A claim for damages arising from a wrongful preliminary attachment must be prosecuted in the same court where the attachment bond was filed and the writ of attachment was issued, pursuant to Rule 57, Section 20 of the Rules of Court; prosecuting such a claim in a separate action before a different court is improper and that court lacks jurisdiction.

The dispute originated from a collection suit filed by Allied Overseas Commercial Co., Ltd. (Allied) against Ben Uy Rodriguez in the CFI of Manila, where Allied obtained a writ of preliminary attachment secured by a bond from Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. (Pioneer). Although the Manila case was dismissed for improper venue, Rodriguez subsequently filed a separate action in the CFI of Cebu against Pioneer and Allied (later including Allied's assignee, Hadji Esmayaten Lucman) to claim damages for the alleged wrongful and malicious attachment.

• Allied Overseas Commercial Co. Ltd. filed a collection suit against Ben Uy Rodriguez in CFI Manila and secured a writ of preliminary attachment by posting a P450,000 bond from Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. (Pioneer).
• The attachment was levied on Rodriguez's real properties in Cebu.
• Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss (granted for improper venue) and an application for damages against the attachment bond in the Manila case.
• The CFI Manila dismissed the complaint but set a hearing for Rodriguez's damages claim against the bond.
• Rodriguez withdrew his damages claim in the Manila CFI and filed a separate civil action (R-12069) for damages due to wrongful attachment against Pioneer and Allied in the CFI Cebu.
• Pioneer filed its answer in the Cebu case; Allied, a foreign corporation, was not properly served summons.
• A first pre-trial was conducted on May 5, 1971, attended by Rodriguez and counsel for Pioneer; the parties did not settle, and the case was set for trial.
• Later, the complaint was amended to implead Hadji Esmayaten Lucman (assignee of Allied) as defendant; Lucman filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim. Pioneer also filed its answer to the amended complaint with a compulsory counterclaim.
• On February 21, 1972, the CFI Cebu Clerk of Court sent telegrams notifying counsels for Pioneer and Lucman of a "pretrial" scheduled for February 28, 1972. No telegram was sent to Pioneer Corporation itself.
• As of February 21, 1972, Rodriguez had not yet filed a reply/answer to the compulsory counterclaims of Pioneer and Lucman. Rodriguez's answer to Lucman's counterclaim was dated February 22, 1972.
• Petitioners' counsel filed an urgent motion for postponement of the Feb 28 pre-trial, citing lack of awareness of a prior setting, issues not yet joined (no answer to counterclaims), and a prior hearing commitment in Manila.
• The motion for postponement, sent via registered airmail special delivery, was received by the Cebu Post Office on Feb 28 but apparently not immediately by the court.
• On Feb 28, the CFI Cebu postponed the pre-trial to March 20 due to petitioners' absence but stated they would be declared in default if proof showed they received notice by Feb 28.
• On Feb 29, 1972, upon verification that counsels received the telegrams on Feb 21, the CFI Cebu declared Pioneer and Lucman in default and allowed Rodriguez to present evidence ex parte.
• On March 9, 1972, the CFI Cebu rendered a decision finding the attachment wrongful and malicious, ordering Pioneer to pay P350,000 moral, P50,000 exemplary damages, and P50,000 litigation expenses, and ordering Lucman to pay P50,000 exemplary damages and P30,000 attorney's fees. It also declared Rodriguez not indebted to Lucman/Allied and a check purportedly issued by Rodriguez a forgery.

• The CFI Cebu acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of default of February 29, 1972, and the subsequent decision.
• The second pre-trial scheduled for February 28, 1972 was illegal and improper as a pre-trial had already been conducted on May 5, 1971, and the Rules do not authorize a second pre-trial.
• The case was prematurely set for pre-trial on February 28, 1972, because the last pleading (respondents' answer to petitioners' compulsory counterclaims) had not yet been filed, thus the issues were not yet joined.
• Notice of the February 28 pre-trial was insufficient and defective because petitioner Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. (the party itself) was not notified, only its counsel was, which is a jurisdictional defect.
• The denial of their motion for postponement, which had meritorious grounds, constituted grave abuse of discretion.
• The remedy of ordinary appeal from the default judgment is inadequate, not speedy, and insufficient because being declared in default prevented them from raising issues or defenses in the trial court, which cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• The CFI of Cebu lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action (Civil Case R-12069), as a claim for damages against an attachment bond must be filed in the same court that issued the attachment (CFI Manila), pursuant to Rule 57, Sec. 20.

• The Court of Appeals correctly denied the petition for certiorari as petitioners had the remedy of ordinary appeal from the CFI Cebu's decision.
• Any errors committed by the trial judge could be assigned as errors in their appeal.
• The rule requiring damages for wrongful attachment to be claimed in the same action (Rule 57, Sec. 20) is not applicable because the principal case in Manila was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, preventing the presentation of the damages claim therein.
• Petitioners were properly declared in default for failing to appear at the scheduled pre-trial despite due notice (via telegram to counsel).
• The trial court acted within its discretion in calling the pre-trial and denying the postponement.

