The concurrent appointments of an individual as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) are unconstitutional because the two offices are incompatible, violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.

The case arose from the appointment of Magdangal B. Elma to two significant government positions: first as Chairman of the PCGG and subsequently, during his tenure there, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. This dual appointment raised concerns about potential conflicts of interest and violations of constitutional provisions designed to prevent officials from holding multiple public offices, particularly given the distinct and potentially overlapping or conflicting responsibilities of the two roles.

• Respondent Magdangal B. Elma was appointed Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on October 30, 1998, and took his oath of office for this position.
• On January 11, 1999, while serving as PCGG Chairman, Elma was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC).
• Elma took his oath of office as CPLC the following day but waived any remuneration he might receive for this second position.
• Petitioners challenged these concurrent appointments as unconstitutional.
• By the time of the Supreme Court's resolution, supervening events had occurred: appointees of former President Joseph Estrada, including Elma, had been replaced by appointees of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, rendering the immediate controversy moot as Elma no longer held these positions.

• Respondent Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravene Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.
• Respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices, which is prohibited.

• The strict prohibition against holding multiple positions under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries, not to other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary, citing the Resolution in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.
• Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution should apply, which allows a public officer to hold multiple positions if the law allows it or the primary functions of either position allow such concurrent appointment.
• There exists a close relation between the two positions (PCGG Chairman and CPLC) and there is no incompatibility between them, thus the primary functions of either position would allow concurrent appointments.
• The appointment of the CPLC from among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.

• Whether the concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of the PCGG and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) are unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII and/or Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
• Whether the issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent appointments should be resolved despite the case being rendered moot by supervening events.

• The Supreme Court partly granted the petition and declared respondent Magdangal B. Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC unconstitutional.
• The Court ruled that although the case was moot, it would resolve the substantive issue because it raised a significant legal question capable of repetition yet evading review, and it was necessary to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.
• The Court found that an incompatibility exists between the positions of PCGG Chairman and CPLC. The CPLC's duties include giving independent legal advice on actions of heads of executive departments and agencies (like the PCGG) and reviewing investigations involving them. Thus, as CPLC, Elma would be required to give legal opinions on his own actions as PCGG Chairman, raising questions of impartiality, which the prohibition against holding incompatible offices seeks to avoid. This violates Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution.
• The Court clarified that the stricter prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution (applicable to Cabinet members, their deputies, and assistants) does not apply to the PCGG Chairman or CPLC, as neither is a head of an executive department, an undersecretary, or an assistant secretary in that specific constitutional sense.
• Even if, for argument's sake, Section 13, Article VII were applicable, Elma's appointments would still be invalid because the positions were not held in an ex-officio capacity, nor were the primary functions of one office required for the other. The separate appointment to CPLC negates an ex-officio character.
• Ultimately, the appointments were primarily deemed unconstitutional under Section 7, Article IX-B due to the incompatibility of the functions of the two offices.

• Constitutional Prohibition Against Holding Multiple Offices (Article IX-B, Section 7) — This provision states that "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." This was the primary basis for declaring Elma's concurrent appointments unconstitutional due to incompatibility.
• Constitutional Prohibition Against Holding Multiple Offices (Article VII, Section 13) — This provision states that "The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure." The Court found this stricter prohibition not directly applicable to Elma as neither PCGG Chairman nor CPLC falls under the definition of "Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants" (i.e., heads of executive departments, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries).
• Incompatibility of Offices — This doctrine holds that two offices are incompatible when there is an inconsistency in their functions, such as when one is subordinate to the other, or when one has the right to interfere with the other, making it improper for one person to hold both. The Court applied this test and found that the CPLC's duty to review actions of agency heads (like the PCGG Chairman) created an inherent incompatibility, as Elma would essentially review his own actions or be placed in a position where his impartiality would be compromised.
• Moot and Academic Principle (Exception for "Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review") — This principle states that courts will generally not decide moot cases where there is no longer an actual controversy. However, an exception exists if the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The Court applied this exception to resolve the constitutional question regarding concurrent appointments despite Elma no longer holding the positions, due to the public interest and likelihood of recurrence.
• Ex-Officio Capacity — This refers to an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the primary office. The Court noted that for officials covered by Article VII, Section 13 to hold another post, it must be, among other things, in an ex-officio capacity. Elma's separate appointment to CPLC negated this.

• "Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public."
• "[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other."
• "As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices."
• "It is clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions."

• Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary (G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA 317 and Resolution of 1 August 1991) — Referenced as the primary authority for harmonizing Article VII, Section 13 and Article IX-B, Section 7 of the Constitution regarding the prohibition on holding multiple offices, and for defining the scope of officials covered by the stricter prohibition in Article VII, Section 13, as well as the exceptions to it (e.g., ex-officio positions).
• Quimson v. Ozaeta (98 Phil. 705 (1956)) — Cited for the principle that there is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.
• People v. Green (13 Sickels 295, 58 N.Y. 295, 1874 WL 11282 (N.Y.)) — Cited for establishing the crucial test for determining incompatibility between two offices, specifically whether one office is subordinate to the other or has the right to interfere with the other.
• US v. Mouat (124 US 303 (1888)) — Referenced (via Civil Liberties Union) to clarify that "deputies and assistants" under Article VII, Section 13 refer to undersecretaries and assistant secretaries of executive departments, not officials merely holding an equivalent rank.
• Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission (G.R. No. 161113, 9 August 2005) — Cited as authority for the Court's decision to resolve an otherwise moot and academic case if the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
• Gayo v. Verceles (G.R. No. 150477, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 504) — Cited to support the exception to the mootness doctrine where a question is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
• Viola v. Hon. Alunan III (343 Phil. 184 (1997)) — Also cited to support the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine.
• Province of Batangas v. Romulo (G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736) — Referenced for the principle that supervening events do not preclude the Court from resolving legal or constitutional issues to formulate guiding principles for the public.
• Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (433 Phil. 506 (2002)) — Cited for the same principle as Province of Batangas v. Romulo regarding the Court's duty to resolve important constitutional issues despite mootness.

• 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 13 — This section prohibits the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. The Court determined this was not directly applicable to Elma but discussed its stringent requirements arguendo.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-B, Section 7, par. 2 — This section provides the general rule that no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of their position. This was the primary constitutional provision used to invalidate Elma's concurrent appointments due to incompatibility.
• Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 — This order delineated the functions and duties of the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. It was used by the Court to demonstrate the CPLC's responsibilities, including reviewing decisions on investigations involving agency heads, thereby establishing the incompatibility with the PCGG Chairman role.
• Executive Order No. 1, 28 February 1986 — This executive order, which created the PCGG, was implicitly referenced in relation to the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman, which involve the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and investigation of graft and corruption.