirements for proving foreign official records and laws. The Court found that the respondent's submission of an unauthenticated photocopy of the Japanese Civil Code failed to comply with these sections.
• Article 15 of the Civil Code — This article, which establishes the nationality principle, was cited to explain that Article 26(2) of the Family Code serves as a specific and necessary exception for Filipinos in mixed marriages.

• Gesmundo, C.J. — Concurred that a judicial proceeding abroad is not required for recognition under Article 26(2) and that remand is the proper course of action. He emphasized that the legal safeguard against collusion, which is present in domestic annulment cases, is inapplicable to foreign divorce recognition proceedings because the marriage has already been dissolved under foreign law.
• Leonen, SAJ. — Concurred with the ponencia, reiterating his view that a plain reading of Article 26(2) does not require a judicial divorce and to impose such a condition amounts to judicial legislation. He argued that this interpretation is consistent with constitutional principles of human dignity, equality, and the evolving realities of family structures.
• Caguioa, J. — Concurred, arguing that the plain-meaning rule (verba legis) applies to Article 26(2), which does not distinguish between judicial and non-judicial divorces. He differentiated "agreement" from "collusion," stating that a divorce by mutual agreement sanctioned by foreign law is not the prohibited collusion contemplated in the Family Code for domestic proceedings.
• Zalameda, J. — Concurred, praising the decision for continuing the jurisprudential trend of removing obstacles for Filipinos in mixed marriages. He highlighted the severe practical, financial, and emotional burdens faced by Filipinos abroad, particularly in Japan, in seeking recognition of their divorces, citing communications from Philippine embassy officials.

• Hernando, J. — Dissented, arguing that a foreign divorce, to be recognized in the Philippines, must be the result of a judicial proceeding before a competent foreign court. He contended that a "divorce by mutual agreement" is an extrajudicial act that contravenes Philippine public policy against absolute divorce and collusion and is not the "valid judgment" contemplated by our procedural rules.
• Singh, J. — Dissented, submitting that Article 26(2) should be interpreted to cover only foreign divorces obtained through a judicial proceeding. She argued that this interpretation aligns with the legislative intent behind the provision, the procedural rules for recognizing foreign judgments (Rule 39, Section 48), and the strong public policy against absolute divorce and collusion.