When sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC (e.g., insertion of a finger into the vagina) is committed against a child victim under twelve (12) years old, the proper nomenclature is "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period as provided in the second proviso of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, not the lower penalty of prision mayor under Article 266-B of the RPC, because R.A. No. 7610 provides stronger deterrence and special protection for child victims.

The case arose from two separate incidents where the accused-appellant, Salvador Tulagan, sexually abused his nine-year-old neighbor, AAA, first by inserting his finger into her vagina in September 2011, and later by having sexual intercourse with her in October 2011, leading to charges of sexual assault and statutory rape respectively.

• Accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan lived approximately 5 meters away from the house of the victim AAA's grandmother, where AAA also lived.
• Sometime in September 2011, while nine-year-old AAA was peeling corn with her cousin, Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and inserted his finger into her private part, causing pain.
• On or about October 8, 2011, around 11:00 a.m., while AAA was playing with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house, he brought her inside, told her to be quiet, lie down, removed her shorts and panties, undressed himself, kissed her cheeks, held her hands, pinned her down, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing pain and making her cry.
• AAA did not immediately report the incidents until her aunt, BBB, noticed a man (Tulagan) looking at AAA on October 17, 2011, became suspicious, examined AAA's genitalia upon her return from an outside bathroom, found it swollen, and prompted AAA's confession about both incidents.
• A genital examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder revealed a healed laceration at the 6 o'clock position in AAA's hymen and a dilated or enlarged vaginal opening, which was noted as abnormal for a 9-year-old child.
• Tulagan presented defenses of denial and alibi, claiming he was gathering banana leaves during the time of the September incident and denying knowledge of AAA, attributing the accusation to a prior misunderstanding between his mother and AAA's grandmother.

• The accused-appellant (Tulagan) argued that the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the testimony of the victim (AAA), alleging it was inconsistent and fraught with lapses affecting her credibility.
• He contended that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• He imputed ill motive on the part of AAA's grandmother due to a prior misunderstanding with his mother.
• He raised the defense of alibi, claiming physical impossibility of being at the crime scene during the alleged September incident.
• He implicitly argued against the credibility of the delayed reporting of the incidents.

• The plaintiff-appellee (People of the Philippines) maintained that the testimony of the victim (AAA) was credible, straightforward, and unwavering, particularly regarding the insertion of the finger (sexual assault) and the penis (statutory rape).
• It argued that all the elements of both sexual assault and statutory rape were duly established beyond reasonable doubt.
• It asserted that minor inconsistencies in testimony do not diminish credibility but rather bolster it by discounting rehearsal.
• It contended that the victim's positive identification of the accused prevails over the defenses of denial and alibi, especially since physical impossibility was not established.
• It argued that delay in reporting the rape does not necessarily affect the truthfulness of the charge absent proof of concoction or ill motive.

• Whether the accused-appellant's guilt for sexual assault and statutory rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• How to reconcile and apply the provisions on Acts of Lasciviousness (Art. 336 RPC), Rape (Art. 266-A RPC as amended by RA 8353), and Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, particularly concerning the proper nomenclature, penalties, and damages when the victim is a minor.
• Specifically, what is the proper crime designation and penalty for inserting a finger into the vagina of a child under 12 years old?

• The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the conviction of Salvador Tulagan for both crimes, with modifications.
• The Court found AAA's testimony credible, positive, and categorical, sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and corroborated by medical findings. The defenses of denial and alibi were rejected as weak and unsubstantiated, failing to show physical impossibility.
• The Court extensively discussed and reconciled the RPC and R.A. No. 7610 provisions. It held that for the act committed in SCC-6210 (finger insertion into the vagina of a 9-year-old), the proper designation is Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
• Pursuant to the second proviso of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which mandates a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period for lascivious conduct against a child under 12, the Court ruled this higher penalty applies over the prision mayor prescribed under Article 266-B of the RPC for sexual assault, emphasizing R.A. 7610's policy of stronger deterrence for child abuse. The indeterminate sentence for this crime was accordingly modified.
• The conviction for statutory rape (SCC-6211) under Article 266-A(1)(d) and the penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC were affirmed.
• Damages were modified based on People v. Jugueta standards: For SCC-6210 (Sexual Assault in relation to R.A. 7610), Civil Indemnity, Moral Damages, and Exemplary Damages were set at P50,000.00 each. For SCC-6211 (Statutory Rape resulting in reclusion perpetua), Civil Indemnity, Moral Damages, and Exemplary Damages were set at P75,000.00 each. All damages awarded earn 6% interest per annum from finality until fully paid.

