The seizure of allegedly obscene materials, even under the guise of an anti-smut campaign and police power, requires a prior judicial determination of obscenity and the issuance of a valid search warrant; law enforcement authorities cannot unilaterally determine obscenity and confiscate materials without violating constitutional guarantees of due process and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.

The case arose from an "Anti-Smut Campaign" initiated by then-Mayor of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing. As part of this campaign, various publications, including the petitioner's "Pinoy Playboy" magazines, were seized from vendors and publicly burned based on the authorities' belief that they were obscene, pornographic, and indecent.

• On December 1 and 3, 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, acting under an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by Mayor Ramon D. Bagatsing, seized and confiscated magazines, publications, and other reading materials believed to be obscene from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners, and peddlers along Manila sidewalks.
• The seized materials, including "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by petitioner Leo Pita, were later burned in public.
• On December 7, 1983, Pita filed a case for injunction with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narciso Cabrera (Superintendent of Western Police District), seeking to restrain them from confiscating his magazines or preventing their sale, claiming the magazine was decent, artistic, educational, not per se obscene, and protected by constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press.
• The RTC initially granted a temporary restraining order but later denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case for lack of merit.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision.

• The police officers could not, without any court warrant or order, seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines based solely on their determination that the magazines were obscene.
• The trial court erred in dismissing the case on its merits without a full hearing, when only the application for a writ of preliminary injunction was submitted for resolution.
• The magazine "Pinoy Playboy" is a decent, artistic, and educational magazine, not per se obscene, and is protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
• The seizure of his magazines violated the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures and the prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law.

• The confiscated materials were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities.
• The confiscation and seizure were undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code (regarding obscene publications).
• The materials confiscated belonged to magazine stand owners and peddlers, and the petitioner's establishment was not raided.
• The State has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, and freedom of the press is not without restraint.
• The right against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes exceptions, such as when there is consent to the search or seizure.

• Whether police officers can, without a court warrant, seize and confiscate magazines based on their unilateral determination that they are obscene.
• Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the case on its merits when only the application for a writ of preliminary injunction was submitted for resolution.
• Whether the seizure of the petitioner's magazines violated his constitutional rights to due process, freedom of speech, and protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

• The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
• The Court held that the authorities must apply for a search warrant from a judge if they believe an obscenity rap is in order.
• The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to warrant State interference.
• The judge must determine whether the materials are indeed "obscene" on a case-to-case basis. If probable cause exists, a search warrant may be issued.
• The proper suit is then brought under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
• The Court emphasized that searches and seizures must be done through a judicial warrant; otherwise, they are unreasonable. The fact that the case involves alleged obscenity does not exempt authorities from complying with constitutional requirements for search and seizure.
• The Court rejected the argument that the Mayor could order the raid without a warrant simply because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" had been committed, as this would make the Mayor judge, jury, and executioner.
• However, because the magazines had already been destroyed, the Court declined to grant affirmative relief, deeming that aspect of the case moot and academic.

• Freedom of Speech and Press — A constitutional right guaranteeing the ability to express oneself without government restriction, subject to certain limitations. The Court stated that "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection, and the burden to show a clear and present danger justifying restriction lies with the authorities.
• Due Process of Law — A fundamental constitutional guarantee that all legal proceedings will be fair and that one will be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before life, liberty, or property is taken away. The Court held that the seizure of magazines without a judicial hearing and determination of obscenity violated due process.
• Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures — A constitutional protection against arbitrary intrusions by the government. The Court reiterated that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, and the warrantless seizure of the magazines was unconstitutional.
• Police Power — The inherent power of the state to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. While P.D. Nos. 960 and 969 are police power measures, they do not authorize high-handed acts or exempt law enforcers from constitutional requirements like due process and the need for a warrant.
• Clear and Present Danger Test — A standard used to determine under what circumstances limits can be placed on First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, or assembly. The Court stated that the State must demonstrate the existence of a danger, clear and present, to justify State action to stop speech; the authorities must show objective and convincing proof of such danger.
• Judicial Determination of Obscenity — The principle that the question of whether material is obscene is a judicial one, to be decided by a court, not unilaterally by law enforcement. The Court outlined a procedure requiring judicial application for a warrant, convincing proof of obscenity, and a judge's determination.
• Presumption of Validity of Speech — Speech is presumed to be validly said, and the burden is on the State to demonstrate a clear and present danger to justify its suppression.

