AI-generated
# AK992362
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Exec. Secretary Ermita

This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by several Senators challenging the constitutionality of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's appointments of respondents as acting secretaries of various executive departments while Congress was in session, without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the President has the power to issue such acting appointments under the Constitution and existing laws, specifically Executive Order No. 292, and that these appointments are temporary and do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Primary Holding

The President of the Philippines has the constitutional and statutory power to appoint department secretaries in an acting capacity without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, even while Congress is in session, as such appointments are temporary measures to fill vacancies and ensure the continuous performance of executive functions.

Background

The case arose after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed several individuals as acting secretaries of various executive departments in August 2004, while the 13th Congress was in its regular session and the Commission on Appointments had already been constituted. Petitioners, who are members of the Senate, questioned the legality of these appointments, arguing they bypassed the confirmation process required by the Constitution.

History

  1. Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Supreme Court on 8 September 2004.

Facts

  • The Senate and the House of Representatives commenced their regular session on July 26, 2004.
  • The Commission on Appointments (CA) was constituted on August 25, 2004.
  • President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of various departments on August 15 and 23, 2004, while Congress was in session.
  • The appointment papers uniformly stated that respondents were appointed "ACTING SECRETARY" of their respective departments.
  • Respondents took their oath of office and assumed their duties as acting secretaries.
  • On September 8, 2004, petitioners, as Senators of the Republic, filed the present petition questioning the constitutionality of these acting appointments.
  • Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004.
  • On September 23, 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to the same respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • The President cannot appoint department secretaries in an acting capacity without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session.
  • In case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, only an Undersecretary can be designated as Acting Secretary, pursuant to Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292).
  • While Congress is in session, no appointments, whether regular or acting, can be made to a vacant position requiring CA confirmation without first obtaining its consent.
  • Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292, which allows the President to make temporary designations, does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution but only to those vested by law (statutes).
  • The issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse and can circumvent the CA confirmation process.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • The petition is moot because President Arroyo had already extended ad interim appointments to the respondents on September 23, 2004, after Congress recessed.
  • The President has the power to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, even while Congress is in session, based on Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292.
  • The power to appoint is essentially executive, and limitations thereon are strictly construed against the legislature.
  • Section 17 of EO 292 allows the President to temporarily designate an officer already in government service or any other competent person to perform functions of an office in the executive branch when a vacancy exists.

Issues

  • Whether the petitioners possess the requisite legal standing to file the petition.
  • Whether the petition has become moot and academic due to the subsequent issuance of ad interim appointments to the respondents.
  • Whether the President can appoint department secretaries in an acting capacity without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session.

Ruling

  • Only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmeña, who are members of the Commission on Appointments, have standing to sue due to the potential impairment of their prerogatives as CA members; other petitioners lack standing as mere members of Congress.
  • The petition is not barred by mootness because the issue of the constitutionality of the President's appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session is capable of repetition yet evading review.
  • The President has the power to appoint department secretaries in an acting capacity even while Congress is in session, without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This power is derived from the President's executive power to appoint and is supported by Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292, which allows the President to make temporary designations to fill vacancies. Such acting appointments are a stop-gap measure, temporary in nature, and distinct from ad interim appointments which require CA confirmation. The President must be able to appoint an alter ego of her choice, even temporarily. The term "law" in EO 292 includes the Constitution. The one-year limitation on temporary designations in EO 292 safeguards against abuse.

Doctrines

  • Mootness (Exception: Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review) — A case is considered moot if it ceases to present a justiciable controversy. However, courts may decide an otherwise moot case if the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review. This was applied because the question of the constitutionality of acting appointments during congressional session is likely to recur.
  • Power to Appoint (Executive Nature) — The power to appoint is inherently an executive function, and legislative interference is limited to instances expressly allowed by the Constitution, with limitations construed strictly against the legislature. The Court upheld the President's authority to make acting appointments as part of this executive power.
  • Commission on Appointments (Nature of Power) — Although composed of members of Congress, the Commission on Appointments exercises powers that are executive in nature, emanating directly from the Constitution, and is independent of Congress. This was cited to clarify that the CA's role does not make the appointment process legislative.
  • Locus Standi (Legal Standing for Members of Congress/Commission on Appointments) — To have standing, a party must show a direct and personal injury. The Court ruled that only petitioners who were members of the Commission on Appointments had standing because the President's actions could potentially impair their specific constitutional prerogatives related to appointments, unlike members of Congress generally.
  • Alter Ego Principle — Department secretaries are considered the alter egos of the President, acting for and in behalf of the President in their respective spheres of competence. This principle underscores the necessity for the President to appoint individuals who enjoy her full trust and confidence, even in an acting capacity.
  • Acting Appointments vs. Ad Interim Appointments — Acting appointments are temporary, made to fill a vacancy until a permanent appointee is chosen, do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and can be made whether Congress is in session or not. Ad interim appointments are made during a recess of Congress, are effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress, and require CA confirmation. The Court emphasized this distinction to validate the President's actions.
  • Statutory Construction (Meaning of "Law") — The term "law" in a statute is not confined to acts of Congress but encompasses the Constitution, statutes, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. This was applied to interpret Section 17 of EO 292, which allows the President to make temporary designations for offices where appointment is vested in him "by law," to include appointments vested by the Constitution.

Key Excerpts

  • "The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office."
  • "Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence."
  • "The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that '[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.'"
  • "Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments."

Precedents Cited

  • Tolentino v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 148334, 21 January 2004) — Cited for the general rule on mootness and the exception that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
  • Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 159085, 3 February 2004) — Cited by petitioners regarding standing of members of Congress when congressional powers are impaired; the Court distinguished this by noting the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress.
  • Sarmiento III v. Mison (No. L-79974, 17 December 1987) — Referenced for the principle that limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.
  • Cunanan v. Tan, Jr. (G.R. No. L-19721, 10 May 1962) — Cited for the doctrine that the Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution, independent of Congress, and its functions are purely executive in nature.
  • Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr. (G.R. No. 93711, 25 February 1991) — Referenced for the definition and temporary nature of an acting appointment as a stop-gap measure.
  • National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 156982, 8 September 2004) — Cited in relation to the broad meaning of "law" which includes the Constitution, statutes, ordinances, implementing rules, and judicial decisions.

Provisions

  • 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 16 — This section details the President's power to nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint heads of executive departments and other officials. It also grants the President power to make appointments during the recess of Congress (ad interim appointments). Respondents cited this as a basis for the President's general appointing power.
  • Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), Book IV, Chapter 2, Section 10(5) — This provision states that an Undersecretary shall temporarily discharge the duties of the Secretary in case of vacancy, and the President shall likewise make the temporary designation of Acting Secretary from among them. Petitioners argued this limited the President's choice for Acting Secretary.
  • Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), Book III, Title I, Chapter 5, Section 16 — This section affirms that the President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws. Respondents cited this to support the President's power.
  • Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), Book III, Title I, Chapter 5, Section 17 — This section grants the President the power to issue temporary designations to an officer already in government service or any other competent person to perform functions of an office in the executive branch when a vacancy exists or the incumbent is unable to perform duties, with such designation not exceeding one year. The Court heavily relied on this provision to uphold the President's power to make acting appointments.
  • Rules of Court, Rule 65 — The petition was filed under this rule for certiorari and prohibition.