The posting of documents detailing a criminal complaint against a private individual on a public bulletin board, motivated by ill will and without justifiable motive, constitutes libel because malice is presumed from the defamatory imputation, and such act does not fall under privileged communication when done by third parties not involved in the original proceedings.

The case arose after an election of officers for the Pasay-Alabang-FTI South Expressway Jeepney Operators and Drivers Association (PAFSEJODA) on March 23, 2002. The petitioners, Orillo and Danieles, were losing candidates, while the complainant, Romeo Cabatian, a retired member of the Philippine National Police, won as Vice President. Approximately a month after the election, documents pertaining to a carnapping complaint filed by Jean Jardeleza against Cabatian were posted on the PAFSEJODA terminal's bulletin board.

• On April 26, 2002, at the PAFSEJODA jeepney terminal in Taguig, Metro Manila, documents were posted on the association's bulletin board.
• These documents pertained to a criminal complaint for carnapping filed by Jean Jardeleza against Romeo Cabatian before the Office of the Pasig City Prosecutor.
• Prosecution witnesses Ronald Regala and Faustino Villaflor testified they saw petitioners Orillo and Danieles, along with Lito Nepacina, Estelito Francisco, and Arnel Bertulfo, posting the documents.
• Cabatian, upon being informed, went to the terminal with a photographer, took pictures of the posted documents, and then removed them.
• Orillo claimed he was in Bicol on April 26-27, 2002, for a town fiesta and his niece's baptism, presenting a Certificate of Baptism and photos.
• Danieles alleged he was merely a spectator and was implicated for refusing Cabatian's request to testify against his co-accused.
• The documents posted included a report by Police Senior Inspector Jimmy Gonzales Mandario referring the carnapping case against Cabatian and Jardeleza's complaint, which narrated Cabatian forcibly taking her vehicle over an unpaid loan.
• The PAFSEJODA election, where petitioners lost and Cabatian won as Vice President, was held on March 23, 2002, about a month before the posting incident.

• Orillo argued it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene on April 26, 2002, as he was allegedly en route to or in Bicol.
• Danieles contended he was merely a spectator and was included in the charge for refusing to testify against his co-accused.
• Petitioners claimed the Court of Appeals erred in admitting photographs of the posted documents because the photographer was not presented to testify.
• They argued that the prosecution failed to prove ill motive, asserting that posting the documents a month after the election would not serve any purpose of informing members about candidate qualifications.
• They insisted that they had no access to the documents kept in the PAFSEJODA office after the election as they were barred from the terminal.
• They questioned whether Cabatian's testimony clearly established that the documents were actually posted or that prosecution witnesses saw them posting.

• The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the conviction for libel.
• The posted documents were defamatory as they ascribed the crime of carnapping to Cabatian, which is incriminatory on its face.
• While the original statements in the documents might be privileged (being part of judicial proceedings), this privilege does not extend to petitioners who lacked justifiable motive for republication.
• The presumption of malice stands because the petitioners were not the original authors and their act of posting was not privileged.
• The timing of the posting (after Cabatian won the election against them) indicated ill will and an intent to harm Cabatan's reputation.
• Petitioners' defenses of denial and alibi are weak and insufficient to overturn the positive identification by prosecution witnesses and the presumption of malice.
• The issues raised by petitioners regarding alibi and motive are questions of fact, not appropriate for a Rule 45 petition.

• Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the petitioners' conviction for libel by finding that all elements of libel, particularly publication and malice, were present.
• Whether the petitioners' defenses of alibi and denial, and their challenge to the admissibility of photographic evidence, are meritorious.
• Whether the act of posting the documents falls under privileged communication.
• Whether the complainant, Romeo Cabatian, should be considered a private individual or a public officer for the purpose of determining the standard for malice in a libel case.

• The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision with modification as to the penalty.
• The Court upheld the factual findings of the lower courts regarding petitioners' participation in posting the libelous articles, as Rule 45 petitions are limited to questions of law and petitioners failed to show any exception.
• All elements of libel were found to be present: (a) the imputation of carnapping was discreditable; (b) publication occurred when the documents were posted on a public bulletin board accessible to third persons; (c) the victim, Romeo Cabatian, was clearly identified; and (d) malice was presumed.
• Complainant Cabatian was deemed a private individual. Therefore, the "actual malice" test (requiring proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth), applicable to public officials/figures, does not apply. Instead, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code from the defamatory imputation, as petitioners failed to show good intention and justifiable motive.
• The posting did not constitute privileged communication. The documents, while originating from judicial proceedings, lost their privileged character when republished by petitioners, who were not parties to said proceedings and acted with malice. The posting was not done to inform voters, as the election was already over, nor was it a fair and true report made in good faith.
• The photographs were properly admitted as they were identified by competent witnesses (Cabatian and Regala) who could testify to their accuracy, even if the photographer was not presented.
• The Court found the petitioners' actions were impelled by ill feeling from their election loss, evidenced by posting only Jardeleza's side of the story.
• The penalty was modified from imprisonment to a fine of P6,000.00, in line with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, which expresses a preference for imposing only a fine in libel cases, considering the circumstances like the petitioners being first-time offenders and the limited range of publication.

