The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, which provide that an appointive official is deemed ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy, are not unconstitutional and do not violate the equal protection clause or suffer from overbreadth.

The case arose from legal provisions requiring appointive public officials to be considered automatically resigned from their posts upon filing a certificate of candidacy for an elective office. These "resign-to-run" provisions were challenged by petitioners, leading to an initial Supreme Court decision declaring them unconstitutional. This prompted motions for reconsideration from the COMELEC and various intervenors, arguing for the validity of these provisions based on distinctions between elective and appointive officials and the need to maintain a non-partisan civil service.

• The Supreme Court's Decision of December 1, 2009, declared unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678.
• These provisions mandate that any person holding a public appointive office is considered ipso facto resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy.
• The December 1, 2009 Decision found these provisions violative of the equal protection clause (by differentiating between elective and appointive officials) and suffering from overbreadth.
• Respondent COMELEC filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration on December 14, 2009.
• Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon, Tom V. Apacible, and the IBP - Cebu City Chapter filed motions for reconsideration-in-intervention.
• The Court allowed the intervention of Roxas, Drilon, and Apacible, finding they had substantial interest, but denied intervention for IBP-Cebu City Chapter for lack of specific and substantial interest.
• The movants argued that the original Decision violated the constitutional proscription against partisan political activity by appointive officials, that the differential treatment was based on substantial distinctions, that the provisions were not overbroad, and that public interest demanded reversal.

• (As per the grounds for the now-reversed December 1, 2009 Decision) The "resign-to-run" provisions for appointive officials violate the equal protection clause because they unfairly discriminate against appointive officials compared to elective officials, who are not deemed resigned upon filing their certificates of candidacy.
• (As per the grounds for the now-reversed December 1, 2009 Decision) The provisions suffer from overbreadth as they indiscriminately apply to all appointive civil servants, regardless of the nature of their position or the level of office sought, and without regard to whether the activity is partisan or non-partisan.
• (As per the grounds for the now-reversed December 1, 2009 Decision) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to justify the restriction on the fundamental rights of appointive public officials.

• (COMELEC and Movants-Intervenors) The assailed Decision is contrary to the constitutional proscription against the participation of public appointive officials in partisan political activity.
• (COMELEC and Movants-Intervenors) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause because the differential treatment between elective and appointive officials rests on material and substantial distinctions germane to the purposes of the law.
• (COMELEC and Movants-Intervenors) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth.
• (COMELEC and Movants-Intervenors) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such reversal.

• Whether the COMELEC's motion for reconsideration was timely filed.
• Whether the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention were proper.
• Whether Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
• Whether these provisions suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth.

• The COMELEC's motion for reconsideration was timely filed within the reglementary period.
• The motions for reconsideration-in-intervention by Senator Roxas, former Senator Drilon, and Tom Apacible were allowed due to their substantial interest and the inability to protect their rights in a separate proceeding, despite being filed after judgment, in the higher interest of justice. The IBP-Cebu City Chapter's motion was denied for lack of specific and substantial interest.
• The assailed provisions (Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, and Section 66 of the OEC) do not violate the equal protection clause. The Court, reaffirming Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, held that substantial distinctions exist between elective and appointive officials (e.g., mandate from electorate vs. appointment, term of office, prohibition on partisan political activity for appointive officials) justifying the differential treatment. The classification is germane to the law's purpose of preserving the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of public service and deferring to the sovereign will for elected officials.
• The assailed provisions do not suffer from overbreadth. The limitation on candidacy regardless of the incumbent appointive official's position is valid to prevent the danger of a "powerful political machine" and systematic abuse. The limitation regardless of the type of office sought (partisan or non-partisan) is also valid; specific rules like Section 39 of the OEC govern barangay elections (non-partisan), and the challenged provisions primarily apply to partisan elections. Even if applied to non-partisan elections, the government's interest in regulating employee conduct is significant. The Court emphasized that overbreadth must be substantial and judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep, and such was not demonstrated.

• Intervention (Rule 19, Rules of Court) — A procedure by which a third person, not originally a party to the suit, but claiming an interest in the subject matter, comes into the case, in order to protect his right or interpose his claim. The Court allowed intervention even after judgment, citing higher interest of justice, substantial right/interest of intervenors, and inability to protect rights elsewhere for most movants.
• Equal Protection Clause (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1) — Requires that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike, both in rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It allows for reasonable classification provided it (1) rests on substantial distinctions, (2) is germane to the purposes of the law, (3) is not limited to existing conditions only, and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class. The Court found the distinction between elective and appointive officials regarding the "resign-to-run" rule met these criteria, particularly emphasizing the differing natures of their offices and the constitutional ban on partisan political activity for appointive officials.
• Stare Decisis et Non Quieta Movere — Adherence to precedents; once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. The Court invoked this doctrine regarding its prior ruling in Fariñas v. Executive Secretary on the equal protection challenge to similar provisions, stating the issue was not mere obiter dictum.
• Obiter Dictum — An opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. The Court clarified that its ruling on equal protection in Fariñas was not obiter dictum as it was a point within the issues presented and resolved.
• Legislative Discretion/Wisdom of the Law — Courts cannot pass upon the wisdom of a legislative classification or the policy choices made by the legislature, as long as they are reasonable and not arbitrary. The Court deferred to the legislative judgment in treating elective and appointive officials differently.
• Overbreadth Doctrine — A facial challenge to a law asserting that it is so broadly written that it deters constitutionally protected speech or conduct. The Court held that for laws regulating conduct (not pure speech), overbreadth must be real and substantial. It found the challenged "resign-to-run" provisions were not substantially overbroad, as they primarily targeted partisan elections, and even if applicable more broadly, the governmental interests served were significant.
• Constitutional Ban on Partisan Political Activity by Civil Servants (Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(4)) — Prohibits officers and employees in the civil service from engaging, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political activity. This was a key basis for distinguishing appointive officials (covered by the ban) from elective officials (who inherently engage in partisan politics).