• "Undoubtedly, 'immoral' lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection."
• "In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a 'clear and present danger' that would warrant State interference and action."
• "[T]he burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on the ... authorit(ies)."
• "It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge."
• "The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or 'obscene'."
• "[T]o say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, 'violation of penal laws' has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one."

• People vs. Kottinger — Cited for its early test of obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall," and "that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency," ultimately decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community." The Court noted Kottinger's uncertainty and reliance on a hypothetical "community standard."
• People v. Go Pin — Cited as a later case that was "even hazier" in defining obscenity, distinguishing between art for art's sake and commercialized art appealing to morbid curiosity.
• People v. Padan y Alova — Referenced for introducing the "redeeming" element concept to Philippine jurisprudence regarding obscenity, suggesting that an actual exhibition of a sexual act has no redeeming feature.
• Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak — Cited for adopting the test: "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." This case marked a departure by focusing on the "dominant theme" and making obscenity determination a judicial question.
• Miller v. California — An American Supreme Court case cited for establishing "basic guidelines" for obscenity: (a) appeal to prurient interest by average person applying contemporary standards; (b) patently offensive depiction of sexual conduct defined by state law; and (c) lack of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, taken as a whole.
• Reyes v. Bagatsing — Cited for the principle that in free expression cases, "the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on the ... authorit(ies)," and that there must be "objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger."
• Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon — Referenced for its definition of police power as “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.”
• Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP — Cited as a precedent where the Supreme Court countermanded RTC orders authorizing a search due to a defective warrant. The current case was deemed to have greater reason for reprobation due to the complete absence of a warrant.
• People vs. Malesugui — Mentioned by the Court of Appeals (and noted by the Supreme Court) as an exception to the warrant requirement (consent to search).
• People vs. Veloso; Alvero vs. Dizon — Mentioned by the Court of Appeals as an exception to the warrant requirement (search incident to arrest).
• Papa vs. Magno — Mentioned by the Court of Appeals as an exception to the warrant requirement (search of a vehicle or movable structure).

• Constitution (1973), Art. IV, Sec. 9 — (Now Art. III, Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution) Protection of the right to express oneself in print (freedom of speech and press). Invoked by petitioner and acknowledged by the Court as fundamental, though not absolute.
• Constitution (1973), Art. IV, Sec. 3 — (Now Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution) Protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requirement for a warrant. The Court held this was violated by the warrantless seizure.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 201 (as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969) — Laws punishing the author, publishers, and sellers of obscene publications. Respondents claimed their actions were pursuant to this, but the Court emphasized the need for prior conviction or proper forfeiture proceedings as outlined in the decrees themselves.
• Presidential Decree No. 960, Sec. 2 (as amended by P.D. No. 969) — Outlines the procedure for the disposition of prohibited articles (obscene materials), requiring conviction for forfeiture or separate forfeiture proceedings by the Chief of Constabulary if there is an acquittal, with an appeal to the Secretary of National Defense. The Court highlighted that these procedures were not followed.
• Rules of Court (1964 rev.), Rule 126, Sec. 12 — (Now Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 rev.), Rule 126, Sec. 12, now Sec. 13) Regarding search without warrant of a person arrested. The Court noted this exception requires a lawful arrest for a crime committed, which was not the situation here.
• Civil Code, Art. 32 — Mentioned as a potential remedy against abuse of official power, providing for damages for violation of constitutional rights.
• Revised Penal Code, Arts. 129, 130 — Mentioned as potential remedies against abuse of official power, penalizing maliciously obtained search warrants and searching domicile without witnesses.