• Libel (Article 353, Revised Penal Code) — A public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Applied here as petitioners were found to have made such an imputation against Cabatian by posting the carnapping complaint.
• Elements of Libel — (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. The Court found all these elements present in the petitioners' act of posting the documents.
• Presumption of Malice in Defamation (Article 354, Revised Penal Code) — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in cases of privileged communication. Applied because Cabatian is a private individual, and the imputation was defamatory, and petitioners failed to show good intention or justifiable motive, nor did the act fall under privileged communication.
• Actual Malice Test (New York Times v. Sullivan doctrine) — Public officials and public figures cannot recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to their official conduct unless they prove that the statement was made with "actual malice" – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The Court clarified this test does not apply here as Cabatian is a private individual.
• Privileged Communication (Article 354, Revised Penal Code) — Communications that are not actionable as libel even if defamatory. Absolutely privileged communications are not actionable even if the author acted in bad faith (e.g., statements in judicial proceedings by parties/counsel). Qualifiedly privileged communications are actionable if malice is proven (e.g., private communication in performance of a duty, fair and true report of official proceedings). The Court ruled the petitioners' act of posting was not privileged because they were not parties to the judicial proceeding from which the documents originated, and they acted with malice, not in good faith or in performance of a duty.
• Admissibility of Photographs — Photographs, when presented in evidence, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy as a faithful representation of the object portrayed. Applied to affirm the admission of the photographs of the posted documents even without the photographer's testimony, as Cabatian and Regala identified them.
• Rule 45 Petition (Questions of Law) — A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to questions of law, and factual findings of the appellate court are binding. The Court applied this by declining to re-evaluate the factual findings on petitioners' alibi and participation, as no compelling reason or valid exception was shown.
• Preference for Fine in Libel Cases (SC Administrative Circular No. 08-2008) — Recognizes an emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in libel cases, based on decided cases and judicial discretion. Applied by the Court in modifying the penalty imposed on petitioners from imprisonment to a fine.

• "Whether the complainant is a private person or a public officer is a matter ought to be considered in deciding libel cases."
• "A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."
• "Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions."
• "The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy."

• Tulfo v. People — Referenced for explaining the distinction in libel laws concerning comments on public affairs and the conduct of public officials, and the application of the "actual malice" test for public officers/figures.
• New York Times v. Sullivan — Cited as the origin of the "actual malice" test for libel cases involving public officials in the United States, a test adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
• Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Hon. Capulong — Mentioned for extending the "actual malice" requirement to "public figures" in libel cases.
• Sison v. People — Cited for the rule on the admissibility and identification of photographs in evidence, stating that witnesses other than the photographer can identify them if competent.
• People v. Sesbreno — Referenced for explaining the public policy rationale behind the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication for utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings.
• Pascual v. Burgos — Cited for the general rule that Rule 45 petitions should only raise questions of law and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally binding.
• Brillante v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the definition of elements of libel and privileged communication.
• Lagaya y Tamondong v. People — Cited in relation to the requisites for qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354(1) RPC.
• Buatis Jr. v. People — Cited for the principle that courts have discretion to impose either fine or imprisonment or both in libel cases, and referenced in the context of SC Admin. Circular No. 08-2008.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 353 (Definition of Libel) — Central to the case, defining the crime for which petitioners were convicted.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 354 (Requirement for Publicity/Presumption of Malice and Privileged Communication) — Crucial for determining the presence of malice and whether the posted documents constituted privileged communication. Its exceptions were found not applicable.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 355 (Libel by Means of Writing or Similar Means) — Specifies the penalty for libel, which includes imprisonment or a fine, or both, providing the basis for the Court's modification of the penalty to a fine.
• Rules of Court, Rule 45 (Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court) — Governs the nature of the petition filed by petitioners, emphasizing that it should generally be confined to questions of law.
• Rules of Court, Rule 132, sec. 20 (Proof of private document) — Invoked by petitioners regarding the authentication of photographs, though the Court found other means of authentication sufficient.
• Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 (Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases) — Applied by the Court to justify the modification of the penalty from imprisonment to a fine.