• Credibility of Child Victim Testimony: Definition: Testimonies of child victims, especially in rape cases, are often given full weight and credit due to their vulnerability and the shame associated with fabricating such stories. Application: The Court found AAA's testimony credible, straightforward, and corroborated, upholding the trial court's assessment despite minor alleged inconsistencies which were deemed not to affect the core narration and identification.
• Defense of Alibi: Definition: For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis. Application: Tulagan's alibi failed as he lived only 50 meters away from AAA's house, thus not establishing physical impossibility.
• Defense of Denial: Definition: Denial is an inherently weak, negative defense that cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of prosecution witnesses on affirmative matters. Application: Tulagan's denial was weak and could not overcome AAA's consistent and categorical positive identification and testimony.
• Statutory Construction (RPC vs. Special Law - R.A. 7610): Definition: When an act is punishable under the RPC and a special law, the law providing the higher penalty should generally apply, especially when the special law (like R.A. 7610) embodies a state policy for stronger deterrence and protection for a specific class (children). Provisos qualify the immediately preceding clause. Later laws prevail over earlier conflicting laws. Application: The Court extensively analyzed the interplay between RPC Art. 266-A(2)/Art. 336 and R.A. 7610, Sec. 5(b). It concluded that for sexual assault (finger insertion) against a child under 12, the specific proviso in Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610 mandating reclusion temporal medium prevails over the general penalty of prision mayor in Art. 266-B RPC. It clarified that R.A. 8353 did not repeal Art. 336 RPC entirely, nor did it supersede Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610 regarding penalties for child victims.
• Statutory Rape: Definition: Rape committed when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented; force, intimidation, or consent is immaterial as the law presumes the victim incapable of giving consent. Application: Tulagan was convicted of statutory rape under Art. 266-A(1)(d) because AAA was 9 years old when he had carnal knowledge of her.
• Sexual Assault (as distinct from Rape/Acts of Lasciviousness): Definition: Under RA 8353, specific acts like inserting an object into the genital/anal orifice or penis into the mouth/anal orifice are classified as sexual assault under Art. 266-A(2), distinct from carnal knowledge (rape) under Art. 266-A(1) and general acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336. Application: The act of finger insertion fell under Sexual Assault (Art. 266-A(2)) but was penalized under R.A. 7610 due to the victim's age.
• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Penalties (Civil Indemnity/Damages): Definition: The amounts awarded for civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages in criminal cases often correspond to the severity of the penalty imposed, following standardized amounts set by jurisprudence like People v. Jugueta. Application: The Court adjusted the damages based on the penalties finalized for both crimes (reclusion temporal medium range for the modified sexual assault, reclusion perpetua for statutory rape), applying the Jugueta guidelines.
• Children Exploited in Prostitution or Other Sexual Abuse (EPSOSA Element): Definition: A qualifying circumstance under R.A. 7610, Section 5, defining children who, due to specific circumstances (money, profit, coercion, influence), indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Application: The Court clarified that while this element defines the scope of Section 5 generally, the provisos regarding victims under 12 years apply directly by referencing RPC articles, making the EPSOSA element itself less critical for prosecution under the proviso but crucial for applying Section 5 directly to victims 12 or older but below 18.

• "Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed."
• "What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition."
• "Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere 'crime against chastity' in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a 'crime against persons' akin to rape... We hold that if the acts constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be 'Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610'... Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is still reclusion temporal in its medium period, and not prision mayor."
• "[A] child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act..." (Clarified in the decision regarding its application under R.A. 7610 depending on age).
• "[I]n case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will."

