The COMELEC's inordinate and unjustified delay of approximately six years in conducting and resolving the preliminary investigation for an election offense violates the accused's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases, warranting the dismissal of the complaint.

The case arose from petitioner Joseph Roble Peñas's candidacy for Mayor of Digos City in the 2010 National and Local Elections. After the election, he filed his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE), declaring P600,000.00 in expenses. The COMELEC Campaign Finance Unit later informed him that, based on the number of registered voters and the P3.00 per voter limit for candidates belonging to a political party, his allowed expenditure was only P281,403.00, indicating he had overspent. This led to a formal complaint for election overspending.

• Petitioner Joseph Roble Peñas ran for Mayor of Digos City in the 2010 National and Local Elections under the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC). Digos City had 93,801 registered voters.
• On June 7, 2010, Peñas filed his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE), declaring total campaign expenditures of P600,000.00.
• On October 1, 2014, the COMELEC Campaign Finance Unit informed Peñas that under Section 13 of RA 7166, he was allowed to spend only P3.00 per registered voter, totaling P281,403.00, and thus he had exceeded the limit.
• On October 29, 2014, Peñas submitted an Affidavit of Correction/Explanation, claiming that P112,924.10 for printing sample ballots and P245,000.00 for lawyer's fees should be excluded as party expenses or lawful expenditures not counted against his personal limit, bringing his actual expenses to P241,574.01.
• On November 6, 2014, the COMELEC Campaign Finance Unit filed a formal complaint against Peñas for election overspending.
• On February 9, 2015, Peñas submitted his Counter-Affidavit, reiterating that the disputed expenses were NPC political party expenses and excluded under Section 102(i) and (k) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
• On November 5, 2018, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 18-0665 finding probable cause against Peñas, deeming his correction a mere afterthought.
• Peñas filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 13, 2018, which was denied by the COMELEC En Banc in Resolution No. 20-0121-33 dated December 9, 2020.

• The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for overspending, despite his submission of an Affidavit of Correction/Explanation.
• The notarized SOCE was not duly executed as it was not supported by receipts and vouchers as stated, and thus should not bind him, especially since he admitted its defectiveness.
• The COMELEC incurred inordinate delay in conducting the preliminary investigation, violating his right to a speedy disposition of his case, as it took approximately three years and nine months from submission of his counter-affidavit to find probable cause, and another two years to resolve his motion for reconsideration.

• The petition for certiorari was filed out of time, as petitioner failed to deduct the period used for filing his motion for reconsideration from the 30-day period under Rule 64.
• Petitioner had other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies, such as submitting to the trial court's jurisdiction and proceeding to trial.
• There was no inordinate delay, considering the COMELEC's workload with intervening elections in 2016 and 2019; moreover, petitioner failed to make a timely assertion of his right to speedy disposition and was deemed to have acquiesced to the delay.
• The finding of probable cause was well-supported by petitioner's own SOCE, a notarized document.
• The Affidavit of Correction/Explanation was self-serving and an afterthought, and its legal effect should be threshed out during trial.

• Whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed.
• Whether certiorari is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for the petitioner.
• Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against petitioner for election overspending, particularly by reason of inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation.

• The Supreme Court granted the petition, nullified COMELEC Resolution No. 18-0665 and Resolution No. 20-0121-33, and dismissed the formal complaint against petitioner for election overspending.
• While the petition was indeed filed late under Rule 64, the Court relaxed the procedural rules due to the meritorious grounds of the petition, specifically the grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC, to prevent a grave injustice.
• Certiorari was deemed an appropriate remedy because a full-blown trial would not be a speedy and adequate remedy to relieve petitioner from the detrimental effect of a wrongful charge filed despite inordinate delay.
• The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion due to inordinate delay. The preliminary investigation took approximately six years from the filing of the formal complaint to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, far exceeding the period prescribed by the COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure (20 days to terminate investigation, 5 days to issue resolution).
• The COMELEC failed to justify the delay; citing general elections in 2016 and 2019 was insufficient, especially since the simplicity of the issue (mathematical computation of overspending) and the fact that petitioner was an incumbent elected official should have prompted dispatch.
• The delay grossly prejudiced petitioner by causing mental anguish, affecting his reputation, and potentially impairing his defense.
• Petitioner did not waive his right to speedy disposition by not "following up" his case, as respondents in preliminary investigations do not have a duty to do so, and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibit motions to dismiss, leaving no legitimate avenue to assert this right earlier at that stage. Asserting the right before arraignment is timely.

• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases (Article III, Section 16, 1987 Constitution) — This constitutional right guarantees that all persons shall have their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies resolved expeditiously. The Court found this right was violated by the COMELEC's inordinate and unexplained delay of over six years in resolving the election overspending complaint against the petitioner.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — This refers to a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power due to passion or hostility. The Court held that the COMELEC's inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation, without sufficient justification, constituted grave abuse of discretion.
• Inordinate Delay (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan guidelines) — This doctrine outlines the framework for determining if the right to speedy disposition has been violated, considering the length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice to the accused. The Court applied these guidelines and found inordinate delay, shifting the burden to the COMELEC to justify it, which it failed to do.
• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules — This principle allows courts to relax strict adherence to procedural rules when it would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice. The Court applied this to the late filing of the certiorari petition, citing the need to address the grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC.
• Certiorari as a Remedy (Rule 65, Rules of Court) — This extraordinary writ is available when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court found certiorari appropriate despite other potential remedies, as a trial would not provide expeditious relief from a wrongful charge tainted by inordinate delay.
• Duty of Prosecutor/Investigating Body to Expedite Cases — The responsibility to expedite preliminary investigations and prosecutions lies with the investigating body (in this case, COMELEC), not the respondent. The Court reiterated that a respondent is not duty-bound to follow up on their case.

• "Here, the Court finds that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it recommended the filing of an Information against petitioner despite the inordinate and oppressive delay which attended the conduct of preliminary investigation."
• "Indubitably, therefore, inordinate delay attended the COMELEC's conduct of the preliminary investigation of petitioner's case."
• "Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it." (Quoting Coscalluela v. Sandiganbayan and applied to COMELEC)
• "[I]t is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him." (Quoting Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan)

• Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (837 Phil. 815 (2018)) — Referenced for the guidelines in resolving issues concerning inordinate delay and the right to speedy disposition of cases. The Court applied these guidelines extensively to determine that inordinate delay occurred and COMELEC failed to justify it.
• Pates v. COMELEC (609 Phil. 260 (2009)) — Cited to establish that the "fresh-period rule" is inapplicable to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64, and the intervening period for a motion for reconsideration is deducted from the 30-day period.
• Magante v. Sandiganbayan (836 Phil. 1108 (2018)) — Cited for explaining that the right to speedy disposition of cases is broader than speedy trial and applies to all judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative tribunals, confirming immunity from arbitrary delay.
• Javier v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 237997, June 10, 2020) — Cited as apropos to the petitioner's situation, particularly that respondents in preliminary investigations do not have a duty to follow up on their case, and that inaction does not amount to acquiescence to delay. Also cited for the timeliness of asserting the right to speedy disposition before arraignment.
• Coscalluela v. Sandiganbayan (as cited in Javier) — Referenced for the principle that respondents in preliminary investigation proceedings do not have a duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case, and this remains good law.
• Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan (366 Phil. 602 (1999)) — Cited for the prosecutor's duty to speedily resolve complaints regardless of petitioner's objection or acquiescence to delay, unless the delay is attributable to the petitioner.
• Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 236177-210, February 3, 2021) — Cited for the principle that absent extraordinary complications, delay in resolving a preliminary investigation with simple issues is not justified.

• 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 16 — Guarantees the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This was the primary constitutional basis for dismissing the complaint due to inordinate delay.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX, Section 2, Paragraph 6 — Empowers the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute cases for violation of election laws. This section establishes COMELEC's authority in the underlying matter.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 3 — Authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases. This highlights COMELEC's duty to act promptly.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-A, Section 6 — Allows each Constitutional Commission en banc to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice. This is another basis for COMELEC's rule-making power.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), Section 100 — Relates to limitations upon expenses of candidates. This was the substantive provision petitioner was accused of violating.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), Section 102(i) and (k) — Pertains to lawful expenditures, specifically for employment of counsel and printing of sample ballots, which petitioner argued should be excluded from his personal campaign expenses.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), Section 262 — Defines other election offenses, which includes violation of Section 100.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), Section 265 (as amended by RA 9369) — Grants the COMELEC power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses.
• Republic Act No. 7166, Section 13 — Specifies the authorized expenses of candidates and political parties (P3.00 per voter for candidates with a political party). This was the basis for calculating petitioner's spending limit.
• COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 34, Section 8 — Mandates that preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days from receipt of counter-affidavits, and resolution thereof made within five (5) days thereafter. COMELEC's failure to adhere to this was central to the finding of inordinate delay.
• COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 13, Section 1(a) — Prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in COMELEC proceedings. This was relevant to the argument that petitioner had no legitimate avenue to assert his right to speedy disposition earlier.
• Rules of Court, Rule 64, Section 3 — Governs the period for filing petitions for certiorari from COMELEC decisions (30 days), and the deduction of time taken for a motion for reconsideration. This was relevant to the timeliness of the petition.