Pulido v. People

In a criminal prosecution for bigamy, an accused can validly interpose the defense of a void ab initio marriage, and a judicial declaration of the absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent marriage, irrespective of the time it was obtained, is a valid defense that negates the element of a prior valid and subsisting marriage.

The case arose from a criminal complaint for Bigamy filed by Nora S. Arcon against her husband, Luisito G. Pulido. Pulido married Arcon in 1983. While this marriage was subsisting, he married another woman, Rowena U. Baleda, in 1995. Upon discovering the second marriage in 2007, Arcon filed the bigamy charge. Pulido's defense centered on the claim that his first marriage to Arcon was void ab initio due to the absence of a valid marriage license, a fact which was later confirmed by a judicial declaration of nullity obtained while the bigamy case was ongoing.

• Petitioner Luisito G. Pulido married his teacher, Nora S. Arcon, on September 5, 1983, when he was 16 years old.
• On July 31, 1995, while his marriage to Arcon was still subsisting, Pulido contracted a second marriage with Rowena U. Baleda. The marriage certificate for this second marriage indicated Pulido's civil status as "single."
• In 2007, Arcon confronted Pulido, who admitted his affair with Baleda. Arcon subsequently discovered the second marriage and filed a complaint for Bigamy against Pulido and Baleda on December 4, 2007.
• Prior to the filing of the bigamy case, Baleda had already filed a petition to annul her marriage to Pulido, which the RTC of Imus, Cavite granted on October 25, 2007, declaring it null and void for being bigamous.
• During the pendency of the bigamy case against him, Pulido obtained a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage to Arcon from the RTC of Imus, Cavite on November 27, 2015, on the ground of lack of a valid marriage license. This decision became final and executory on May 11, 2016.

• The petitioner argued that he could not be held liable for bigamy because an essential element of the crime—that the first marriage be legally subsisting—was absent.
• He contended that his first marriage to Arcon was void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license, a fact confirmed by a subsequent judicial declaration of nullity.
• He asserted that the retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity for remarriage, to his case violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation, since his first marriage was governed by the Civil Code.

• The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that Article 40 of the Family Code applies because Pulido's second and bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995, when the Family Code was already in effect.
• The OSG maintained that Pulido was required to obtain a prior judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Arcon as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.
• It was argued that the crime of bigamy was already consummated the moment Pulido entered into the second marriage without his first marriage being judicially declared null and void, making the subsequent declaration of nullity immaterial to his criminal liability.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage, secured after the celebration of the second marriage, should be considered a valid defense in a bigamy case.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in a prosecution for bigamy even without a prior and separate judicial declaration of its nullity.
  • Whether Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a judicial declaration of nullity for purposes of remarriage, has amended Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy.

• Procedural:
  • Yes, the Court ruled that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent marriage is a valid defense in a bigamy prosecution, irrespective of when it is secured. The accused may present such a declaration in the criminal proceeding to prove the absence of an element of the crime. The Court abandoned previous rulings that a subsequently acquired declaration of nullity is immaterial.
• Substantive:
  • Yes, the Court held that a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense against a bigamy charge. Since a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place, the first element of bigamy—a prior valid marriage—is lacking. The Court clarified that Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage, did not amend or repeal Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Its purpose is to ensure the validity of a subsequent marriage, not to define a crime or remove a defense in a bigamy case. The Court applied the principles of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed against the State and in favor of the accused. Based on the judicial declaration that Pulido's first marriage was void ab initio, he was acquitted.

• Void ab initio marriage as a valid defense in bigamy — The Court established that the absolute nullity of a prior or subsequent marriage is a valid defense in a bigamy case. Because a void marriage is inexistent from the beginning, it negates the first element of bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC, which requires the offender to be "legally married." This ruling abandons the doctrine established in cases like Mercado v. Tan and Tenebro v. Court of Appeals.
• Retroactive Effect of a Void Marriage — A judicial declaration of a marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the date of its celebration. In this case, the declaration of nullity of Pulido's first marriage meant that, in the eyes of the law, he was never married to Arcon, thus he could not have committed bigamy when he contracted the second marriage.
• Statutory Construction of Penal Laws (Rule of Lenity) — This principle dictates that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. The Court applied this rule to hold that Article 40 of the Family Code, a civil law provision, cannot be interpreted to expand the scope of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code at the expense of the accused's rights.
• Collateral Attack on a Void Marriage — The Court affirmed that the validity of a void marriage can be attacked collaterally in any proceeding where it is essential to the determination of the case, including a criminal prosecution for bigamy. This is distinguished from a voidable marriage, which can only be attacked in a direct proceeding for annulment.

• "All told, we hold that in criminal prosecutions for bigamy, the accused can validly interpose the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent marriages obtained by the accused in a separate proceeding, irrespective of the time within which they are secured, is a valid defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy."

• Mercado v. Tan, Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, Jarillo v. People — These cases, which established the prevailing doctrine that a prior judicial declaration of nullity is required before contracting a second marriage to avoid liability for bigamy, were explicitly abandoned by the Court in this decision.
• People v. Mendoza and People v. Aragon — The Court reverted to the doctrine in these older cases, which held that a person can raise the defense of a void first marriage in a bigamy case even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.
• Domingo v. Court of Appeals — Referenced for its analysis of the legislative intent behind Article 40 of the Family Code, showing that the requirement of a judicial declaration of nullity was intended "for purposes of remarriage" and not to amend the elements of bigamy.
• Niñal v. Bayadog — Cited to support the principle that, for purposes other than remarriage, a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack in a criminal case where its validity is essential to the issue.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 349 (Bigamy) — This is the law defining and penalizing the crime of bigamy. The Court's ruling centered on the interpretation of its elements, particularly the requirement of a prior valid marriage that has not been "legally dissolved."
• Family Code, Article 40 — This provision requires a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void before a party can remarry. The Court ruled that this article is for civil law purposes (i.e., to ensure the validity of the subsequent marriage) and does not amend the penal provision on bigamy or preclude the defense of a void marriage in a criminal case.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 350 (Marriage contracted against provisions of laws) — The Court noted that this provision, not Article 349, is the proper statute to penalize individuals who knowingly contract a marriage without the necessary legal requirements or in disregard of a legal impediment, thereby addressing concerns that the new ruling would allow individuals to mock the sanctity of marriage.

• Justice Perlas-Bernabe — Emphasized that based on a strict construction of Article 349 of the RPC, the term "legally dissolved" presupposes a valid or voidable marriage that needs dissolution, not a void ab initio marriage which is inexistent from the start. She argued that Article 40 of the Family Code, being a civil law provision, cannot be construed to impliedly amend a penal law like the crime of bigamy.
• Justice Caguioa — Provided a comprehensive historical review of the vacillating jurisprudence on the issue. He argued that the plain language of Article 349 of the RPC never covered void ab initio marriages and that the framers of Article 40 of the Family Code explicitly limited its application to the "purpose of remarriage," without intending to alter the elements of bigamy.
• Justice Lazaro-Javier — Focused on the constitutional rights of the accused. She argued that requiring a prior judicial declaration of nullity as the sole evidence to disprove the first element of bigamy (a valid prior marriage) unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof and violates the accused's right to raise reasonable doubt through any relevant and admissible evidence in the same criminal proceeding.