This case is an appeal affirming the conviction of Emma Leocadio and Sherryl Leocadio for Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The accused-appellants recruited twelve young women, eleven of whom were minors, from Bohol, promising them work in an internet cafe in Angeles, Pampanga, which was intended for cybersex activities. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision, finding all elements of qualified trafficking under R.A. No. 9208 were established, including the recruitment of minors and trafficking in large scale, and that conspiracy between the appellants was proven. The Court modified the damages awarded and clarified the inapplicability of the "without eligibility for parole" phrase to the penalty of life imprisonment in this specific context.
Primary Holding
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation constitutes "trafficking in persons" even without the means enumerated for adult trafficking, and the crime is qualified if the victim is a child or if committed in large scale (against three or more persons); conspiracy can be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused towards a common criminal design.
Background
The case arose from the recruitment of young women, mostly minors, from impoverished island barangays in Getafe, Bohol, with promises of lucrative employment in an internet cafe in Angeles, Pampanga. This recruitment preyed on their vulnerability due to poverty, with the ultimate purpose being their engagement in cybersex operations.
History
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Accused-appellants charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons in Criminal Case No. CBU-93590 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City.
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RTC rendered a Decision on September 24, 2015, finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
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Accused-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02220.
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CA rendered a Decision on June 29, 2017, affirming the RTC's decision with modifications to include moral and exemplary damages and a declaration of ineligibility for parole.
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Accused-appellants appealed the CA Decision to the Supreme Court.
Facts
- In the first week of August 2011, Emma Leocadio and her daughter Sherryl Leocadio recruited twelve young women from Jagoliao and Nasingin, Bohol, to work in an internet cafe in Angeles, Pampanga. Eleven of these women were minors.
- CCC, a minor, was told by Sherryl she would work in Manila in an internet cafe, dancing strip wearing only a bra and panty. Emma gave CCC's mother P2,000, deductible from CCC's salary.
- DDD and AAA, both minors, were approached in Nasingin by Ella Leocadio (Emma's half-sister) and another woman. At Annabel's house, Emma assessed them, instructed them to fetch their mothers, and assured them Sherryl would teach them computer use. Emma later told them in Cebu to abide by foreigner's instructions online, including undressing. DDD's mother received P1,000 from Emma, deductible from DDD's salary. AAA's mother was promised P1,000 but received it from Emma only before leaving for Cebu.
- BBB, 18 years old, had previously worked for Emma's son Richard in Pampanga. She was deceptively fetched from her carinderia job in Lapu-Lapu City, told her father was sick. Emma wanted her back in Pampanga. BBB agreed due to a loan from Emma, deductible from her salary.
- On August 4, 2011, the accused-appellants and the girls traveled by pump boat from Getafe, Bohol, to Pier 1, Cebu City. Emma paid for fares, which were deductible.
- In Cebu City, Emma bought Super Ferry tickets to Manila for the group. The tickets falsely stated the minors were of legal age.
- On August 5, 2011, at Pier 4, Cebu City, while attempting to board the vessel for Manila, the group was intercepted by maritime police after a security guard reported suspicious activity involving women herding minors.
- Accused-appellants could not present parental consent or DOLE authority for the minors' travel. They were arrested, and the Miranda Rights were read to them.
- Investigation at the police station revealed erasures on the tickets, particularly regarding the ages of the girls. The DSWD took custody of the girls; eleven admitted to being minors, and nine provided birth documents.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Accused-appellants claimed they did not recruit the minors; instead, the parents of the girls approached them to bring their daughters to Manila to find work.
- They argued that there was no conspiracy between them in the commission of the crime, with Sherryl merely accompanying her mother Emma on vacation and having no part in the alleged recruitment.
- They contended that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the commission of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
Arguments of the Respondents
- The prosecution argued that all elements of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under R.A. No. 9208 were established beyond reasonable doubt.
- The accused-appellants recruited, transported, and harbored the victims, who were mostly minors, for the purpose of sexual exploitation, specifically cybersex.
- The means used included taking advantage of the victims' vulnerability due to poverty and giving payments or benefits (advances on salary) to achieve consent.
- The crime was qualified because the trafficked persons were children and the trafficking was committed in large scale (against more than three persons).
- Conspiracy was evident from the accused-appellants' overt acts performed in furtherance of a common purpose to recruit and transport the minors for indecent acts.
Issues
- Whether the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 6 (a) and (c), in relation to Sections 4 (a) and 3 of R.A. No. 9208.
- Whether conspiracy existed between the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime.
Ruling
- Yes, the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The Court found that all elements of the crime were established: (1) the act of recruitment, transportation, and harboring of persons; (2) the means of taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons (though not strictly necessary as victims were children); and (3) the purpose of exploitation (prostitution or sexual exploitation through cybersex). The testimonies of the victims CCC, DDD, AAA, and BBB consistently showed that the accused-appellants recruited them for work in an internet cafe in Pampanga, involving acts like strip dancing and undressing for foreigners online. Payments were advanced to their parents, deductible from salaries. The crime was qualified because eleven of the twelve victims were minors (children under R.A. No. 9208) and it was committed in large scale (against twelve individuals).