• Whether the CFI of Cebu committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners in default on February 29, 1972, and rendering the decision of March 9, 1972.
• Whether a second pre-trial is authorized by the Rules of Court after a first pre-trial has already been conducted.
• Whether the case was prematurely set for pre-trial before the last pleading (answer to compulsory counterclaims) was filed.
• Whether notice of pre-trial sent only to counsel, and not to the party itself (Pioneer), is valid and sufficient.
• Whether the denial of the motion for postponement constituted grave abuse of discretion.
• Whether ordinary appeal is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the circumstances, barring certiorari.
• Whether the CFI of Cebu has jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for damages arising from a wrongful attachment issued by the CFI of Manila in a separate case.

• Yes, the CFI of Cebu committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in issuing the default order and subsequent decision, which are null and void.
• The Rules of Court do not authorize or empower a court to call a second pre-trial hearing after a first pre-trial was duly attended by the parties; doing so is impractical, useless, and time-consuming, and the court lacks authority to declare parties in default for failure to attend such an unauthorized second pre-trial.
• The pre-trial set for February 28, 1972 was premature because the last pleading (respondents' answer to petitioners' compulsory counterclaims) had not yet been filed as required by Rule 20, Sec 1, meaning the case was not yet ready or ripe for pre-trial.
• Notice of pre-trial must be served on both the party and its counsel; failure to notify the party itself (Pioneer Corp.) is a fatal, jurisdictional defect rendering the subsequent default order void. Notice to counsel alone is insufficient.
• The CFI Cebu committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for postponement, which alleged meritorious grounds (issues not joined, prior commitment), especially since the court eventually did postpone the hearing, indicating the petitioners' absence did not unduly delay proceedings. The postal delay in delivering the motion was not attributable to petitioners.
• While ordinarily appeal bars certiorari, appeal was not an adequate remedy in this specific case because the petitioners, having been improperly declared in default, were deprived of the opportunity to present evidence or raise defenses, which they could not do for the first time on appeal. Certiorari is proper to correct jurisdictional errors or patent nullities.
• The CFI of Cebu lacked jurisdiction over the action for damages arising from the wrongful attachment. Rule 57, Section 20 mandates that such claims must be filed in the same action where the attachment bond was posted and the writ issued (i.e., the CFI Manila case), before trial or appeal is perfected or judgment becomes executory. Filing a separate case in a different court (CFI Cebu) is improper. Respondent Rodriguez waived objections to the Manila court's jurisdiction over his person by filing an affirmative claim for damages against the bond therein.

• Mandatory Nature of Pre-Trial (Rule 20, Sec. 1 & 2): Definition: Rule 20 mandates a pre-trial conference after the last pleading is filed to consider settlement, simplify issues, etc., and failure to appear can result in default. Application: While pre-trial is mandatory, the Court held this applies to the first pre-trial. The Rules do not authorize compelling attendance at a second pre-trial after one was already held, rendering the default order for non-attendance at the second pre-trial invalid.
• Requirement of Notice to Party for Pre-Trial (Rule 20, Sec. 2): Definition: Both the party and their counsel must be notified of the pre-trial schedule. Failure to appear may lead to non-suit or default. Application: The CFI Cebu only notified petitioners' counsels via telegram, failing entirely to notify petitioner Pioneer Insurance (the party) itself. This failure was deemed a jurisdictional defect invalidating the default order.
• Last Pleading Rule (Rule 20, Sec. 1 & Definition): Definition: Pre-trial is scheduled only after the last pleading has been filed. The last pleading depends on the presence of counterclaims or cross-claims requiring replies or answers. Application: The pre-trial was set before respondents had answered the compulsory counterclaims in the amended answer. Therefore, the last pleading had not been filed, and setting the pre-trial was premature.
• Certiorari vs. Appeal (Adequacy of Remedy): Definition: Certiorari lies when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Appeal is generally adequate, barring certiorari. However, certiorari may be granted despite the availability of appeal if appeal is not adequate (e.g., does not promptly relieve from injurious effects, involves jurisdictional errors, patent nullity, requires broader interests of justice). Application: The Court found appeal inadequate because petitioners were illegally defaulted, preventing them from presenting evidence or defenses, which couldn't be raised first on appeal. The errors (lack of jurisdiction, invalid default) were fundamental, justifying certiorari.
• Jurisdiction for Attachment Damages (Rule 57, Sec. 20): Definition: Claims for damages resulting from wrongful attachment must be claimed, upon application with due notice, in the same action where the attachment was issued and the bond filed, and must be included in the final judgment. Application: The damages claim against Pioneer's bond, posted in the CFI Manila case, could only be pursued in that same CFI Manila case, not in a separate action in CFI Cebu. The CFI Cebu thus lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of Rodriguez's complaint.
• Waiver of Objection to Personal Jurisdiction: Definition: A party submits to the court's jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief (e.g., filing a counterclaim or application for damages). Application: By filing the Application for Damages Against Bond in the CFI Manila case, Rodriguez sought affirmative relief and thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the CFI Manila over his person, waiving any prior objection based on improper venue.

