A State cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"—that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.

The case arose during the height of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, specifically in Montgomery, Alabama, a focal point of civil rights activism and resistance. The advertisement in question, "Heed Their Rising Voices," sought support for the civil rights movement and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and criticized the actions of Southern officials, including those in Montgomery, in suppressing civil rights activities.

• Respondent L.B. Sullivan, one of three elected City Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, supervised the Police Department, Fire Department, Department of Cemetery, and Department of Scales.
• Sullivan filed a civil libel action against the New York Times Company (a New York corporation publishing The New York Times) and four individual Black clergymen from Alabama.
• The action was based on a full-page advertisement titled "Heed Their Rising Voices" published in The New York Times on March 29, 1960, by the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South."
• The advertisement described alleged actions against civil rights demonstrators and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., including statements about police conduct on the Alabama State College campus and Dr. King's arrests.
• Sullivan claimed that although he was not named, the statements referring to "police" and actions attributed to "Southern violators" libeled him in his capacity as Commissioner supervising the police.
• Several statements in the advertisement were factually inaccurate: students sang the National Anthem, not "My Country, 'Tis of Thee"; nine students were expelled for demanding service at a lunch counter, not for leading a demonstration at the Capitol; the campus dining hall was not padlocked; police were deployed near campus but did not "ring" it in connection with the Capitol demonstration; Dr. King had been arrested four times, not seven.
• Sullivan made no effort to prove actual pecuniary loss.
• The Times' Advertising Acceptability Department approved the ad, relying on a letter from A. Philip Randolph (known as a responsible person) certifying that the names listed had given permission, and on the endorsement of many well-known people. No independent check of the ad's accuracy against Times news files was made.
• Sullivan demanded a retraction from all petitioners as required by Alabama law for punitive damages. The individual petitioners did not respond, claiming no authorization for the use of their names. The Times wrote a letter expressing puzzlement about how the ad referred to Sullivan but did not publish a retraction for him, though it did for Governor Patterson regarding different aspects of the ad.
• The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements were "libelous per se," that malice was presumed for compensatory damages, and that falsity and malice were presumed. For punitive damages, actual malice was required under Alabama law, but the judge refused to instruct that actual intent to harm or gross negligence and recklessness had to be found.
• The jury returned a general verdict for Sullivan for $500,000.

• The rule of law applied by the Alabama courts, which presumed malice and falsity and did not require proof of actual damages for "libel per se," unconstitutionally abridged their First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms of speech and press when applied to criticism of a public official's conduct.
• The evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a judgment for Sullivan, particularly regarding proof that the statements were made "of and concerning" him and with actual malice.
• The allegedly libelous statements, published as part of a paid advertisement, did not lose their constitutional protection because they communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, and sought financial support for a movement of high public interest.
• The Fourteenth Amendment applies to state court actions enforcing state common law rules, thus constituting "state action."
• The individual petitioners argued there was no evidence they had published or authorized the publication of the alleged libel.
• The Times argued that the Alabama courts' assumption of jurisdiction over its corporate person overreached territorial due process limits (though this was foreclosed by a general appearance).

• The statements in the advertisement were libelous per se under Alabama law, as they tended to injure his reputation and bring him into public contempt in his capacity as Commissioner.
• The statements, particularly those concerning police actions, referred to him because he was the Commissioner in charge of the Police Department.
• Under Alabama law, once libel per se was established, falsity, malice, and general damages were presumed, and proof of actual pecuniary injury was not required.
• The First Amendment does not protect libelous publications.
• The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not private action, and thus did not apply to a civil lawsuit between private parties (a contention the Supreme Court rejected).
• The evidence supported the jury's finding that the statements were made "of and concerning" him and that the Times acted with malice, inferable from its irresponsibility in printing the ad and its failure to retract for him while retracting for the Governor.

• To what extent do the constitutional protections for speech and press under the First and Fourteenth Amendments limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct?
• Can a public official recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct without proving that the statement was made with "actual malice" (knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its truth or falsity)?
• Was the evidence presented constitutionally sufficient to support the judgment for the respondent, specifically concerning whether the statements were made "of and concerning" him and with "actual malice"?

• The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama.
• The Court held that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts was constitutionally deficient for failing to provide safeguards for freedom of speech and press required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in libel actions by public officials against critics of their official conduct.
• A public official is prohibited from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.
• The evidence presented in this case was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for Sullivan because it failed to support a finding that the statements were made with actual malice or that they related to him in a way that met constitutional standards.
• The presumption of malice under Alabama law for general damages is inconsistent with federal constitutional requirements. The state rule requiring a defendant to prove truth also unconstitutionally deters criticism of official conduct.
• The evidence against the Times (failure to check files, reliance on Randolph's letter, failure to retract for Sullivan) at most supported a finding of negligence, not the reckless disregard required for actual malice.
• The evidence was also constitutionally defective in supporting the jury's finding that the statements were made "of and concerning" Sullivan, as an impersonal criticism of government operations cannot be transmuted into a personal libel of an official merely by virtue of the official's position.