• "The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other."
• "By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy... Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification." (Quoting Fariñas)
• "The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will."
• "Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort." (Quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma)

• Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 147387) — Cited as controlling precedent. It upheld the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act (repealing the resign-to-run rule for elective officials) in relation to Sections 66 (retaining resign-to-run for appointive officials) and 67 (original resign-to-run for elective officials) of the OEC, finding the distinction between elective and appointive officials did not violate the equal protection clause.
• Mancuso v. Taft (476 F.2d 187 (1973)) — A US Court of Appeals case previously cited in the December 1, 2009 Decision to support striking down resign-to-run provisions. This Resolution states Mancuso was effectively overruled by subsequent US Supreme Court cases and is no longer good law.
• United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, et al. (413 U.S. 548 (1973)) — US Supreme Court case that upheld the Hatch Act's restrictions on political activities of federal employees, including running for office. Cited to show that the US Supreme Court uses an interest-balancing approach for such restrictions, effectively overruling Mancuso.
• Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al. (413 U.S. 601 (1973)) — US Supreme Court case that upheld Oklahoma's "Little Hatch Act" restricting political activities of state employees, including candidacy. Cited alongside Letter Carriers to demonstrate that resign-to-run provisions for government employees are constitutionally permissible in the US and that the overbreadth doctrine is applied sparingly.
• Magill v. Lynch (560 F.2d 22 (1977)) — US Court of Appeals (First Circuit, same court as Mancuso) case cited to show that the First Circuit itself recognized Mancuso as no longer good law after Letter Carriers and Broadrick, upholding a resign-to-run provision even for nonpartisan elections under certain circumstances.
• Clements v. Fashing (457 U.S. 957 (1982)) — US Supreme Court case upholding Texas resign-to-run provisions. Cited to counter the dissent's interpretation, emphasizing that the US Supreme Court deferred to legislative judgment even when the regulation was incomplete, as long as there was a rational predicate.
• Morial, et al. v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, et al. (565 F.2d 295 (1977)) — US Court of Appeals case upholding a resign-to-run rule for judges. Cited to show that restrictions can be tailored to specific classes of officials based on state interests, and that legislatures have leeway in determining which positions require such restrictions.

• Republic Act No. 9369, Section 13 (amending Sec. 11 of R.A. 8436, now Sec. 15 on Official Ballot) — The second proviso of its third paragraph, requiring appointive officials to be ipso facto resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy, was upheld as constitutional.
• Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), Section 66 — States that any person holding a public appointive office shall be considered ipso facto resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy. Upheld as constitutional.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, Section 4(a) — Reiterates the ipso facto resignation rule for appointive officials filing certificates of candidacy. Upheld as constitutional.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-B, Section 2(4) — Prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in electioneering or partisan political campaigns. Cited as a fundamental basis for distinguishing appointive officials (covered by the ban) from elective officials.
• 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 1 (Equal Protection Clause) — The core constitutional provision against which the "resign-to-run" laws were tested. The Court found no violation.
• Rules of Court, Rule 19 (Intervention) — Sections 1 and 2 were discussed regarding the propriety and timeliness of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention.
• Rules of Court, Rule 56-A, Section 2 and Rule 52, Section 1 — Cited regarding the timeliness of COMELEC's motion for reconsideration.
• Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 8, Section 55 (Political Activity) — Prohibits appointive civil servants from engaging in partisan political activity, while allowing elective officials to do so. Cited as a statutory basis for the substantial distinction between the two classes of officials.
• Omnibus Election Code, Section 39 (Certificate of Candidacy for Barangay Elections) — Contains a separate deemed resignation rule for barangay elections, indicating that Section 66 primarily applies to partisan elections.
• Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), Section 14 — Repealed Section 67 of the OEC (which deemed elective officials resigned upon filing COC for another office), highlighting the legislative choice to treat elective and appointive officials differently.

