The accused, a minor who acted with discernment, is guilty of two counts of statutory rape, not qualified statutory rape, when the qualifying circumstance of relationship within the third civil degree is not specifically alleged in the Information, even if the victim is his niece. Furthermore, two penetrations committed without a significant interval constitute only one count of rape.

The case arose from accusations that XXX265439, then 17 years old, raped his 9-year-old niece, AAA265439, on three separate occasions in February 2010. The relationship between the accused and the victim (uncle-niece) and the victim's age were central to the charges.

• On February 18, 2010, around 4:00 p.m., 17-year-old XXX265439 (accused) went to his brother's house where his 9-year-old niece, AAA265439 (victim), was watching television with her younger brother.
• The accused gave AAA265439's younger brother PHP 1.00 and told him to move to another part of the house.
• Once alone with AAA265439, the accused removed her shorts and underwear, removed his own, coaxed her to lie down, and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA265439 felt pain but remained quiet out of fear. The accused left when he heard voices outside. This formed the basis for Criminal Case No. 11081-G.
• On February 19, 2010, around 4:00 p.m., the accused again approached AAA265439, threatened to kill her if she reported the previous incident, removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
• AAA265439 testified that on February 19, 2010, the accused penetrated her twice, stating "He removed and after that he again inserted, sir." This formed the basis for Criminal Case Nos. 11082-G and 11083-G.
• AAA265439's mother, BBB265439, arrived and saw the accused hurriedly leaving AAA265439's room. She found AAA265439 pulling up her underwear and shorts. Suspecting rape, BBB265439 confronted and hit the accused with a bamboo stick.
• The incident was reported to Barangay Captain CCC265439, and the accused voluntarily went with police for questioning.
• Dr. Luisa V. Escondo examined AAA265439 and found a cut/lacerated wound at the 9 o'clock position on her hymenal area.
• The accused denied the charges, claiming BBB265439 had been physically abusing him and that he was never alone with AAA265439.
• The Informations for all three counts alleged that the accused, "a seventeen years (sic) old who acted with discernment," had carnal knowledge of "his niece [AAA265439] a nine (9) years (sic) old female child."
• The accused was born in 1992, making him 17 years old at the time of the crimes in February 2010.

• XXX265439 (accused-appellant) denied the charges against him.
• He claimed that BBB265439 (victim's mother) had been physically abusing him since 2004.
• He asserted that although he was staying in BBB265439's house for two years, he was never alone with AAA265439.
• He sought affirmative relief from the Supreme Court, pleading for his acquittal.

• The People of the Philippines (plaintiff-appellee), through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued for the affirmation of the Court of Appeals' decision, maintaining that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of qualified statutory rape.
• The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA265439, her mother BBB265439, Barangay Captain CCC265439, social worker Rosalinda G. Buñales, and Dr. Ramon Baldovino.
• The prosecution emphasized the victim's consistent and credible testimony regarding the sexual assaults.

• Whether XXX265439 is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of qualified statutory rape.
• Whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship was sufficiently alleged in the Informations.
• Whether the two penetrations on February 19, 2010, constitute one or two separate counts of rape.
• Whether XXX265439, a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, acted with discernment.
• What is the proper penalty to be imposed upon XXX265439, considering his minority and finding of discernment.

• The Supreme Court partly granted the appeal. XXX265439 was found guilty of two counts of statutory rape (not qualified) and acquitted of one count.
• For Criminal Case Nos. 11081-G (February 18 incident) and 11082-G (first penetration on February 19), the accused was found guilty of statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of carnal knowledge and the victim being under 12 years of age were proven.
• The crime was not qualified statutory rape because the Informations, while stating the victim was the accused's niece, did not specifically allege that the accused was a relative "by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree," which is a requisite for qualified rape under Article 266-B.
• Regarding the incident on February 19, 2010 (Criminal Case Nos. 11082-G and 11083-G), the Court found that the victim's statement that "He removed and after that he again inserted" did not indicate a significant interval between the two penetrations. Thus, these acts constituted only one count of statutory rape, leading to acquittal in Criminal Case No. 11083-G.
• The Court found that the accused, although 17 years old at the time of the crime, acted with discernment. His actions, such as inducing the victim's younger brother to leave them alone and threatening the victim, showed an understanding of the depravity and consequences of his acts.
• Due to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (Article 68(2) RPC), the penalty was lowered by one degree from reclusion perpetua (for statutory rape) to reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty for each count was set to six years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 15 years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
• The accused was deemed entitled to serve his sentence in an agricultural camp or training facility under Section 51 of RA 9344, despite having reached the age of majority by the time of conviction, as the automatic suspension of sentence under Section 38 of RA 9344 was no longer applicable because he was over 21 at conviction.
• Civil liabilities were affirmed at PHP 75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages per count, with 6% interest per annum.