• Actual Malice — Defined in this context as a statement made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The Court established this as the standard a public official must prove to recover damages for defamatory falsehoods related to official conduct. Its application here required Sullivan to show the petitioners knew the ad was false or published it with reckless disregard for the truth, which he failed to do.
• First Amendment (Freedom of Speech and Press) — Guarantees the right to freedom of speech and of the press. The Court held that this protection extends to robust, uninhibited, and wide-open debate on public issues, which may include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials, and that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and must be protected to ensure "breathing space" for these freedoms.
• Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) — Prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The Court affirmed that the freedoms of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment are made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• State Action — The principle that constitutional limitations, particularly those in the Fourteenth Amendment, apply to actions taken by the state, not purely private conduct. The Court held that the application of a state rule of law by state courts in a civil lawsuit between private parties constitutes "state action" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
• Libel Per Se (Alabama Law) — A statement that is defamatory on its face, where injury to reputation, falsity, and malice are presumed, and general damages can be awarded without proof of actual pecuniary loss. The Court found Alabama's application of this doctrine in the context of public official plaintiffs to be constitutionally deficient as it did not require proof of actual malice and placed the burden of proving truth on the defendant.
• Sedition Act of 1798 (Historical Context) — A federal statute that criminalized false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the government or its officials. The Court discussed the historical condemnation of this Act as unconstitutional to underscore the central meaning of the First Amendment as protecting criticism of government and public officials.
• Fair Comment — A common law defense in libel actions allowing for the expression of opinion on matters of public interest, traditionally requiring the underlying facts to be true. The Court noted that the constitutional protection for honest misstatements of fact extends the protection for fair comment.

• "Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
• "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
• "Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials—and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker."
• "That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive'..."
• "The present proposition would sidestep this obstacle [prosecutions for libel on government] by transmuting criticism of government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism, and hence potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed. There is no legal alchemy by which a State may thus create the cause of action that would otherwise be denied..."

• Schenectady Union Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 — Cited as the only previous case presenting the question of constitutional limits on libel damages for a public official, where the Court was equally divided and the question was not decided.
• Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 — Referenced for its statement that the Constitution does not protect libelous publications, but distinguished because it involved a criminal libel statute applied to defamation of a racial group, and the Court there noted that "public men, are, as it were, public property."
• Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 — Distinguished. The Court rejected the argument that the advertisement lost constitutional protection because it was "commercial," noting the ad here communicated information and opinion on matters of public concern, unlike the purely commercial advertising in Chrestensen.
• Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 — Cited for the principle that the fact that newspapers and books are sold does not diminish their First Amendment protection, and by analogy, that requiring proof of guilty knowledge (or actual malice here) is essential to prevent self-censorship.
• Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) — Cited extensively as a leading state court case adopting a rule similar to the "actual malice" standard, requiring a plaintiff (a candidate for public office) to prove actual malice for recovery in libel.
• Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 — Cited for the analogous protection (absolute privilege) accorded to federal officials for statements made within the outer perimeter of their duties, highlighting the need for a corresponding privilege for citizen-critics of government.
• Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 — Referenced for the principle that a rule compelling a critic of official conduct to guarantee truth leads to self-censorship and that the burden of proving an unprotected utterance (like one made with actual malice) must be on the party claiming it is unprotected.
• Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 — Cited for the fundamental principle that the opportunity for free political discussion is essential to the security of the Republic.
• Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 — Cited for the principle that it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind on all public institutions, and that criticism of judges does not justify punishment as contempt unless there's a clear and present danger to justice.
• Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 — Cited for the Court's duty to make an independent examination of the record in free speech cases and for the idea that even "half-truths" and "misinformation" in criticism of judicial conduct are protected.
• City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 139 N.E. 86 (1923) — Cited for the proposition that "no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of jurisprudence," to argue against allowing libel of an official to function as libel on government.

• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Its guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press are central to the ruling, establishing the right to criticize public officials and government.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Applied the First Amendment's protections to the States, making the "actual malice" standard a federal constitutional requirement for state libel laws involving public officials. Specifically, the Due Process Clause.
• Alabama Code, Tit. 7, § 914 — Alabama statute denying a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel action unless a written demand for public retraction is made and the defendant fails or refuses to comply. Sullivan complied with this demand.
• Alabama Code, Tit. 14, § 350 — Alabama's criminal libel law, cited to illustrate that the civil libel judgment far exceeded potential criminal penalties and lacked criminal law safeguards, thus having a more inhibiting effect on speech.
• Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596 — Discussed extensively as historical background demonstrating the early American commitment against punishing criticism of government, despite the Act allowing truth as a defense. Its historical repudiation supported the Court's ruling.

• Justice Black (joined by Justice Douglas) — Concurred in reversing the judgment but argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments provide an absolute, unconditional constitutional right for the press and individuals to criticize official conduct, completely prohibiting a State from awarding damages to public officials for such criticism, regardless of "malice." He believed the "actual malice" standard is an elusive concept offering insufficient protection.
• Justice Goldberg (joined by Justice Douglas) — Concurred in the result, asserting that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford an absolute, unconditional privilege for citizens and the press to criticize official conduct, despite potential harm from excesses and abuses. He argued that the right to speak one's mind about public officials should not depend on a jury's probe of motivation, and that libel on the official conduct of governors can have no more place in the Constitution than libel on government itself.