A state statute that permits public authorities to enjoin the future publication of a newspaper or periodical found to be "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" constitutes a prior restraint on publication in violation of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional, particularly when applied to charges of official misconduct.

The case arose under a 1925 Minnesota law, Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota, which declared that any person engaged in the business of regularly publishing a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical" was guilty of a nuisance. The statute authorized actions in the name of the State to perpetually enjoin such publications. This law, often referred to as a "gag law," was enacted amidst concerns about yellow journalism and scurrilous publications but raised significant First Amendment issues.

• The County Attorney of Hennepin County, Minnesota, brought an action under a state statute (Chapter 285, Laws of 1925) to enjoin the publication of "The Saturday Press," alleging it was a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper."
• The complaint cited nine issues of "The Saturday Press" published between September 24, 1927, and November 19, 1927, which allegedly contained malicious, scandalous, and defamatory articles concerning various public officials and entities, including the Mayor of Minneapolis, the Chief of Police, the County Attorney himself, a special law enforcement officer, members of a Grand Jury, and the "Jewish Race."
• The articles charged, in substance, that a Jewish gangster controlled gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcement officials were neglecting their duties, engaging in illicit relations with gangsters, and participating in graft.
• The statute provided that if a publication was found to be a nuisance, its publishers could be perpetually enjoined from producing, editing, publishing, circulating, or distributing any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, and from further conducting such nuisance under the same or any other name.
• The state trial court, finding the allegations true and that "The Saturday Press" was "chiefly devoted to malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles," issued a permanent injunction abating the newspaper and perpetually enjoining the defendants from publishing any malicious, scandalous, or defamatory newspaper.
• The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the statute and the injunction.

• The Minnesota statute authorizing the suppression of newspapers as public nuisances violated the liberty of the press and of speech as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
• The statute constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication, effectively establishing a system of censorship.
• Even if the publications were defamatory, the remedy should be through libel laws (post-publication punishment) rather than pre-publication suppression.
• The statute was unconstitutional regardless of whether the injunction issued was broader than warranted by the statute itself; the core issue was the statute's validity.

• The liberty of speech and press protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is not absolute and does not include an unrestricted right to publish everything.
• The Minnesota statute was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power, aimed at abating the business of regularly publishing malicious, scandalous, and defamatory matter, which constitutes a public nuisance.
• The statute did not abridge the freedom of the press but rather targeted the abuse of that freedom by prohibiting an unlawful business.
• The statute was not directed at incidental defamatory publications but at the business of regularly producing such material.
• The evil the Act sought to suppress was a nuisance in fact, and the state had the power to prohibit such a business.
• The defense that the published matter was true and published with good motives and for justifiable ends was available under the statute, making it reasonable.

• Does the Minnesota statute, authorizing proceedings to enjoin the publication of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical" as a public nuisance, violate the liberty of the press as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?

• Yes, the Minnesota statute, as applied to publications charging neglect of duty and corruption on the part of law-enforcing officers, is an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment because it constitutes a prior restraint on publication.
• The Court reasoned that the chief purpose of the constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press is to prevent previous restraints upon publication. While the liberty is not absolute (e.g., wartime, obscenity, incitement to violence are exceptions), the statute's effect was to subject publishers to censorship by requiring them to satisfy a judge that future publications would not be objectionable.
• The Court emphasized that for charges against public officials, the remedy lies in libel laws, not in suppressing the publication itself. Characterizing the publication business as a nuisance does not avoid the constitutional protection against prior restraint.
• The fact that the statute allowed a defense of truth published with good motives and for justifiable ends did not save it, as the essence of the liberty of the press is freedom from such pre-publication scrutiny and potential suppression.
• The statute was deemed the essence of censorship, inconsistent with the historical understanding and purpose of the freedom of the press, especially concerning criticism of public officials.