• "The mandatory character of a pretrial and the serious consequences confronting the parties in the event that each party fails to attend the same must impose a strict application of the Rule such that where we find no authority for the court to call another pre-trial hearing... the conclusion is inescapable that the respondent Judge committed a grave and serious abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in declaring defendant Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. 'as in default'..."
• "Indeed, a second pre-trial is impractical, useless and time-consuming."
• "We have carefully noted the telegraphic notices sent by the clerk of court and we find this omission which is fatal to the respondents' cause: no telegram was sent to the defendant Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. The telegram was sent to the counsel of this defendant, but none to the defendant itself... Notice to the counsel is not enough. We reiterate - that this failure is a jurisdictional defect."
• "...appeal is not an adequate remedy where party is illegally declared in default." (Citing Omico v. Villegas)
• "...the claim for damages against a bond in an alleged wrongful attachment can only be prosecuted in the same court where the bond was filed and the attachment issued." (Citing Ty Tion v. Marsman, Del Rosario v. Nava, etc.)

• Insurance Co. of North America vs. Republic (21 SCRA 887): Cited to support the principle that once a pre-trial has been held, the filing of an amended complaint does not necessarily require another pre-trial, especially if it would be impractical. Used here to argue against the necessity/validity of the second pre-trial.
• Home Insurance Co. vs. United Lines Co. (21 SCRA 863): Cited to explain the rationale for requiring the party's presence at pre-trial – to compel parties to personally appear for possible compromise. Supports the ruling that notice must be given to the party itself.
• Pineda vs. Court of Appeals (67 SCRA 228): Cited for the rule that a party may not be declared in default for failure to attend pre-trial where only his counsel was notified. Also cited for the principle that courts should be liberal in setting aside default judgments.
• Sta. Maria, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals (45 SCRA 596): Cited for the principle that a pre-trial may be unnecessary if the case cannot be settled or if circumstances do not necessitate another one after an amendment. Supports the argument against the mandatory nature of the second pre-trial.
• Taroma vs. Sayo (67 SCRA 508): Cited to reiterate the mandatory requirement of serving pre-trial notice separately upon the party and counsel, and outlining the best practice for service through counsel with express imposition of duty on counsel to notify the party.
• Silvestre v. Torres (57 Phil. 885): Cited for the general principle defining an "adequate remedy" sufficient to bar certiorari – one that is equally beneficial, speedy, and sufficient to promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment.
• Fernando v. Vasquez (L-26417, Jan. 30, 1970): Cited as an example where the Supreme Court granted certiorari despite the availability of appeal, particularly where broader interests of justice require it or the orders are null and void.
• Omico v. Villegas (63 SCRA 285): Cited as direct precedent establishing that appeal is not an adequate remedy when a party has been illegally declared in default.
• Santos vs. Court of Appeals (95 Phil. 360): Cited by respondents but distinguished by the Court. Respondents used it to argue Rule 57 Sec 20 doesn't apply if the main case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court found it not controlling because in Santos, no claim for damages was ever presented/filed in the original court, unlike here where Rodriguez initially filed an application.
• Ty Tion vs. Marsman & Co. (5 SCRA 761) & other cases (Del Rosario, Estioco, Neva Espana, Tan Suyco, Raymundo, Santos v. Moir): Cited collectively as the latest decisions reiterating the controlling rule that damages for wrongful attachment under Rule 57 Sec 20 must be claimed in the same court where the attachment was issued.
• Soriano v. Palacio (12 SCRA 557): Cited to illustrate that filing a motion for reconsideration of a default judgment constitutes submission to the court's jurisdiction, analogous to how Rodriguez submitted to CFI Manila's jurisdiction by filing his damages application there.

• Rule 20, Revised Rules of Court (Pre-trial): Specifically Sec. 1 (Pre-trial mandatory; matters considered), Sec. 2 (Failure to appear; default), Sec. 3 (Judgment on pleadings/summary judgment), Sec. 4 (Record of pre-trial), Sec. 5 (Pre-trial calendar). Applied extensively to determine the validity of the second pre-trial, the necessity of notice to the party, and the timing relative to the last pleading.
• Rule 57, Revised Rules of Court (Attachment): Specifically Sec. 20 (Claim for damages on account of illegal attachment). This was the central rule used to determine that the CFI Cebu lacked jurisdiction over the damages claim, which should have been pursued in the CFI Manila where the attachment originated.