A communication made in good faith upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even if it contains criminatory matter which would otherwise be slanderous or libelous; this qualified privilege applies to complaints against public officials addressed to the proper authorities for redress, and malice cannot be presumed but must be proven by the prosecution.

In late 1915, numerous citizens of Pampanga, concerned about the alleged misconduct of Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, prepared a petition detailing charges of malfeasance and asking for his removal from office. This petition, along with supporting affidavits, was submitted to the Executive Secretary, the proper authority for handling such complaints against justices of the peace at the time, through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien.

• In late 1915, thirty-four citizens of Pampanga, including councilors and property owners (the defendants-appellants), prepared and signed a petition addressed to the Executive Secretary, through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien.
• The petition, supported by five individual affidavits, accused Roman Punsalan, Justice of the Peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, of malfeasance in office and sought his removal.
• Specific charges included: (1) Francisca Polintan alleged Punsalan demanded P5 (later P3) to draw up a complaint, kept her as a servant for four days, and took chickens and "gandus" from her. (2) Valentin Sunga alleged Punsalan told him he needed to pay P50 to win a land case, and after losing, Punsalan said he could still win on appeal if he paid P50. (3) Leoncio Quiambao alleged Punsalan secretly gave him P30 at his house on the day of trial for an assault complaint, which was then shelved.
• The Executive Secretary referred the matter to the Judge of First Instance (JFI) for investigation. The JFI initially found two charges established and recommended Punsalan's removal.
• Punsalan moved for a new trial, which the JFI granted. After further hearing, including a letter from local officials supporting Punsalan, the JFI suppressed the charges and acquitted Punsalan.
• Subsequently, a criminal action for libel was filed against the thirty-four petitioners (now defendants) based on statements in their petition, such as calling Punsalan "absolutely unfit, eminently immoral and dangerous to the community."
• The trial court (Judge Percy M. Moir) convicted most defendants of libel, fining each P10. A motion for a new trial by the defendants was denied, leading to this appeal.
• During the libel trial, the defendants' counsel initially objected to the admission of the administrative proceedings (Exhibit A), but the Supreme Court considered these proceedings essential for determining the case.

• The defendants-appellants argued that the trial court erred in overruling their motion for a new trial.
• They contended the court erred in refusing to permit them to withdraw an inadvertent objection to the admission of the administrative proceedings (expediente administrativo).
• They claimed the court erred in sustaining the prosecution's objection to introducing the affidavits upon which their petition was based.
• The core argument was that the alleged libelous statement was unqualifiedly privileged.
• They argued the court erred in implicitly holding that the burden was on them to show the statements were true and free from malice.
• They asserted the court erred in not acquitting them, as the evidence failed to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

• The plaintiff-appellee (The United States, represented by the Attorney-General) argued for the confirmation of the conviction.
• The Attorney-General contended that the case was identical to United States vs. Julio Bustos (13 Phil., 690), with the exceptions that there was more publicity in the present instance and the person to whom the charge was made (Executive Secretary) had less jurisdiction than the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case.
• The prosecution implicitly argued that the statements in the petition were false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous, made with intent to prejudice and defame Justice of the Peace Punsalan.

• Whether the defendants-appellants are guilty of libel for the statements made in their petition against Justice of the Peace Roman Punsalan.
• Whether the petition submitted to the Executive Secretary, containing charges against a public official, is covered by the doctrine of qualified privilege.
• What attitude the judiciary should take in interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic prerogatives of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
• Whether malice was proven by the prosecution, or if good faith and probable cause on the part of the petitioners negate libel.

• The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and acquitted the defendants-appellants with costs de officio.
• The Court held that the petition was a qualifiedly privileged communication. The defendants, as citizens, had an interest in the conduct of their justice of the peace and a duty to bring alleged misconduct to the attention of the proper authorities.
• The Executive Secretary was the appropriate official to receive such complaints, as justices of the peace were appointed and could be removed by the Governor-General, who acted through the Executive Bureau in such matters.
• The Court found that the petitioners acted in good faith, with probable cause to believe the charges were true, given that a Judge of First Instance initially found some charges serious enough to recommend removal. There was no undue publicity, and the charges were submitted through reputable attorneys.
• Express malice was not proven by the prosecution. In cases of qualified privilege, malice is not presumed from the defamatory nature of the words but must be established by the plaintiff.
• The Court emphasized that the Libel Law must be construed in harmony with constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition, which include the right to criticize public officials.

• Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition — Fundamental rights guaranteed by the Organic Law (Philippine Bill of 1902, Jones Law of 1916), which allow for full discussion of public affairs and criticism of public officials. The Court stated these rights are essential for democracy and that citizens have a duty to assist in investigating alleged official misconduct. This doctrine was central to the Court's liberal interpretation of the Libel Law in favor of the defendants.
• Qualified Privilege — A defense in defamation cases where a communication, made in good faith on a subject in which the communicating party has an interest or duty, is made to a person with a corresponding interest or duty. The Court found the defendants' petition to the Executive Secretary fell under this doctrine, as they were citizens concerned with official conduct, and the Executive Secretary was the proper authority. This privilege negates the presumption of malice.
• Bona Fides (Good Faith) — The ultimate test for qualified privilege. If a communication is made with an honest belief in its truth and without malicious intent, it is protected. The Court found the defendants acted in good faith, with probable cause, and with justifiable motives (to secure the removal of a perceived venal official), thus meeting the bona fides test.
• Presumption of Malice — In ordinary libel cases, malice can be presumed from defamatory words. However, when a communication is privileged, this presumption is destroyed, and the plaintiff (prosecution in a criminal libel case) bears the onus of proving actual malice. The Court found the prosecution failed to prove express malice.
• Public Policy — The doctrine of privileged communications rests on public policy, which favors the free and unfettered administration of justice and good government, even if it occasionally protects a malicious slanderer. The Court invoked public policy to protect citizens making good faith complaints against public officials.
• Judicial Notice — The Court took judicial notice of official action in administrative cases and of judicial proceedings supplemental to the basis action, allowing it to consider the entire administrative record related to the complaint against Punsalan, despite initial objections to its admission.

• "Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom."
• "A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts."
• "If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled."
• "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
• "A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,.although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable."
• "The ultimate test is that of bona fides."
• "Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship."

• Kepner vs. U. S. (1904), 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga (1907), 204 U. S., 470 — Cited to establish that the guarantees of freedom of speech and press in the Philippine Bill of Rights carry with them all applicable jurisprudence of English and American constitutional cases.
• Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1 — Cited as well-considered cases supporting the principle that public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy, and that full discussion of public affairs is demanded.
• Howarth vs. Barlow (1906), 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510 — Quoted for the proposition that people in a free government are not obliged to speak of official conduct in whispers.
• Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma (1899), 175 U. S., 409, 411 — Cited for the public policy basis of the doctrine of privileged communications.
• Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344 — Cited for the classic definition of qualified privilege by Lord Campbell, C. J.
• White vs. Nicholls (1845), 3 How., 266 — Cited for the rule that falsehood and absence of probable cause amount to proof of malice, and for the ultimate test of bona fides in privileged communications.
• U. S. vs. Galeza (1915), 31 Phil, 365 — Cited as a later case more directly in point than the Julio Bustos case, supporting the privileged nature of complaints against officials to proper authorities. Also cited in connection with the Governor-General's power to remove justices of the peace.
• U. S. vs. Sedano (1909), 14 Phil., 338; U. S. vs. Contreras (1912), 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo (1915), 29 Phil., 595 — Distinguished from the present case, as these involved convictions for libels of public officials where malice, traduction, falsehood, and calumny against the man (not just the officer) were present.
• United States vs. Julio Bustos (1909), 13 Phil., 690 — Distinguished by the Court. The Attorney-General argued it was identical, but the Court noted that in Julio Bustos, there were "wild statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, 'to persons who could not furnish protection.'" The current case involved a communication to a proper authority with probable cause.
• Yancey vs. Commonwealth (1909), 122 So. W., 123 — Noted as relevant to the discussion.

• Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900 — Cited for laying down the rule: "That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
• Philippine Bill, Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 — Cited as an organic act for the Philippines continuing the guaranty of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
• Jones Law, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 — Cited as an organic act for the Philippines continuing the guaranty of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
• First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States — Referenced as the counterpart to the free speech and press provisions in the Philippine Organic Acts.
• Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 42 — Mentioned in the context that a case may be reopened on account of errors of law committed at trial, supporting the Court's decision to consider the administrative proceedings.
• Administrative Code of 1917, Sections 203 and 229 — Cited to show that justices of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General and may be removed by him upon recommendation of a JFI or on his own motion, and that the Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matters, making the Executive Secretary a proper recipient of the complaint.

• CARSON, J. — Concurred with the result. However, he opined that the Attorney-General was correct in stating that this case was substantially identical with the former United States vs. Bustos (13 Phil. Rep., 690). Justice Carson believed the doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case had long since been abandoned by the Court and suggested it would be better for the administration of the Libel Law to explicitly state this, citing U.S. vs. Sedano, U.S. vs. Contreras, U.S. vs. Montalvo, and U.S. vs. Galeza as indicative of this abandonment.