• Liberty of the Press (Fourteenth Amendment) — The freedom of speech and of the press, which are fundamental personal rights and liberties, are protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. The Court affirmed that this liberty is not an absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse, but the statute in question went beyond permissible limits.
• Prior Restraint — A governmental restriction on speech or publication before it actually takes place. The Court held that the Minnesota statute imposed a prior restraint by allowing for an injunction to prevent future publications. It reiterated that the chief purpose of the liberty of the press is to prevent such previous restraints, which are presumed unconstitutional with only limited exceptions. The statute was found to be the "essence of censorship."
• Police Power — The inherent authority of a government to enact laws and regulations to protect, preserve and promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people. While acknowledging the State's police power, the Court found that it could not justify the broad prior restraint imposed by the Minnesota statute on publications concerning official misconduct.
• Public Nuisance — An act or omission that obstructs, damages, or inconveniences the rights of the community. The Minnesota statute characterized the business of regularly publishing malicious, scandalous, and defamatory material as a public nuisance. The Court ruled that labeling such a publication business a "nuisance" does not circumvent the constitutional protection against prior restraint, especially when it involves criticism of public officials.
• Subsequent Punishment for Libel — The imposition of penalties (civil or criminal) after a defamatory statement has been published. The Court distinguished permissible subsequent punishment for libel from impermissible prior restraint, indicating that public officials' remedy for false accusations lies in libel laws, not in suppressing newspapers.

• "If we cut through mere details of procedure, the operation and effect of the statute in substance is that public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter—in particular that the matter consists of charges against public officers of official dereliction—and unless the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or periodical is suppressed and further publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is of the essence of censorship."
• "The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege."
• "Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official malfeasance, unquestionably create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guaranty is that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to prevent publication."

• Gitlow v. New York (268 U.S. 652) — Cited to affirm that the liberty of speech and of the press are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
• Patterson v. Colorado (205 U.S. 454) — Referenced for the principle that the main purpose of constitutional provisions for freedom of the press is to prevent previous restraints upon publications, not to prevent subsequent punishment for publications deemed contrary to public welfare. Also cited for the point that preliminary freedom does not depend on proof of truth.
• Schenck v. United States (249 U.S. 47) — Cited as an example of a recognized limitation on free speech, particularly in wartime, where utterances hindering national efforts are not protected. This was used to illustrate that freedom from prior restraint is not absolute but that the Minnesota statute did not fall within such exceptional circumstances.
• Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. (221 U.S. 418) — Referenced in the context of permissible injunctions against speech that has the effect of force (e.g., in labor disputes), illustrating a narrow exception to the general prohibition on prior restraints not applicable in Near's case.
• Commonwealth v. Blanding (3 Pick. 304) — Quoted (Chief Justice Parker) for the historical understanding in Massachusetts that liberty of the press was intended to prevent previous restraints, especially those stifling criticism of rulers, while holding users responsible for abuse.

• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Specifically, the due process clause, which the Court held incorporates the liberty of the press and protects it from state infringement. This was the primary constitutional provision upon which the decision rested.
• Chapter 285, Session Laws of Minnesota for the year 1925 (Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1927, 10123-1 to 10123-3) — This is the Minnesota statute that was declared unconstitutional. It allowed for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of any "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical" and authorized injunctions against such publications.

• Mr. Justice Butler — Justice Butler, joined by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland, dissented, arguing that the Minnesota statute was a constitutional exercise of the state's police power to abate a public nuisance. He contended that the liberty of the press does not include the right to habitually publish malicious, scandalous, and defamatory matter. Butler viewed the statute not as a prior restraint in the historical sense of censorship by a licenser, but as a remedy enforced by judicial procedure against an ongoing business found to be a nuisance after publication. He emphasized that the defendants were engaged in the business of defamation and that the state had a right to protect its citizens from such harmful conduct. He also argued that the decision unduly restricted the power of states to deal with local evils and that the Court was giving "freedom of the press a meaning and a scope not heretofore recognized."