A Member of the Batasang Pambansa is prohibited from appearing as counsel before any administrative body, and this prohibition extends to indirect appearances, such as intervening in a case under the guise of protecting a minimal stockholding acquired shortly before and for the purpose of such intervention, when the true intent is to participate in the proceedings in a capacity akin to counsel.

The case arose from a contested election of the Board of Directors of International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) on May 14, 1979, which led to a quo warranto proceeding (SEC Case No. 1747) filed by the "Acero Group" against the "Puyat Group" before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez, after initially attempting to appear as counsel for the Acero Group and facing objection, purchased a nominal number of IPI shares and then sought to intervene in the SEC case as a stockholder.

• On May 14, 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, resulting in the Puyat Group allegedly gaining control of the Board.
• On May 25, 1979, the Acero Group initiated quo warranto proceedings (SEC Case No. 1747) before the SEC, questioning the election results.
• Between May 25-31, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, attempted to enter his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero in the SEC case, but the Puyat Group objected based on the constitutional prohibition against Assemblymen appearing as counsel before administrative bodies.
• On May 15, 1979 (though notarized on May 30, 1979), Assemblyman Fernandez purchased ten (10) shares of IPI stock for P200.00 from Augusto A. Morales at the request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
• On May 31, 1979, the day after the notarization of his stock purchase, Assemblyman Fernandez filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in SEC Case No. 1747, claiming legal interest as an owner of ten IPI shares.
• On July 17, 1979, respondent SEC Associate Commissioner de Guzman granted Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene based on his stock ownership.
• This order allowing intervention prompted the petitioners (Puyat Group) to file the instant suit for Certiorari and Prohibition.

• Petitioners argued that Assemblyman Fernandez's intervention in the SEC case violated Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which prohibited Assemblymen from appearing as counsel before any administrative body, such as the SEC.
• They contended that Fernandez's acquisition of a nominal number of shares and subsequent motion to intervene was a circumvention of the constitutional prohibition, especially after his initial attempt to appear as counsel for respondent Acero was objected to.
• The intervention was, in effect, an indirect appearance as counsel.

• Respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, supported by the Solicitor General, argued that the intervention was permissible because Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder, had a legal interest in the matter in litigation.
• Assemblyman Fernandez, through his motion for intervention, claimed he was appearing not as counsel for another, but to protect his own interest as a stockholder of IPI.
• His appearance was ostensibly for the protection of his ownership of ten shares and not for the petitioners or other respondents who had their own counsel.

• Whether Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI, could intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
• Whether Assemblyman Fernandez's intervention in the SEC case constituted an indirect "appearance as counsel" before an administrative body, in contravention of the constitutional prohibition.

• The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the SEC Commissioner's order that allowed Assemblyman Fernandez to intervene. The temporary restraining order was made permanent.
• The Court found that Assemblyman Fernandez's intervention was an indirect "appearance as counsel before x x x an administrative body" and thus a circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
• The Court considered the circumstances: Fernandez acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock (ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares) "after the fact" (after the contested election and the filing of the quo warranto suit), and only one day before the scheduled SEC hearing.
• More significantly, before moving to intervene, Fernandez had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, which was objected to. Realizing the validity of the objection, he then chose to "intervene" based on his newly acquired stock.
• The Court concluded that the "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity, and to believe his avowed purpose was purely to protect his minimal shareholding would be naive.
• Upholding the intervention would render the constitutional provision ineffective, as an Assemblyman could simply acquire minimal interest in a client's case and then intervene.

• Constitutional Prohibition on Appearance by Legislators (Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution) — This provision stated: "No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction, ... or before any administrative body." The Court applied this by finding that Assemblyman Fernandez's intervention in the SEC case, an administrative body, under the specific circumstances, amounted to an indirect appearance as counsel, thereby violating this prohibition.
• Principle Against Indirect Violation of Law (Circumvention) — This principle posits that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Court applied this by reasoning that Assemblyman Fernandez's intervention, after his direct appearance as counsel was thwarted, was a mere scheme to achieve the same prohibited end (participating actively in the SEC proceedings) through an indirect means (as an intervenor stockholder). The Court stated, "That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection..."

• "Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect 'appearance as counsel before x x x an administrative body' and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition."
• "The 'intervention' was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naiveté. He would still appear as counsel indirectly."
• "A ruling upholding the 'intervention' would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the 'interest' of the client and then 'intervene' in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited."

• L-51928 (Puyat vs. De Guzman, referring to a CFI case involving Edgardo P. Reyes) — Referenced to note that in a related matter, Assemblyman Fernandez had appeared as counsel for a defendant in a Court of First Instance case, where the Supreme Court had previously ruled he could not appear as counsel because the CFI, in that instance, was a court "without appellate jurisdiction" for the specific action. This highlighted Fernandez's pattern of attempting to appear in related legal matters.
• Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108 P 1046 (cited from Am. Digest, 2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5) — Cited in support of the principle that what is directly prohibited by the Constitution cannot be done by indirection or by a general legislative act intended to accomplish the prohibited object.

• Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution — This section detailed the prohibitions and inhibitions applicable to Members of the Batasang Pambansa, specifically the prohibition against appearing as counsel before any administrative body. This was the central legal provision upon which the Court based its ruling that Assemblyman Fernandez's intervention was unconstitutional.