• Dimakuta v. People (771 Phil. 641): Cited as instructive on the principle that where lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610 is also covered by sexual assault under RPC Art. 266-A(2), the offender is liable under R.A. 7610 (Sec. 5b) if the victim is a child, as it provides a higher penalty. Referenced throughout the reconciliation discussion.
• People v. Caoili (G.R. No. 196848): Cited for prescribing guidelines in designating the proper offense (Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 RPC vs. Lascivious Conduct under Sec. 5(b) R.A. 7610) and determining penalties based on the victim's age. Referenced throughout the reconciliation discussion.
• Quimvel v. People (G.R. No. 214497): Cited for its discussion on the application of the provisos in Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610, particularly the rule on statutory construction regarding provisos, and its application by analogy to statutory rape involving victims under 12. Referenced extensively.
• People v. Garcia (695 Phil. 576): Cited for the principle that testimonies of child victims are generally given full weight and credit.
• Amployo v. People (496 Phil. 747): Cited for its discussion on the definition of "lewd" conduct under Acts of Lasciviousness (Art. 336 RPC).
• Malto v. People (560 Phil. 119): Cited and clarified regarding the distinction between violations of Sec. 5(b) R.A. 7610 and rape under the RPC, and specifically regarding the presumption of a child's incapacity to consent (which the current decision limited primarily to those under 12 for statutory offenses).
• People v. Tubillo (G.R. No. 220718): Cited along with Abay and Pangilinan as cases whose rulings on choosing between R.A. 7610 and RPC based on evidence focus ("coercion/influence" vs. "force/intimidation") were being clarified by this decision.
• People v. Abay (599 Phil. 390): Cited along with Tubillo and Pangilinan for the same reason; its analysis regarding prosecution choices for victims over 12 was discussed.
• People v. Pangilinan (676 Phil. 16): Cited along with Tubillo and Abay for the same reason; its approach to prosecuting under either law was reviewed.
• People v. Jugueta (783 Phil. 806): Cited as the basis for standardizing the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages according to the crime committed and penalty imposed.
• People v. Chingh (661 Phil. 208): Cited to support the view that R.A. 7610 remains applicable despite R.A. 8353, especially regarding its protective mantle for child victims.
• People v. Larin, Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, Garingarao v. People: Cited to support the consistent interpretation that R.A. 7610 Sec 5(b) covers not just child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse through coercion/influence, even if occurring only once.
• People v. Brioso (788 Phil. 292): Cited regarding the presumption of incapacity to discern good from evil for victims under 12 or demented in statutory offenses.
• People v. Combate (653 Phil. 487): Cited for the justification and nature of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in criminal cases.

• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 266-A (Rape; When and How Committed, as amended by R.A. 8353): Specifically paragraphs 1(d) (Statutory Rape) and 2 (Sexual Assault).
• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 266-B (Penalties for Rape, as amended by R.A. 8353): Basis for penalties (reclusion perpetua for rape, prision mayor for sexual assault).
• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 335 (When and how rape is committed - repealed/amended by RA 8353): Referenced in relation to R.A. 7610's proviso and historical context.
• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 336 (Acts of Lasciviousness): Discussed extensively regarding its elements, scope, non-repeal by R.A. 8353, and relationship with R.A. 7610.
• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 337 (Qualified Seduction): Referenced in discussion regarding penalties increased by R.A. 7610, Sec 10.
• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 338 (Simple Seduction): Referenced in discussion regarding possible applicable crimes if elements of rape/abuse under RA 7610 are not met.
• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 339 (Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party): Referenced in discussion regarding penalties increased by R.A. 7610, Sec 10.
• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 17 (Principals): Referenced in relation to liability for promoting child prostitution under R.A. 7610.
• Revised Penal Code (RPC), Article 202 (Prostitutes; Penalty): Referenced for the definition of a prostitute.
• Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act): Specifically Section 3(a) (Definition of Children), Section 5 (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse, particularly 5(b) and its provisos), Section 10 (Increased penalties for certain RPC crimes against children under 12). Extensively discussed and applied.
• Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997): Amended RPC provisions on Rape (Arts. 266-A, 266-B), central to the discussion on reconciliation with R.A. 7610 and Art. 336 RPC.
• Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (IRR of R.A. 7610): Cited for definitions of "lascivious conduct" and "sexual abuse".
• Rules of Court, Rule 110, Section 6 (Sufficiency of complaint or information): Impliedly referenced regarding the need to properly designate the offense.
• Rules of Court, Rule 117, Section 3(f) (Grounds for motion to quash - more than one offense charged): Mentioned as a possible ground if Information wrongly alleges elements of both RPC and RA 7610 violation for the same act.
• 1987 Constitution, Article XV, Section 3(2) (Right of children to assistance and special protection): Cited as the constitutional basis for laws like R.A. 7610.