• Carpio, J. — Concurred with the ponencia of Chief Justice Puno. Argued that filing a Certificate of Candidacy is inherently an electioneering or partisan political activity. Stated that Article IX-B, Section 2(4) and Article XVI, Section 5(3) of the Constitution mandate that civil service employees (including military) cannot engage in partisan political activity except to vote. Therefore, the ipso facto resignation rule for appointive officials upon filing a COC is consistent with these constitutional prohibitions.

• Nachura, J. — Voted to maintain the Court's December 1, 2009 Decision, arguing the automatic resignation rule for appointive officials is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. Reiterated that the classification between appointive and elective officials is not germane to the law's purpose as the evils sought to be prevented (e.g., use of office for political advantage) exist for both. Argued that Mancuso v. Taft remains applicable as Letter Carriers and Broadrick dealt with different types of laws (prohibitions on active political campaigning, not automatic resignation upon candidacy). Maintained that US courts upheld resign-to-run rules only when applied to specific officials under a germane classification, not as a general, sweeping provision.
• Carpio Morales, J. — (Referred to in the main text as joining Justice Nachura's dissent to the current Resolution, and having written a dissent to the original ponencia that was reversed by the Dec 1, 2009 Decision. Her dissent to the original ponencia that was reversed by the Dec 1, 2009 Decision, meaning she was in favor of striking down the provisions, is not detailed in this specific resolution text, but her stance is clear from her joining Nachura's dissent here.) Her dissent to the original ponencia (which would have upheld the provisions) argued against the constitutionality of the ipso facto resignation rule for appointive officials. The current resolution notes she concurs in accordance with her dissents to the original ponencia (which was the one that was ultimately reversed by the Dec 1, 2009 decision, and now this Feb 22, 2010 resolution is reversing that Dec 1, 2009 decision). Essentially, she maintained her position that the provisions are unconstitutional. (Self-correction: The text on page 31 states "Carpio Morales, J., concur in accordance with my dissents to the original ponencia." The "original ponencia" here refers to the ponencia that would have dismissed the Quinto petition, which was then defeated by the Nachura-penned Dec 1, 2009 decision. So, Carpio Morales consistently believed the provisions were constitutional. The current resolution is reinstating what would have been the outcome of her original stance. The text says "Carpio Morales, J., concur in accordance with my dissents to the original ponencia." This means she dissented from the ponencia that was overturned by the Dec 1, 2009 decision. So, she was against striking down the laws. Her current concurrence is with the Puno resolution that upholds the laws. My initial interpretation of her dissent was incorrect; she is actually concurring with the current resolution to uphold the laws, consistent with her original dissenting position to the ponencia that was briefly successful on Dec 1, 2009).
• The text actually states on page 31: "Corona, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, and Bersamin, JJ., joins the dissent of Justice Nachura." and "Carpio Morales, J., concur in accordance with my dissents to the original ponencia." This means Carpio Morales concurs with the current Puno resolution upholding the laws, because she dissented from the ponencia that initially (before the Dec 1, 2009 decision) would have been adverse to Quinto/Tolentino. The Dec 1, 2009 decision (penned by Nachura) favored Quinto/Tolentino. So Nachura is dissenting from this reversal. Carpio Morales is concurring with this reversal. Therefore, the only notable dissenting opinion detailed in this resolution is Justice Nachura's. (Final check: The text on page 42 starts Nachura's dissent. The text on page 54 starts Carpio Morales' dissent to the Dec 1, 2009 decision, which means she argued for the constitutionality of the provisions. Thus, in this Feb 22, 2010 resolution, she would be concurring with Puno, not dissenting. The prompt asks for dissenting opinions to this resolution. The detailed dissent provided is from Nachura. The reference to Carpio Morales' dissent on p.31 is to her dissent against the ponencia that was reversed by the Dec 1, 2009 decision. So she is concurring with the current resolution.)
• Nachura, J. — Maintained that the ipso facto resignation rule for appointive officials is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. Argued that the classification is not germane as the evils (e.g., abuse of office, neglect of duty) apply to both elective and appointive officials, with elective officials often having more coercive influence. Contended that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is not "partisan political activity" under the OEC, and that Mancuso v. Taft is still applicable as Letter Carriers and Broadrick concerned different types of laws. Stated that US courts upheld resign-to-run rules only for specific officials under germane classifications, not as sweeping provisions. Emphasized that specific evils require specific remedies, not overly broad measures.
• (The provided text includes a "DISSENTING OPINION" by CARPIO MORALES, J. starting on page 54. This dissent is from the December 1, 2009 Decision, where she argued FOR the constitutionality of the resign-to-run laws. Therefore, in the context of the February 22, 2010 Resolution which UPHOLDS these laws, her previous dissent aligns with the majority. The prompt asks for dissenting opinions to this Resolution. Justice Nachura is the primary dissenter to this Resolution. The inclusion of Carpio Morales' dissent from the previous decision might be for context, but she is not dissenting from the current resolution.)
• Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, and Bersamin, JJ. — Joined the dissent of Justice Nachura. (No separate detailed opinion provided in the text for them).