- Yes, conspiracy between Emma and Sherryl Leocadio was proven. Their concerted actions, including joint recruitment efforts, Sherryl's specific description of the lewd work to CCC, their collective travel with the victims, Emma's purchase of tickets, and their presence during the attempted departure for Manila, demonstrated a common design and purpose to traffic the victims for sexual exploitation.
- The Court affirmed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P2,000,000.00 for each appellant. It modified the CA's award of moral damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00 per victim, maintained exemplary damages at P100,000.00 per victim, and ordered payment of 6% per annum interest on all monetary awards from finality until full payment. The phrase "shall not be eligible for parole" was deleted as it is not necessary to qualify life imprisonment under the circumstances.
Doctrines
- Trafficking in Persons (R.A. No. 9208, Section 3(a)) — Refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position, taking advantage of vulnerability, or giving/receiving payments or benefits to achieve consent of a person having control over another, for the purpose of exploitation. The Court found all elements present: accused-appellants recruited and transported the victims, took advantage of their vulnerability (poverty), and intended them for sexual exploitation (cybersex).
- Trafficking of a Child (R.A. No. 9208, Section 3(a) last paragraph) — The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph (e.g., threat, force, coercion). This was applied because eleven of the victims were minors, making the means used less critical for establishing the crime.
- Qualified Trafficking in Persons (R.A. No. 9208, Section 6) — Trafficking is qualified if: (a) the trafficked person is a child; or (c) the crime is committed by a syndicate or in large scale (against three or more persons). The Court applied this because the victims included eleven children and the crime was committed against twelve individuals (large scale).
- Conspiracy — Exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It need not be proven by direct evidence but may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, indicating a common purpose or design. The Court found conspiracy from the coordinated actions of Emma and Sherryl in recruiting, transporting, and managing the victims for the intended cybersex operation.
- Vulnerability of the Victim — A circumstance that can be taken advantage of by traffickers. In this case, the victims' poverty and underprivileged status rendered them vulnerable to the promises of work, which the appellants exploited.
- Consent of the Victim (especially a minor) — Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under R.A. No. 9208. A minor's consent is considered meaningless, especially when coercive, abusive, or deceptive means are used, or even without such means, it's not given out of free will. This was relevant as even if parents consented, it did not negate the crime.
Key Excerpts
- "Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208. The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will."
- "The fact that there were no actual indecent shows that were performed by the victims, except for BBB, is immaterial. It is not necessary that the victims have performed or are performing the act of prostitution or sexual exploitation at the time when the perpetrators were apprehended. The material fact in the crime charged is that the purpose of the perpetrators is to engage the victims in the said act of prostitution or sexual exploitation."
- "There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the con mission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt."
Precedents Cited
- People of the Philippines v. Nancy Lasaca Ramirez — Cited for enumerating the elements that must be established to successfully prosecute the crime of trafficking in persons under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208.
- Antonio Planteras, Jr. v. People of the Philippines — Cited for the principle that knowledge or consent of a minor is not a defense in trafficking cases under R.A. No. 9208, as a minor's consent is rendered meaningless.
- People v. Lababo — Cited for summarizing the basic principles in determining the existence of conspiracy, including that it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused.
- Bahilidad v. People — Referenced within the People v. Lababo citation, presumably for similar principles on conspiracy.
- People v. Casio — Cited in relation to moral damages, comparing trafficking to crimes like seduction and rape, and noting the horrendous nature of being trafficked for prostitution. The current case was distinguished due to the victims (except BBB's past experience) not yet being subjected to actual cybersex, leading to a reduction in moral damages compared to Casio.
- People v. Jugueta — Cited in relation to the imposition of legal interest at 6% per annum on monetary awards from finality until full payment.
Provisions
- Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003), Section 3(a) — Defines "Trafficking in Persons" and its elements, including the special provision for trafficking of a child. This was central to establishing the crime.
- Republic Act No. 9208, Section 3(b) — Defines "Child" as a person below eighteen (18) years of age. This was applied to determine that eleven victims were minors.
- Republic Act No. 9208, Section 3(c) — Defines "Prostitution." This was relevant to establish the exploitative purpose of the trafficking.
- Republic Act No. 9208, Section 3(f) — Defines "Sexual Exploitation." This was also relevant to establish the exploitative purpose.
- Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a) — Enumerates acts that promote trafficking, likely referring to the recruitment and transportation aspects. The charge sheet specified this section.
- Republic Act No. 9208, Section 6(a) — Qualifies trafficking if the trafficked person is a child. This was applied as eleven victims were minors.
- Republic Act No. 9208, Section 6(c) — Qualifies trafficking if committed in large scale (against three or more persons). This was applied as twelve persons were trafficked.
- Republic Act No. 9208, Section 10(a) and (c) — Specifies penalties for trafficking and qualified trafficking. This was the basis for the life imprisonment and fine imposed.
- Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines) — Referenced by the CA in relation to parole eligibility, and by the SC in clarifying that the phrase "without eligibility for parole" should not be appended to life imprisonment when RA 9346 is not the reason for non-imposition of death penalty.
- Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Referenced in the context of parole eligibility. The SC noted that parole is generally for divisible penalties, and the "without eligibility for parole" phrase was deemed unnecessary for life imprisonment in this case.
- A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC (Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility for Parole" in Indivisible Penalties) — Cited by the Supreme Court as the basis for deleting the "shall not be eligible for parole" qualification from the sentence of life imprisonment.