• Statutory Rape (Article 266-A(1)(d), RPC) — Sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age, regardless of her consent. The law presumes that a victim below 12 does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent. Applied here as the victim was 9 years old, and carnal knowledge was proven for two instances.
• Qualified Statutory Rape (Article 266-B, RPC) — Statutory rape attended by certain qualifying circumstances, one of which is if the offender is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. This doctrine was invoked but found not applicable because the specific qualifying circumstance of relationship within the third civil degree was not sufficiently alleged in the Informations, even though the victim was the accused's niece.
• Requirement of Specific Allegation in Information — For a qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it must be specifically alleged in the Information. Applied here to rule out qualified statutory rape because the specific degree of relationship was not alleged.
• Single Larceny Doctrine/Unity of Criminal Intent (by analogy to rape) — Multiple acts driven by a single criminal impulse may constitute a single crime. While not explicitly termed "single rape doctrine," the Court ruled that two penetrations without a significant interval constitute only one count of rape. Applied here to reduce two alleged rapes on February 19 to a single count.
• Discernment in Minors (RA 9344, Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act) — The mental capacity of a minor (above 15 but below 18) to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. This must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Applied here to hold the 17-year-old accused criminally liable because his actions (luring the victim's brother away, threatening the victim) demonstrated discernment.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority (Article 68(2), RPC) — If the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. Applied here to lower the penalty for statutory rape by one degree.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103) — A law that mandates a sentence for a convicted person to be an indeterminate one, with a minimum and maximum term. Applied here in sentencing the accused for each count of statutory rape.
• Credibility of Child Victim's Testimony — Testimonies of child victims are generally accorded full weight and credence, as their youth and immaturity are often badges of truth and sincerity, and they would not narrate sordid details unless experienced. Applied here to give credence to AAA265439's testimony.
• Denial as a Defense — Denial is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over positive and credible testimony. Applied here as the accused's denial was overcome by the victim's categorical testimony.
• Factual Findings of Trial Courts — Trial courts' factual findings on witness credibility are accorded respect, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, due to their unique opportunity to observe witness demeanor. Applied here in upholding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
• Suspension of Sentence under RA 9344 (Section 38 and 40) — A child in conflict with the law (CICL) found guilty may have their sentence suspended. However, this suspension is limited until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Applied here to determine that the accused, being over 21 at the time of conviction, was no longer eligible for automatic suspension of sentence.
• Confinement of Convicted CICL (Section 51, RA 9344) — A CICL may serve his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facility instead of a regular penal institution. Applied here, directing the remand of the case for such imposition.

• "Notably, XXX265439 merely offered denial which did not overcome the clear, categorical, and positive testimony of AAA265439 that he sexually assaulted her on February 18 and 19, 2010. To be sure, denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of AAA265439 that XXX265439 committed the crime."
• "Here, AAA265439 merely stated that on February 19, 2010, XXX265439 penetrated her twice or that 'he removed his penis and inserted it again.' There is no indication, however, that there was a significant interval between the two penetrations described by AAA265439. XXX265439, therefore, can only be convicted of two counts of statutory rape."
• "Evidently, XXX265439 committed the crimes with an understanding of their depravity and consequences. He must, therefore, suffer the full brunt of the penalty of the crimes."

• People v. Estrada (624 Phil. 211 (2010)) — Cited to emphasize that the qualifying circumstance of the accused being "a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree" must be alleged in the Information for qualified rape. It was immaterial that the appellant admitted the victim was his niece.
• People v. Lucena (728 Phil. 147 (2014)) — Distinguished from the present case. In Lucena, three separate counts of rape were found because penetrations occurred at five-minute intervals, showing several criminal intents. Here, no significant interval was shown for the two penetrations on the second day.
• People v. ZZZ (857 Phil. 629 (2019)) — Cited for the definition of "discernment" as the "mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act."
• Dorado v. People (796 Phil. 233 (2016)) — Cited to explain the application of RA 9344 to children in conflict with the law (CICL) who acted with discernment, including processes like diversion and suspended sentence.
• CICL XXX v. People (899 Phil. 467 (2021)) — Cited for the ruling that a petitioner beyond 21 years of age at conviction could no longer avail of the suspension of sentence under Section 38 of RA 9344, as per Section 40.
• People v. Jugueta (783 Phil. 806 (2016)) — Cited as the basis for the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages awarded in rape cases.
• People v. DDD (G.R. No. 233323, August 26, 2020) — Cited in relation to the elements of statutory rape and the presumption of lack of consent for victims below 12 years old.
• People v. XXX (G.R. No. 231387, July 13, 2022) — Cited for the principle that denial is an inherently weak defense.
• People v. Bay-Od (845 Phil. 644 (2019)) — Cited for the deference given to trial court's factual findings on credibility, especially when affirmed by the CA.
• BBB v. People (880 Phil. 417 (2020)) — Cited for the principle that courts accord full weight and credence to testimonies of child victims.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 266-A (1)(d) — Defines statutory rape as sexual intercourse with a woman under twelve years of age. Applied as the basis for the conviction for statutory rape.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 266-B(1) — Defines qualified rape, including when the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. Its non-application for qualification was due to insufficient allegation.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 68(2) — Provides for the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority for offenders over 15 but under 18, leading to a penalty one degree lower. Applied to reduce the penalty for XXX265439.
• Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) — Mentioned in the initial charges by the RTC, though the SC ultimately convicted under the RPC provisions for statutory rape.
• Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006):
  • Section 38 (Automatic Suspension of Sentence) — Provides for suspension of sentence for a CICL found guilty. Found not applicable as the accused was over 21 at conviction.
  • Section 40 (Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court) — Governs situations where a CICL under suspended sentence reaches 18, or if disposition measures fail. Relevant to the non-applicability of suspended sentence.
  • Section 51 (Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities) — Allows a CICL to serve sentence in alternative facilities. Applied by the SC, ordering remand for this purpose.
• Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Mandates indeterminate sentences. Applied in determining the final penalty.